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ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΠΑΡΜΕΝΙΔΗΣ.

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DUBLIN UNIVERSITY PRESS SERIES.

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΠΑΡΜΕΝΙΔΗΣ.

THE
PARMENIDES OF PLATO,

WITH
INTRODUCTION, ANALYSIS, AND NOTES,

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THE following edition is intended chiefly for the Metaphysician. That reading, accordingly, has always been preferred which makes the argument more plain.

I am indebted to PROFESSOR DAVIES, of the Queen's College, Galway, for his careful revision of the proofs.

TRINITY COLLEGE,

January, 1882.

INTRODUCTION.

EXISTENCE is an aspect of thought. All existence is thought—thought either actual or possible. That is to say, every mode of existence, when grasped by cognition, would be found to be a mode of thought. Such is the position of the Idealist.

2. The Idealist thinks his case made out, because all such notions as Matter and Things in themselves, when examined, prove to be figments—figments made up of elements so incompatible, that to affirm the one is to deny the other. So Berkeley disposes of Matter, by the bare statement that what is inactive is not causal, and *vice versa*. The Idealist rejects a monster whose sole function is to fill a gap, where there is no gap.

3. The rejection of a zero, made up of incompatibilities which cancel one another, has nothing to do with the position of Plato and Hegel, that Existence, when analysed, yields opposite moments. This brings us to the question—What is Philosophy?

4. Philosophy makes explicit to thought what is implicitly contained in thought. Berkeley showed that Sensible Qualities are modes of consciousness. Kant showed that consciousness contained a Necessary and Universal element, meaning by *necessary* what is construed to thought as not possibly otherwise than it is; and by *universal* what is thought as exceptionless. These characteristics, Necessity and Universality, Hegel extended to the object, and so to the universe. Philosophy is thus the explicitness of universal thought.

5. The other day, G. H. Lewes, while showing that Physiology could not supersede Psychology, pointed out that while Force could be translated into Feeling, Feeling could not be expressed in Force. Thus the most advanced Empiricism is idealistic.

6. It may be said that Science will in time express Feeling in terms of Force—that it will translate Psychosis into Neurosis. Granted: it is nothing to the point: Neurosis is the antecedent, and so can never be the consequent. Psychosis—thought—will keep its coin of vantage.

7. According to the Idealist, thought is the only object of thought—thought is the sole instrument of thought; and the product of thought is thought.

8. The instrument of thought is thought only;

that is to say, we analyse a synthesis and reconstruct a synthesis out of our analysis. We do nothing more; yet this process condemns as impossible the prevalent opinion that Psychology is Philosophy.

9. In the *Timaëus*, the Demiurge mixes various ingredients in a bowl. Everyone sees that this is Allegory. But when a Psychologist talks of the interaction of Subject and Object—of the action of the Object on the Subject, he is unconsciously allegorical.

10. The older hypothesis was that of Impulse, *e.g.* Locke's. Yet impulse implies weight, and weight, or gravity, is the result of the whole universe, and, so, cannot account for it. A billiard player may assume that the weight is in the ball; but a thinker ought to see that weight, or any property of a part, must be the result of the whole, and, so, cannot be prior to it. So of Force: it is another word for Movement, and cannot, therefore, originate.

11. So of Chemical Action: chemical action is only possible, because it is the result of certain conditions, and, therefore, cannot cause them. It is easy to say, let Oxygen represent the Subject, Hydrogen the Object, and Water—the result—Consciousness. But the chemist can retranslate: and the weight of the new product is that of the

old elements. Dewar has shown that old elements will form that new substance which is attended by the greatest evolution of heat. On the other hand, in the mental product the old constituents survive, and so the analogy breaks down on every point.

12. So, Psychology starts with a Subject and an Object; and by bringing the two into combination, and by feigning some reciprocal action—either mechanical or chemical—generates the Universe of Consciousness. As before, Subject and Object are results of consciousness at a certain stage, and, therefore, cannot generate it.

13. Des Cartes assumes an Ego, isolated from the rest of the Universe. It is obvious that the Ego is in contrast to the non-Ego; to evolve the non-Ego from the Ego is to offer a proof of that which the proof pre-supposes, and without which the proof would be unmeaning.

14. Locke's Essay is of value as a reply to the Psychology of Des Cartes. As a piece of philosophy, it assumes that there is a Mind on one side, and a set of Things on the other. It is mere Psychology.

15. Natural Realism is not Philosophy. Natural Realism tells us "that along with the presentation of the Object there is always a simultaneous presentation of the Subject, the two being mutually

related to each other.”* True; but this postulates Subject and Object: that is, a Universe, and that Universe cut in two. It is mere Psychology.

16. Atomic theories cannot be Philosophy: they assume Space and Quantity; that is, from an aspect of the Universe they explain the whole.

17. Molecular theories cannot be Philosophy. To the assumptions of Atomism they add the assumption of Quality, and of Difference of Quality. Quality, like quantity and space, must be a result of the Universe. Clerk Maxwell considers that the family likeness of the molecules is an argument that they are not original.

18. Sir John Lubbock has calculated, on the authority of Loschmidt, Stoney, and Sir W. Thomson, that the molecules of gases are not more than the fifty-millionth part of an inch in diameter. It is obvious that any one of these molecules involves the whole problem of Natural Realism, and of the relation of Psychology to Philosophy. Sorby is of opinion that in a length of 1-80,000 of an inch there would probably be from 500 to 2000 molecules—500, for instance, in albumen, and 2000 in water. The nameless fraction of an inch presents us with space and its contents as surely as the field of the

* Monck's *Hamilton*, p. 83, n.

seventy-five millions of worlds, of one of which our earth is but a fraction.

19. Movement in the line of Least Resistance assumes Space, and a System of Pressures. Granting that Space and Motion are Metaphysical Ultima, Philosophy asks why Space and Motion are found in combination. How did the Atom acquire its tenure of Space, and why did Space tolerate the intrusion?

20. Evolution is not Philosophy. If a thing is evolved from within, the process is more than the mere accretion with which the doctrine starts. If the thing gathers material from without, like a rolling snowball, then the process belongs to Mechanics or to Chemistry.

21. "Life," as Virchow expresses it, "is the sum of the joint action of all parts, of the higher or vital ones as of the lower or inferior. There is no one seat of life, but every truly elementary part, especially every cell, is a seat of life." Granting that this statement gives us the results of Physiology, the philosopher must ask, "What brings 'the parts' into juxtaposition? Is it merely a case of juxtaposition, or how otherwise? What is *a part*? What is *higher*? What is *lower*? What is *joint action*?" Socrates would not have had much trouble with a man who described Life as the action of vital parts.

22. Huxley enunciates the hypothesis of Evolution thus:—"The successive species of animals and plants have arisen, the later by the gradual modification of the earlier." As before, if the modification be from within, the fact explodes the theory: if from without, modification is accretion.

23. Sir John Lubbock tells us that "an astonishing variety of most beautiful contrivances have been observed and described by many botanists, especially Hooker, Axel, Delpino, Hildebrand, Bennett, Fritz Müller, and above all Herman Müller and Darwin himself. The general result is, that to insects, and especially to bees, we owe the beauty of our gardens, the sweetness of our fields. To their beneficent, though unconscious action, flowers owe their scent and colour, their honey—nay, in many cases, their form. Their present shape and varied arrangements, their brilliant colours, their honey, and their sweet scent are all due to the selection exercised by insects. In these cases the relation between plants and insects is one of mutual advantage." A Platonist might put it thus: "Insects select flowers by selection." That is, the idea dominates the process, not *vice versa*. At all events, the process implies prior capacity, and therefore reserves for discussion What is Capacity, What is Relation. That is, Physical Science, as always, owes its existence to notions which its professors discard.

24. Professor Huxley, in referring to the nervous system as “that which co-ordinates and regulates Physiological units into an organic whole,” uses more metaphysical terms than Virchow. That is, both use terms borrowed from thought to explain that which, according to them, is the explanation of thought. Neurosis is explained by Psychosis, while Neurosis is the only scientific explanation of Psychosis.

25. Spontaneous generation throws no light on Philosophy. Waiving the decisive objection that it would describe a process which takes place in Time, what does the doctrine amount to, if established? That a mixture of turnip-juice and cheese is, under certain conditions, an antecedent to life. The doctrine is invested with importance by the ignorant, who persist in obtruding on Science the notion Cause, which Science affects to discard.

26. The Scientist, to set aside Metaphysics, reduces Causation to Sequence. If Causation be Sequence only, Thought is not caused by Neurosis. But, in order to degrade Thought, he invests Neurosis with causal power, so that the destruction of Neurosis involves the destruction of Thought. Thought is the Whole of which Causation and Sequence in time are parts—very small parts, indeed.

27. Professor Williamson, in his opening address, gives a sketch of the theories which guided Chemis-

try fifty years ago, and of the changes wrought in them by fifty years' work. Chemical explanation has got rid of predisposing affinities. "Our present explanation" (of a certain phenomenon) "is a simple statement of the fact that under the conditions described, zinc displaces hydrogen from its sulphate." The statement is anything but simple, as it amounts to this:—zinc—one set of relations—displaces hydrogen—a second set of relations—from its sulphate—a third set of relations. A Hegelian would not ask for a more idealistic position than Professor Williamson's simple statement of the fact.

28. Physical Science is not Philosophy, for it requires antecedence and consequence only as an explicit basis. As an *explicit* basis, for the analysis of antecedence and consequence may lead to a great deal more. In fact, it led to the Idealism of Kant.

29. That Science is apparently content with antecedence and consequence is seen in Professor Burdon-Sanderson's address: "Science can hardly be said to begin until we have by experiment acquired such a knowledge of the relation between events and their antecedents, between processes and their products, that in our own sphere we are able to forecast the operations of Nature, even when they lie beyond the reach of desired observation." That is, we predict consequents, because they are caused.

30. Clifford and Lewes hold that the Uniformity of Nature ought to be expressed as the Law of the Collocations of Changes. That is, they merely postulate Simultaneity, Succession, and Fixed Order. What more could an Idealist require?

31. Herbert Spencer's Heredity may account for Necessity as a fact. It does not explain what the Idealist contends for—not merely that a notion is what it is, but that it is explicitly thought as not possibly otherwise—the Necessity of Leibnitz, Kant, and Hegel.

32. Mr. Whittaker, in the interest of Empiricism, reconciles Empiricism with Idealism: "in the final statement of Empiricism, 'relations' are just as fundamental as 'feelings.' All that afterwards becomes thought is implicit not in mere feeling, but in the primitive relations between 'feelings.'"* Feelings are capable of primitive relations, simply because both presuppose one intelligible whole—the position of the Idealist.

33. Taking a portion of the Universe, in order to account for the Universe, is as idle as to suppose that a square on a chess-board is the cause of the board. There can be no fraction outside the whole, and the business of Philosophy must be analysis.

* *Mind*, No. 24, p. 507.

34. Taking analysis as the instrument of thought, Plato, in the *Parmenides*, analyses the Universe into τὸ ἓν and τὰλλα τοῦ ἐνός; the position of τὸ ἓν explaining everything, and its negation nullifying everything.

35. Positing τὸ ἓν, the Universe, as conceived by Plato, may be best described in the words of Hegel: * “Free and infinite Form, as a Totality, involves the principle of Matter in itself”—taking Form in his sense of Complete Whole of Characteristics. Without τὸ ἓν, we may have provisionally an Empiricism like that of Hume and Mill, *Parm.* 164 b; but this, when examined, will end in Nihilism, *Parm.* 165 e.

36. The intelligible element, vindicated by Kant and elaborated by Hegel, is variously termed Ideas and Numbers. The Ideas and Numbers are substantially identical, but Idea denotes the intelligible in relation to the sensibility, while the Numbers are the movements of the pure, intelligible process.

37. Τὸ ἓν brings the *Parmenides* into close relation with the notices of Platonic doctrine preserved in Aristotle and his Scholiasts, as τὸ ἓν is the formative element in the Idea, and the spring from which the Numbers flow.

* *Logic*, p. 204, Wallace's translation.

38. Xenocrates has given a hypothetic genesis of the Ideas. It is only to assist apprehension, as *γένεσις* implies evolution in time, which of course does not apply to the Ideas. ἐκ τοῦ μεγάλου καὶ μικροῦ ὑπὸ Τοῦ Ἐνὸς ἰσασθέντων ἐγένοντο ἅν, εἰ δυνατόν αὐτὰς ἦν γενέσθαι.—*Schol.* 828 a, 1, 2.

39. Τὸ ἐν is neither Number nor Idea, although without it we should have neither Number nor Idea. Number—ἀριθμός—is, according to Greek arithmeticians, σύστημα μονάδων.—*Theon Smyrn.* 23. Τὸ ἐν is the ἀρχὴ of Numerables.

40. As τὸ ἐν has for its *contre-coup* τὸ ἄπειρον— indefinite plasticity—the first Number is the Dyad, αὐτοδυάς. That is, The One and τὸ ἄπειρον, as two items, constitute the System of Two Monads—ἡ αὐτοδυάς—the Prime Dyad.—*Arist. Met.* B. iii. The Dyad has for its Material τὸ ἄπειρον, and for its Form τὸ ἐν: αἱ πρῶτον γεγονυῖαι δύο μονάδες ὡς ἐξ ὕλης μὲν τῆς Ἀορίστου Δυάδος, εἶδους δὲ τοῦ Ἀρχικοῦ Ἐνὸς—τοῦ Αὐτοενὸς δηλονότι—αὗται πεποιή- κασι τὴν πρώτην Δυάδα.—*Syrianus ap. Schol.* 818 b, 46–9.

41. As the Indefinite Dyad is *Major* and *Minor*—τὸ μέγα and τὸ μικρόν—each moiety is a monad. These two monads, with τὸ ἐν as unifier and equator, constitute the System of Three Monads—the Prime Triad—ἡ αὐτοτριάς: αἱ δὲ πάλιν δευτέρως γεγονυῖαι τρεῖς μονάδες, ὡς ἐξ ὕλης μὲν καὶ αὗται

τῆς Ἀορίστου Δυάδος, εἶδους δὲ τοῦ Αὐτοενός, πεποιή-
κασι τὴν Αὐτοτριάδα.—*Syr. ib. 819 a.*

42. Lastly, the Indefinite Dyad as plastic, taking on itself the Prime Dyad as formal, constitutes the System of Four Monads—the Prime Tetrad—ἡ αὐτοτετράς: ἐκ τῆς Αὐτοδυάδος καὶ τῆς Ἀρχικοῦ Δυάδος ἣν Ἀόριστον καλεῖ Δυάδα, ἀπετέλουν τὴν Τετράδα· οὐ συντιθέντες αὐτὰς (*sc. τὰς δυάδας*) οὐδὲ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν αὔξοντες, ἀλλὰ τῆς Ἀορίστου Δυάδος διπλασιάσης τὴν Αὐτοδυάδα, καὶ οὕτως ἀποτεκούσης τὴν Τετράδα.—*Syr. ib. 819 b, 26–31.*

43. The Archic Dyad—ἀόριστος δυάς—is no blank infinite. It is plasticity, ἀνεκλειπτός, *Syr. ib. 907 a, 25.* Its virtues are best given in the words of Syrianus: κινητικὴν οὖσαν ἀρχὴν πάντα τὰ εἶδη γονίμου πληροῦν δυνάμεως καὶ προάγειν εἰς ἀπογέννησιν τῶν δευτέρων καὶ τρίτων αὐλῶν εἰδων.—*Syr. ib. 906 b, 30–32.* δευτέρων καὶ τρίτων αὐλῶν εἰδων are the squares and cubes of the Prime Numbers.

44. The Archic Dyad—ἀόριστος δυάς—is the link between Plato's Physics and Metaphysics. It is Movement both logical and mechanical. All mechanical movement, whether purely mechanical or chemical, is in reality a brief description of relation between two moments. All qualities are relations in disguise. Analysis, therefore, is the supreme organon.

45. The two components of all things, τὸ ἐν

and τὸ ἄπειρον, are thus Metaphysical Ultima discovered by analysis, and not agents in the mechanical, chemical, or so-called psychological sense.

46. Why did Plato use such barren terms as τὸ ἓν—The One, and τὰ ἅλλα—All the rest of it? Τὸ ἓν is the geometrical unit, and Geometry is the medium between Sense and Intellect. Aristotle's usual term for Mathematics, as Plato viewed them, is τὰ μεταξύ.

47. Previous to Plato, the notion The One had been so far developed :—

a. Xenophanes deduced Unity from the theological notion Moral Perfection, making Unity a predicate of Essence :

b. Parmenides, by identifying subject and object, made Unity both the logical and substantive essence of all real existence :

c. Melissus made Unity a predicate, but deduced it from infinity :

d. Zeno defended Unity by proving plurality impossible.

48. In Aristotle's hands the notion Unity became Substance, and in that shape was transmitted by the schoolmen to modern thought. It is obvious that the modern atom is a Lilliputian substance.

49. The One being positive, τὰ ἅλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς is thrown off as its *contre-coup*, by the process which Hegel elaborated.

50. Anti-Platonists, from Aristotle to Jowett, ask—Where are the Ideas? Would a Kantian entertain the question—Where are the Categories, and Ideas, and Forms?

51. According to Hegel, evolution is Specification: according to Haeckel, specification is Evolution. That the road up is the road down must be seen in time.

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THE PARMENIDES OF PLATO.

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THE philosophical portion of the Dialogue is divided into two parts: the first extends from 127d to 135; and the second from 135 to the end, 166. The first part deals with the question of the relation of the Ideas to sensible things; the second with the relation of the head-Idea—The One—to everything else. The first part discusses generally the relation between the supersensible and the sensible; the second elaborates the relations of the paramount metaphysical entity—The One—to all its subordinates, including sensible things. The second part is thus a particular application of the first; but, as The One is the paramount entity, its relations are all-pervading.

With regard to the first portion, we are told by Mr. Jowett that Plato has anticipated the criticism of all future ages on his Ideas. Mr. Grote declares that there are no dialogues in which the Parmenidean objections to the doctrine of Ideas are elucidated or even recited. But surely all the objections which are urged in the *Parmenides* are

Law of Contradiction, he sees at once that these Laws are something more than the facts of his own brain—something more than actual clearness or passing confusion. But, first, as human thought is dominated consciously or unconsciously by the Laws of thinking, so the Divine Thinking is dominated by the Ideas. To say that Ideas exist in the mind is much the same as saying that the Law of Gravity exists in a man's watch.

The relation of the Idea to sensible things, and of God to both, is somewhat as follows: The Idea consists of two elements, the One and the Indefinite. The Indefinite is pure Passivity. Neither of these elements is created. They are co-eternal with God. God is good. As Aristotle explains it, Goodness is the matter, and One, the form, of the highest Ens. God is also Cause, the notion which brings the One and Goodness into communion. Goodness works through Causality, according to the type set by the Idea of Good. Consequently, the Law which dominates Goodness in its Causal Energy is logically prior to that Energy. On what does the Summum Ens work? On the Indefinite, or the passive element in the Idea, the space, or rather place, of the *Timaeus*. The first causal act of Summum Ens imposes the Law of mere sequence on Passivity. The result is, a chaos of unpredictable sequences, a notion grasped by Milton. The second causal act of Summum Ens is to impose on Chaotic sequence predictable sequence or physical Law, and the result is, the Sensible World. The God of

Plato thus creates nothing, he organises Passivity. Aristotle's question, Why the Idea is not in space, if pressed home, comes to this: Why is the whole Idea, with all its Form and Matter, not in a small fractional result of its Matter misconceived, namely, Place? That Space is not an independent Entity can be proved by other considerations. The non-existence of a Vacuum inside the world is stated positively in the *Timaeus*, where its existence would seem necessary, in the case of one moving body displacing another. This phenomenon Plato explains by the hypothesis of circular motion, a motion which may be exemplified by moving a set of balls round the edge of a "solitaire" board. He has been charged with inconsistency in allowing the structural solids, the Tetrahedron, the Octahedron, and the Icosahedron, to combine in different proportions, all the while he denies the existence of Vacuum. He may easily be defended by the consideration that the complement of the interstices is furnished by τὸ ἄπειρον—the element of Passivity or Receptivity in the Idea.

What then is the Sensible Thing, the Sensible Idea of Locke and Berkeley? Relatively to us, it is strictly τὸ φαινόμενον, τὸ γιγνόμενον, that which is in course of presentation, and which, therefore, *ex vi termini*, is passing away. Objectively, it is the causal action of God, working through the Idea, on the senses. Logically, and chronologically, it is distinct from the Idea. In essence, it is the contrary of the Idea, as the one is ever abiding and

the other is momentary; and finally, with regard to theories of perception, the sensible thing bears to its Idea—or rather congeries of Ideas—the relation only of a sign to the thing signified.

“Mind,” says Shelley, “cannot create, it can only perceive.” This is the popular view. It is the usual confounding of Brain and Thought. In the individual, Sensation precedes Thought; Neurosis precedes Psychosis; but Neurosis—Brain—presupposes Space, Time, and all the constituents of Intelligibility.

Everybody agrees that what is in consciousness may be safely dealt with. But the question arises: Is there anything outside consciousness? In the language of the Dialogue, if τὸ ἐν is the formative element, what is τὰλλα τοῦ ἐνός? In other words, What is τὸ ἄπειρον, which Aristotle represents as the second element in the Idea? It is food for Form—τὸ πέρας. To alter Clifford’s term, it may be called Form-stuff. And this Form-stuff, at a certain stage of development, is the χώρα or space of the *Timaeus*—the only passage in Plato’s writings which Aristotle finds at variance with the official statements in Plato’s lectures.—*Phys.* iv. ii. 5.

To make Space an ultimum in the Platonic Genesis is as preposterous as to make Hegel a Hamiltonian because he allows *Richtigkeit* to the pabulum of the senses. Τὸ ἄπειρον is not outside consciousness. It is part of consciousness: it is there as τὸ ἄπειρον. The chemical metaphor has taken such hold, that when we talk of an element

of consciousness, we almost *eo ipso* assert that it is not to be found in the mature consciousness, except in a totally different shape. But, in Plato, the original aspect of the element reappears in the compound: τὸ ἄπειρον is τὸ ἄπειρον, and will not be anything else. Plato is thus a thorough-going Idealist: τὸ ἄπειρον is part of the domain of thought.

In applying the terms of modern speculation to Plato, it is not meant that he had before him modern problems in their present shape. But the best teaching of our time is the importance of history as a basis of criticism, and this teaching shatters the doctrine that we must read a philosopher by what went before and not by what comes after him.

Hegel allows *Richtigkeit*, but not *Wahrheit*, to the sensible element. Plato is more idealistic; for while in the *Phaedo* he combats the notion that the sensible element is delusive, in the *Republic* he argues that the same volume of raw material may and does admit of opposite relations.

The most striking passage in the Dialogue is where Parmenides rebukes Socrates for withholding ideas from mean objects. This is not really at variance with the passage in the *Timaeus*, 66 d–67 a. There he states that Smells are the result of air and water affecting the organs, and that they are distinguished merely as pleasant or the reverse. In the *Philebus*, Smells are not preceded by any craving, and so far are higher than the plea-

tures of repletion. In our day a great poet has written :—

Flower in the crannied wall,
I pluck you out of the crannies ;
Hold you here, root and all, in my hand,
Little flower—but if I could understand
What you are, root and all, and all in all,
I should know what God and man is.

This is genuine Idealism. What we call a single thing is the concourse of all relations—the complexus of all Ideas—all in all.

ΠΑΡΜΕΝΙΔΗΣ.

ΤΑ ΤΟΥΤ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

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| ΖΗΝΩΝ, | | |
| ΠΑΡΜΕΝΙΔΗΣ, | | |
| ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΗΣ. | | |

ΠΑΡΜΕΝΙΔΗΣ.

t. III.
. 126.

Ἐπειδὴ Ἀθήναζε οἴκοθεν ἐκ Κλαζομενῶν ἀφικό-
μεθα, κατ' ἀγορὰν ἐνετύχομεν Ἀδειμάντῳ τε καὶ
Γλαύκῳ· καὶ μου λαβόμενος τῆς χειρὸς ὁ Ἀδεί-
μαντος, χαῖρ', ἔφη, ὦ Κέφαλε, καὶ εἴ τοι δέει τῶν
τῆδε, ὧν ἡμεῖς δυνατοί, φράζε. ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ, εἶπον
ἐγώ, πάρειμί γε ἐπ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο, δεησόμενος ὑμῶν.
λέγοις ἄν, ἔφη, τὴν δέησιν. καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον, τῷ
b ἀδελφῷ ὑμῶν τῷ ὁμομητρίῳ τί ἦν ὄνομα ; οὐ γὰρ
μέμνημαι. παῖς δέ που ἦν ὅτε τὸ πρότερον ἐπεδή-
μησα δεῦρο ἐκ Κλαζομενῶν· πολὺς δὲ ἤδη χρόνος
ἐξ ἐκείνου. τῷ μὲν γὰρ πατρί, δοκῶ, Πυριλάμπης
ὄνομα. πάνυ γε, ἔφη· αὐτῷ δέ γε Ἀντιφῶν. ἀλλὰ
τί μάλιστα πυνθάνει ; οἶδ', εἶπον ἐγώ, πολῖταί μοι
εἰσι, μάλα φιλόσοφοι, ἀκηκόασί τε ὅτι οὗτος ὁ
Ἀντιφῶν Πυθοδώρῳ τινὶ Ζήνωνος ἐταίρῳ πολλὰ
c ἐντετύχηκε, καὶ τοὺς λόγους, οὓς ποτε Σωκράτης
καὶ Ζήνων καὶ Παρμενίδης διελέχθησαν, πολλάκις
ἀκούσας τοῦ Πυθοδώρου ἀπομνημονεύει. ἀληθῆ,
ἔφη, λέγεις. τούτων τοίνυν, εἶπον, δεόμεθα δια-
κούσαι. ἀλλ' οὐ χαλεπόν, ἔφη· μειράκιον γὰρ ὧν
αὐτοὺς εὖ μάλα διεμελέτησεν, ἐπεὶ νῦν γε κατὰ τὸν
πάππον τε καὶ ὁμώνυμον πρὸς ἵππικῇ τὰ πολλὰ
διατρίβει. ἀλλ' εἰ δεῖ, ἴωμεν παρ' αὐτόν· ἄρτι

Introduc-
tion.

1. Cepha-
lus relates
his intro-
duction to
Antipho.

γὰρ ἐνθένδε οἴκαδε οἴχεται, οἰκεί δὲ ἐγγὺς ἐν Με-
λίτῃ. ταῦτα εἰπόντες ἐβαδίζομεν, καὶ κατελάβομεν p. 127
τὸν Ἀντιφῶντα οἴκοι, χαλινόν τινα χαλκεῖ ἐκδιδόντα
σκευάσαι· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐκείνου ἀπηλλάγη οἱ τε ἀδελ-
φοὶ ἔλεγον αὐτῷ ὦν ἔνεκα παρείμεν, ἀνεγνώρισέ τέ
με ἐκ τῆς προτέρας ἐπιδημίας καί με ἡσπάζετο,
καὶ δεομένων ἡμῶν διελθεῖν τοὺς λόγους τὸ μὲν
πρῶτον ὥκνει· πολὺ γὰρ ἔφη ἔργον εἶναι· ἔπειτα
μέντοι διηγείτο.

2. Antipho
relates, on
the autho-
rity of Py-
thodorus, a
conversa-
tion be-
tween
Socrates,
Zeno, and
Parme-
nides; the
particulars
of the
meeting:
Zeno is
reading
aloud his
treatise on
Existence.

ἔφη δὲ δὴ ὁ Ἀντιφῶν λέγειν τὸν Πυθόδωρον
ὅτι ἀφίκοντό ποτε εἰς Παναθήναια τὰ μεγάλα b
Ζήνων τε καὶ Παρμενίδης. τὸν μὲν οὖν Παρμενί-
δην εὖ μάλα δὴ πρεσβύτην εἶναι, σφόδρα πολιόν,
καλὸν δὲ κάγαθόν τὴν ὄψιν, περὶ ἔτη μάλιστα
πέντε καὶ ἐξήκοντα· Ζήνωνα δὲ ἐγγὺς ἐτῶν τεττα-
ράκοντα τότε εἶναι, εὐμήκη δὲ καὶ χαρίεντα ἰδεῖν·
καὶ λέγεσθαι αὐτὸν παιδικὰ τοῦ Παρμενίδου γεγο-
νέναι. καταλύειν δὲ αὐτοὺς ἔφη παρὰ τῷ Πυθοδώρῳ
ἐκτὸς τείχους ἐν Κεραμεικῷ· οἱ δὲ καὶ ἀφικέσθαι c
τόν τε Σωκράτη καὶ ἄλλους τινὰς μετ' αὐτοῦ
πολλούς, ἐπιθυμοῦντας ἀκούσαι τῶν τοῦ Ζήνωνος
γραμμάτων· τότε γὰρ αὐτὰ πρῶτον ὑπ' ἐκείνων
κομισθῆναι· Σωκράτη δὲ εἶναι τότε σφόδρα νέον.
ἀναγιγνώσκειν οὖν αὐτοῖς τὸν Ζήνωνα αὐτόν, τὸν
δὲ Παρμενίδην τυχεῖν ἔξω ὄντα· καὶ εἶναι πάνυ
βραχὺ ἔτι λοιπὸν τῶν λόγων ἀναγιγνωσκομένων,
ἤνίκα αὐτός τε ἐπείσελθῆν ἔφη ὁ Πυθόδωρος d
ἔξωθεν καὶ τὸν Παρμενίδην μετ' αὐτοῦ καὶ Ἀρισ-
τοτελῆ τὸν τῶν τριάκοντα γενόμενον, καὶ σμίκρ'
ἄττα ἔτι ἐπακοῦσαι τῶν γραμμάτων· οὐ μὲν αὐτός
γε, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρότερον ἀκηκοέναι τοῦ Ζήνωνος.

- τὸν οὖν Σωκράτη ἀκούσαντα πάλιν τε κελεύσαι **First part of the dialogue: preliminary discussion, the relation of Τὰ Εἶδη to sensible things.**
τὴν πρώτην ὑπόθεσιν τοῦ πρώτου λόγου ἀναγνῶναι,
καὶ ἀναγνωσθείσης, πῶς, φάναι, ὦ Ζήνων, τοῦτο
e λέγεις; εἰ πολλά ἐστι τὰ ὄντα, ὥς ἄρα δεῖ αὐτὰ
ὁμοιά τε εἶναι καὶ ἀνόμοια, τοῦτο δὲ δὴ ἀδύνατον·
οὔτε γὰρ τὰ ἀνόμοια ὁμοια οὔτε τὰ ὁμοια ἀνόμοια
οἶόν τε εἶναι; οὐχ οὕτω λέγεις; οὕτω, φάναι τὸν
Ζήνωνα. οὐκοῦν εἰ ἀδύνατον τά τε ἀνόμοια ὁμοια
εἶναι καὶ τὰ ὁμοια ἀνόμοια, ἀδύνατον δὴ καὶ πολλὰ
εἶναι· εἰ γὰρ πολλὰ εἴη, πάσχοι ἂν τὰ ἀδύνατα;
ἄρα τοῦτό ἐστιν ὃ βούλονταί σου οἱ λόγοι, οὐκ
ἄλλο τι ἢ διαμάχεσθαι παρὰ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα,
ὥς οὐ πολλά ἐστι; καὶ τούτου αὐτοῦ οἶει σοι
τεκμήριον εἶναι ἕκαστον τῶν λόγων, ὥστε καὶ
ἡγεῖ τοσαῦτα τεκμήρια παρέχεσθαι, ὅσους περ
128 λόγους γέγραφας, ὥς οὐκ ἔστι πολλά; οὕτω λέγεις,
ἢ ἐγὼ οὐκ ὀρθῶς καταμανθάνω; οὐκ, ἀλλά, φάναι
τὸν Ζήνωνα, καλῶς συνήκας ὅλον τὸ γράμμα ὃ
βούλεται. μανθάνω, εἰπεῖν τὸν Σωκράτη, ὦ Παρ-
μενίδη, ὅτι Ζήνων ὅδε οὐ μόνον τῇ ἄλλῃ σου
φιλίᾳ βούλεται ὠκειῶσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ συγ-
γράμματι. ταῦτὸν γὰρ γέγραφε τρόπον τινὰ ὅπερ
σύ, μεταβάλλων δὲ ἡμᾶς πειράται ἐξαπατᾶν ὥς
ἕτερόν τι λέγων. σὺ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ποιήμασιν
b ἐν φῆς εἶναι Τὸ Πᾶν, καὶ τούτων τεκμήρια παρέχει
καλῶς τε καὶ εὖ· ὅδε δὲ αὖ οὐ πολλά φησιν εἶναι,
τεκμήρια δὲ αὐτὸς πάμπολλα καὶ παμμεγέθη παρέ-
χεται. τὸ οὖν τὸν μὲν ἐν φάναι, τὸν δὲ μὴ πολλά,
καὶ οὕτως ἐκάτερον λέγειν, ὥστε μηδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν
εἰρηκέναι δοκεῖν σχεδόν τι λέγοντας ταῦτά, ὑπὲρ
ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἄλλους φαίνεται ὑμῖν τὰ εἰρημένα **3. Socrates criticizes Zeno, and wishes to know if he is right in the view he takes. Zeno says he is. "Then you, Zeno," says Socrates, "agree with Parmenides, but you put your views in the negative form, that Existence is non-plural, while Parmenides puts his in the affirmative, that Existence is one." Zeno explains that his thesis is a reductio ad absurdum of the antagonistic thesis, i. e. greater absurdities follow from supposing Existence**

plural than
from sup-
posing
Existence
one.

εἰρήσθαι. ναί, φάναι τὸν Ζήνωνα, ὦ Σώκρατες. σὺ δ' οὖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν τοῦ γράμματος οὐ πανταχοῦ ᾔσθησαι· καίτοι ὥσπερ γε αἱ Λάκαιναί σκύλακες εὖ μεταθεῖς τε καὶ ἰχνεύεις τὰ λεχθέντα· ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν σε τοῦτο λανθάνει, ὅτι οὐ παντάπασιν οὕτω σεμνύνεται τὸ γράμμα, ὥστε ἅπερ σὺ λέγεις διανοηθὲν γραφῆναι, τοὺς ἀνθρώπους δὲ ἐπικρυπτόμενον ὥς τι μέγα διαπραττόμενον· ἀλλὰ σὺ μὲν εἶπες τῶν συμβεβηκότων τι, ἔστι δὲ τό γε ἀληθὲς βοήθειά τις ταῦτα τὰ γράμματα τῷ Παρμενίδου λόγῳ πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιχειροῦντας αὐτὸν κωμωδεῖν, ὡς εἰ ἓν ἔστι, πολλὰ καὶ γελοῖα συμβαίνει πάσχειν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ἐναντία αὐτῷ. ἀντιλέγει δὴ οὖν τοῦτο τὸ γράμμα πρὸς τοὺς τὰ πολλὰ λέγοντας, καὶ ἀνταποδίδωσι ταῦτα καὶ πλείω, τοῦτο βουλόμενον δηλοῦν, ὡς ἔτι γελοιότερα πάσχοι ἂν αὐτῶν ἢ ὑπόθεσις, εἰ πολλὰ ἔστιν, ἢ ἢ τοῦ ἓν εἶναι, εἴ τις ἱκανῶς ἐπεξίῃ. διὰ τοιαύτην δὴ φιλονεικίαν ὑπὸ νέου ὄντος ἐμοῦ ἐγράφη, καί τις αὐτὸ ἔκλεψε γραφέν, ὥστε οὐδὲ βουλεύσασθαι ἐξεγένετο, εἴτ' ἐξοιστέον αὐτὸ εἰς τὸ φῶς εἶτε μή. ταύτῃ γ' οὖν σε λανθάνει, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι οὐχ ὑπὸ νέου φιλονεικίας οἶει αὐτὸ γεγράφθαι, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ πρεσβυτέρου φιλοτιμίας· ἐπεὶ, ὅπερ γ' εἶπον, οὐ κακῶς ἀπείκασας.

4. Socrates sets forth his theory of Generalization, that the things denoted by general words may participate in opposite

ἀλλ' ἀποδέχομαι, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη, καὶ ἡγοῦμαι ὡς λέγεις ἔχειν. τόδε δέ μοι εἶπέ· οὐ νομίζεις εἶναι αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ εἰδός τι Ὀμοιότητος, καὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ αὖ ἄλλο τι ἐναντίον, ὃ ἔστιν Ἀνόμοιον· τούτοις δὲ δυοῖν ὄντοις καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ καὶ τᾶλλα ἃ δὴ πολλὰ καλοῦμεν μεταλαμβάνειν ;

καὶ τὰ μὲν τῆς Ὁμοιότητος μεταλαμβάνοντα ὅμοια
 γίνεσθαι ταύτῃ τε καὶ κατὰ τοσοῦτον ὅσον. ἂν
 μεταλαμβάνῃ, τὰ δὲ τῆς Ἀνομοιότητος ἀνόμοια,
 τὰ δὲ ἀμφοτέρων ἀμφότερα; εἰ δὲ καὶ πάντα
 ἐναντίων ὄντων ἀμφοτέρων μεταλαμβάνει, καὶ ἔστι
 b τῷ μετέχειν ἀμφοῖν ὁμοιά τε καὶ ἀνόμοια αὐτὰ
 αὐτοῖς, τί θαυμαστόν; εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὰ τὰ ὁμοιά
 τις ἀπέφαινε ἀνόμοια γιγνόμενα ἢ τὰ ἀνόμοια
 ὅμοια, τέρας ἂν, οἶμαι, ἦν· εἰ δὲ τὰ τούτων μετέ-
 χοντα ἀμφοτέρων ἀμφότερα ἀποφαίνει πεπονθότα,
 οὐδὲν ἔμοιγε, ὦ Ζήνων, ἄτοπον δοκεῖ εἶναι, οὐδέ
 γε εἰ ἐν ἅπαντα ἀποφαίνει τις τῷ μετέχειν τοῦ
 Ἑνὸς καὶ ταῦτα ταῦτα πολλὰ τῷ Πλήθους αὖ
 μετέχειν· ἀλλ' εἰ ὃ ἔστιν Ἐν αὐτὸ τοῦτο πολλὰ
 c ἀποδείξει, καὶ αὖ τὰ Πολλὰ δὴ ἐν, τοῦτο ἤδη
 θαυμάσομαι· καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων ὡσαύ-
 τως· εἰ μὲν αὐτὰ τὰ γένη τε καὶ εἶδη ἐν αὐ-
 τοῖς ἀποφαίνοι τὰναντία ταῦτα πάθῃ πάσχοντα,
 ἄξιον θαυμάζειν· εἰ δ' ἐμὲ ἐν τις ἀποδείξει ὄντα
 καὶ πολλὰ, τί θαυμαστόν, λέγων, ὅταν μὲν βού-
 ληται πολλὰ ἀποφαίνειν, ὡς ἕτερα μὲν τὰ ἐπὶ
 δεξιὰ μου ἔστιν, ἕτερα δὲ τὰ ἐπ' ἀριστερά, καὶ
 ἕτερα μὲν τὰ πρόσθεν, ἕτερα δὲ τὰ ὀπισθεν, καὶ
 ἄνω καὶ κάτω ὡσαύτως· Πλήθους γάρ, οἶμαι,
 d μετέχω· ὅταν δὲ ἐν, ἐρεῖ ὡς ἐπὶ ἡμῶν ὄντων εἰς
 ἐγὼ εἶμι ἄνθρωπος, μετέχων καὶ τοῦ Ἑνός· ὥστε
 ἀληθῆ ἀποφαίνει ἀμφότερα. εἰ οὖν τις τοιαῦτα
 ἐπιχειρῇ πολλὰ καὶ ἐν ταῦτα ἀποφαίνειν, λίθους
 καὶ ξύλα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, φήσομεν αὐτὸν πολλὰ
 καὶ ἐν ἀποδεικνύναι, οὐ τὸ Ἐν πολλὰ οὐδὲ τὰ
 Πολλὰ ἐν, οὐδέ τι θαυμαστὸν λέγειν, ἀλλ' ἄπερ

εἶδη, but
 that the
 εἶδη them-
 selves can-
 not admit
 of incom-
 patible
 affections :
 e.g. a man
 is one, and
 so partici-
 pates in
 Unity: but
 he may be
 also one of
 many, in
 which case
 he partici-
 pates in
 Plurality:
 but the
 εἶδος Unity
 can never
 be the εἶδος
 Plurality,
 nor vice
 versa.

ἂν πάντες ὁμολογοῖμεν· ἔαν δέ τις, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, πρῶτον μὲν διαιρῆται χωρὶς αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτὰ τὰ εἶδη, οἷον Ὅμοιότητά τε καὶ Ἀνομοιότητα καὶ Πλήθος καὶ τὸ Ἐν καὶ Στάσιν ^e καὶ Κίνησιν καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, εἴτα ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ταῦτα δυνάμενα συγκεράννυσθαι καὶ διακρίνεσθαι ἀποφαίνῃ, ἀγαίμην ἂν ἔγωγ', ἔφη, θαυμαστῶς, ὦ Ζήνων. ταῦτα δὲ ἀνδρείως μὲν πάννυ ἡγοῦμαι πεπραγματεῦσθαι· πολὺ μὲντ' ἂν ὦδε μᾶλλον, ὡς λέγω, ἀγασθείην, εἴ τις ἔχοι τὴν αὐτὴν ἀπορίαν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς εἶδεσι παντοδαπῶς πλεκομένην, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ὀρωμένοις ¹³⁰ διήλθετε, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τοῖς λογισμῶ λαμβανομένοις ἐπιδείξαι.

5. Socrates denies the universality of εἶδη. He allows that there are εἶδη of Beauty, Goodness, and such like; he is doubtful about the existence of εἶδη for such things as Man, Fire, and Water; and he is quite positive that there are no εἶδη for such things as Hair, Mud, Filth. Parmenides replies that this is a

λέγοντος δὴ, ἔφη ὁ Πυθόδωρος, τοῦ Σωκράτους ταῦτα αὐτὸς μὲν οἶεσθαι ἐφ' ἐκάστου ἄχθεσθαι τὸν τε Παρμενίδην καὶ τὸν Ζήνωνα, τοὺς δὲ πάννυ τε αὐτῷ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν καὶ θαμὰ εἰς ἀλλήλους βλέποντας μειδιᾶν ὡς ἀγαμένους τὸν Σωκράτη. ὅπερ οὖν καὶ παυσαμένου αὐτοῦ εἰπεῖν τὸν Παρμενίδην, ὦ Σώκρατες, φάναι, ὡς ἄξιός ἐστι ἀγασθαι τῆς ὀρμῆς τῆς ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους· καί μοι εἰπέ, αὐτὸς ^b σὺ οὕτω διήρησαι ὡς λέγεις, χωρὶς μὲν εἶδη αὐτὰ ἅττα, χωρὶς δὲ τὰ τούτων αὐτῷ μετέχοντα; καί τί σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι αὐτὴ Ὅμοιότης χωρὶς ἧς ἡμεῖς ὁμοιότητος ἔχομεν, καὶ Ἐν δὴ καὶ Πολλὰ καὶ πάντα ὅσα νῦν δὴ Ζήνωνος ἡκουες; ἔμοιγε, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη. ἦ καὶ τὰ τοιάδε, εἰπεῖν τὸν Παρμενίδην, οἷον Δικαίου τι εἶδος αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ Καλοῦ καὶ Ἀγαθοῦ καὶ πάντων αὐτῷ τῶν τοιούτων; ναί, φάναι. τί δ', ἀνθρώπου εἶδος χωρὶς ἡμῶν καὶ τῶν ^c

οἷοι ἡμεῖς ἐσμὲν πάντων, αὐτό τι εἶδος Ἀνθρώπου human way of thinking, and that nothing is really vile.
 ἢ Πυρὸς ἢ καὶ ὕδατος; ἐν ἀπορίᾳ, φάναι, πολ-
 λάκις δὴ, ὦ Παρμενίδη, περὶ αὐτῶν γέγονα, πότερα
 χρὴ φάναι ὥσπερ περὶ ἐκείνων ἢ ἄλλως. ἢ καὶ
 περὶ τῶνδε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἃ καὶ γελοῖα δόξειεν ἂν
 εἶναι, οἷον Θρίξ καὶ Πηλὸς καὶ ῥύπος ἢ ἄλλο ὅ
 τι ἀτιμότατόν τε καὶ φαυλότατον, ἀπορεῖς εἴτε χρὴ
 φάναι καὶ τούτων ἐκάστου εἶδος εἶναι χωρίς, ὃν
 δ ἄλλο αὐτῶν ὧν ἡμεῖς μεταχειριζόμεθα, εἴτε καὶ
 μή; οὐδαμῶς, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα
 μέν γε, ἅπερ ὁρῶμεν, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι· εἶδος δέ
 τι αὐτῶν οἰηθῆναι εἶναι μὴ λίαν ἢ ἄτοπον. ἤδη
 μέντοι ποτέ με καὶ ἔθραξε μή τι ἢ περὶ πάντων
 ταῦτόν· ἔπειτα ὅταν ταύτῃ στῶ, φεύγων οἴχομαι,
 δείσας μὴ ποτε εἰς τιν' ἄβυθον φλυαρίαν ἐμπεσὼν
 διαφθαρῶ· ἐκέῖσε δ' οὖν ἀφικόμενος, εἰς ἃ νῦν δὴ
 ἐλέγομεν εἶδη ἔχειν, περὶ ἐκείνα πραγματευόμενος
 e διατρίβω. νέος γὰρ εἶ ἔτι, φάναι τὸν Παρμενίδην,
 ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ οὐπω σου ἀντείληπται φιλοσοφία,
 ὥς ἔτι ἀντιλήψεται κατ' ἐμὴν δόξαν, ὅτε οὐδὲν
 αὐτῶν ἀτιμάσεις· νῦν δὲ ἔτι πρὸς ἀνθρώπων ἀπο-
 βλέπεις δόξας διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν.

τόδε οὖν μοι εἶπέ. δοκεῖ σοι, ὥς φῆς, εἶναι 6. Parmenides discusses the rationale of Participation: he shows that particular things cannot participate with the εἶδη by any mode of Extension, either by way of
 εἶδη ἅττα, ὧν τάδε τὰ ἄλλα μεταλαμβάνοντα τὰς
 131 ἐπωνυμίας αὐτῶν ἴσχειν, οἷον Ὀμοιότητος μὲν μετα-
 λαβόντα ὅμοια, Μεγέθους δὲ μεγάλα, Κάλλους τε
 καὶ Δικαιοσύνης δίκαιά τε καὶ καλὰ γίγνεσθαι.
 πάνυ γε, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη. οὐκοῦν ἤτοι ὅλου
 τοῦ εἶδους ἢ μέρους ἑκάστον τὸ μεταλαμβάνον
 μεταλαμβάνει; ἢ ἄλλη τις ἂν μετάληψις χωρὶς
 τούτων γένοιτο; καὶ πῶς ἂν; εἶπεν. πότερον οὖν

δοκεῖ σοι ὅλον τὸ εἶδος ἐν ἐκάστω εἶναι τῶν πολλῶν ἐν ὄν, ἢ πῶς; τί γὰρ κωλύει, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη, ὦ Παρμενίδη, ἐνεῖναι; ἐν ἄρα ὄν καὶ b ταῦτὸν ἐν πολλοῖς χωρὶς οὖσιν ὅλον ἅμα ἐνέσται, καὶ οὕτως αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ χωρὶς ἂν εἴη. οὐκ ἂν, εἴ γε, φάναι, οἷον ἢ ἡμέρα μία καὶ ἢ αὐτὴ οὖσα πολλαχοῦ ἅμα ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον αὐτὴ αὐτῆς χωρὶς ἐστίν, εἰ οὕτω καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν ἐν ἐν πᾶσιν ἅμα ταῦτὸν εἴη. ἡδέως γε, φάναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν ταῦτὸν ἅμα πολλαχοῦ ποιεῖς, οἷον εἰ ἰστίῳ καταπετάσας πολλοὺς ἀνθρώπους φαίης ἐν ἐπὶ πολλοῖς εἶναι ὅλον· ἢ οὐ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἡγεῖ c λέγειν; ἴσως, φάναι. ἢ οὖν ὅλον ἐφ' ἐκάστω τὸ ἰστίον εἴη ἂν, ἢ μέρος αὐτοῦ ἄλλο ἐπ' ἄλλῳ; μέρος. μεριστὰ ἄρα, φάναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔστιν αὐτὰ τὰ εἶδη, καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτῶν μέρους ἂν μετέχοι, καὶ οὐκέτι ἐν ἐκάστω ὅλον, ἀλλὰ μέρος ἐκάστου ἂν εἴη. φαίνεται οὕτω γε. ἢ οὖν ἐθελήσεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, φάναι τὸ Ἐν εἶδος ἡμῖν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μερίζεσθαι· καὶ ἔτι ἐν ἔσται; οὐδαμῶς, εἰπεῖν. ὄρα γάρ, φάναι· εἰ αὐτὸ τὸ Μέγεθος μεριεῖς καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν πολλῶν μεγάλων μεγέθους μέρει d σμικροτέρῳ αὐτοῦ τοῦ Μεγέθους μέγα ἔσται, ἄρα οὐκ ἄλογον φανείται; πάνυ γ', ἔφη. τί δέ; τοῦ Ἰσου μέρος ἕκαστον σμικρὸν ἀπολαβόν τι ἔξει ὧ ἐλάττονι ὄντι αὐτοῦ τοῦ Ἰσου τὸ ἔχον ἴσον τῷ ἔσται; ἀδύνατον. ἀλλὰ τοῦ Σμικροῦ μέρος τις ἡμῶν ἔξει· τούτου δὲ αὐτοῦ τὸ σμικρὸν μείζον ἔσται ἅτε μέρους ἑαυτοῦ ὄντος, καὶ οὕτω δὴ αὐτὸ τὸ Σμικρὸν μείζον ἔσται· ὧ δ' ἂν προστεθῇ τὸ ἀφαιρεθέν, τοῦτο σμικρότερον ἔσται ἄλλ' οὐ μείζον ἢ e

πρίν. οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο, φάναι, τοῦτό γε. τίν' οὖν τρόπον, εἰπεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῶν εἰδῶν σοι τὰ ἄλλα μεταλήψεται, μήτε κατὰ μέρη μήτε κατὰ ὅλα μεταλαμβάνειν δυνάμενα; οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, φάναι, οὗ μοι δοκεῖ εὐκόλον εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον οὐδαμῶς διορίσασθαι.

τί δὲ δὴ; πρὸς τόδε πῶς ἔχεις; τὸ ποῖον; οἶμαί σε ἐκ τοῦ τοιοῦδε ἐν ἑκάστον εἶδος οἶεσθαι εἶναι· ὅταν πόλλ' ἄττα μεγάλα σοι δόξη εἶναι μία τις ἴσως δοκεῖ ιδέα ἢ αὐτὴ εἶναι ἐπὶ πάντα ἰδόντι, ὅθεν ἐν τῷ Μέγα ἡγεῖ εἶναι ἀληθῆ λέγεις, φάναι. τί δ' αὐτὸ τὸ Μέγα καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ μεγάλα, εἰ ὡσαύτως τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπὶ πάντα ἴδης, οὐχὶ ἐν τι αὐτοῦ μέγα φανείται, ὥς ταῦτα πάντα ἀνάγκη μεγάλα φαίνεσθαι; ἔοικεν. ἄλλο ἄρα εἶδος μεγέθους ἀναφανήσεται, παρ' αὐτό τε τὸ Μέγεθος γεγονὸς καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτοῦ· καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις αὖ πᾶσιν ἕτερον, ὥς ταῦτα πάντα μεγάλα ἔσται· καὶ οὐκέτι δὴ ἐν ἑκαστόν σοι τῶν εἰδῶν ἔσται, ἀλλ' ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆθος.

7. The origin of the theory of the unique εἶδος: if the εἶδος be absolutely distinct from the sum of particulars, εἶδος in quantity is infinite, which is an absurdity; it is therefore unique.

ἀλλά, φάναι, ὦ Παρμενίδη, τὸν Σωκράτη, μὴ τῶν εἰδῶν ἑκάστον ἢ τούτων νόημα, καὶ οὐδαμοῦ αὐτῷ προσήκη ἐγγίγνεσθαι ἄλλοθι ἢ ἐν ψυχαῖς· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἐν γε ἑκάστον εἶη καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔτι πάσχοι ἂ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγγο. τί οὖν; φάναι, ἐν ἑκαστόν ἐστι τῶν νοημάτων, νόημα δὲ οὐδενός; ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον, εἰπεῖν. ἀλλὰ τινός; ναί. ὄντος ἢ οὐκ ὄντος; ὄντος. οὐχ' ἑνός τινος, ὃ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἐκείνο τὸ νόημα ἐπὸν νοεῖ, μίαν τινὰ οὔσαν ιδέαν; ναί. εἴτα οὐκ εἶδος ἔσται τοῦτο τὸ νοούμενον ἐν εἶναι, ἀεὶ ὄν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν; ἀνάγκη αὖ

8. The εἶδος perhaps may be an intellectual Concept which exists only in the mind of the concipient: but this hypothesis eventuates in a dilemma, and either alternative is an absurdity.

φαίνεται. τί δὲ δὴ; εἰπεῖν τὸν Παρμενίδην, οὐκ ἀνάγκη, εἰ τᾶλλα φῆς τῶν εἰδῶν μετέχειν, ἢ δοκεῖν σοι ἐκ νοημάτων ἕκαστον εἶναι καὶ πάντα νοεῖν, ἢ νοήματα ὄντα ἀνόητα εἶναι; ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοῦτο, φάναι, ἔχει λόγον.

9. εἶδη may perhaps exist objectively as Types to which sensible things conform: but this hypothesis would involve an infinite series of mediating εἶδη, which is absurd: for the εἶδος is unique.

ἀλλ', ὦ Παρμενίδη, μάλιστα ἔμοιγε καταφαίνεται ὥδε ἔχειν· τὰ μὲν εἶδη ταῦτα ὥσπερ παραδείγματα ^d ἐστάναι ἐν τῇ φύσει, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τούτοις εἰκέναι καὶ εἶναι ὁμοιώματα· καὶ ἡ μέθεξις αὕτη τοῖς ἄλλοις γίνεσθαι τῶν εἰδῶν οὐκ ἄλλη τις ἢ εἰκασθῆναι αὐτοῖς. εἰ οὖν τι, ἔφη, ἔοικε τῷ εἶδει, οἷόν τε ἐκείνο τὸ εἶδος μὴ ὅμοιον εἶναι τῷ εἰκασθέντι, καθ' ὅσον αὐτῷ ἀφωμοιώθη; ἢ ἔστι τις μηχανὴ τὸ ὅμοιον μὴ ὁμοίῳ ὁμοιον εἶναι; οὐκ ἔστι. τὸ δὲ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ ἄρ' οὐ μεγάλη ἀνάγκη ἐνὸς τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἶδους μετέχειν; ἀνάγκη. οὐ δ' ἂν τὰ ^e ὅμοια μετέχοντα ὅμοια ᾗ, οὐκ ἐκείνο ἔσται αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος; παντάπασιν μὲν οὖν. οὐκ ἄρα οἷόν τέ τι τῷ εἶδει ὅμοιον εἶναι, οὐδὲ τὸ εἶδος ἄλλῳ· εἰ δὲ μή, παρὰ τὸ εἶδος αἰεὶ ἄλλο ἀναφανήσεται εἶδος, καὶ ἂν ἐκείνῳ τῷ ὅμοιον ᾗ, ἕτερον αὖ, καὶ 133 οὐδέποτε παύσεται αἰεὶ καινὸν εἶδος γιγνόμενον, εἰάν τὸ εἶδος τῷ ἑαυτοῦ μετέχοντι ὅμοιον γίγνηται. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις. οὐκ ἄρα ὁμοιότητι τᾶλλα τῶν εἰδῶν μεταλαμβάνει, ἀλλὰ τι ἄλλο δεῖ ζητεῖν ὧ μεταλαμβάνει. ἔοικεν. ὁρᾷς οὖν, φάναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅση ἢ ἀπορία, εἰάν τις εἶδη ὄντα αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτὰ διορίζηται; καὶ μάλα.

10. If the εἶδη exist absolutely, we cannot know

εὖ τοίνυν ἴσθι, φάναι, ὅτι ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδέπω ἄπτει αὐτῆς ὅση ἐστὶν ἢ ἀπορία, εἰ ἐν εἶδος ἕκασ- ^b τον τῶν ὄντων αἰεὶ τι ἀφοριζόμενος θήσεις. πῶς

δῆ; εἰπεῖν. πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλα, φάναι, μέγιστον
 δὲ τόδε. εἴ τις φαίη μηδὲ προσήκειν αὐτὰ γίγ-
 νώσκεσθαι ὄντα τοιαῦτα οἷά φαμεν δεῖν εἶναι τὰ
 εἶδη, τῷ ταῦτα λέγοντι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι τις ἐνδείξα-
 σθαι ὅτι ψεύδεται, εἰ μὴ πολλῶν τύχοι ἔμπειρος
 ὢν ὁ ἀμφισβητῶν καὶ μὴ ἀφυής, ἐθέλοι δὲ πάνυ
 πολλὰ καὶ πόρρωθεν πραγματευομένου τοῦ ἐνδεικ-
 c νυμένου ἔπεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀπίθανος εἴη ὁ ἄγνωστα
 ἀναγκάζων αὐτὰ εἶναι. πῇ δῆ, ὦ Παρμενίδη;
 φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη. ὅτι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἶμαι ἂν
 καὶ σὲ καὶ ἄλλον, ὅστις αὐτὴν τινα καθ' αὐτὴν
 ἐκάστου οὐσίαν τίθεται εἶναι, ὁμολογήσαι ἂν πρῶ-
 τον μὲν μηδεμίαν αὐτῶν εἶναι ἐν ἡμῖν. πῶς γὰρ ἂν
 αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν ἔτι εἴη; φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη.
 καλῶς λέγεις, εἰπεῖν. οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅσαι τῶν ἰδεῶν
 πρὸς ἀλλήλας εἰσὶν αἷ εἰσω, αὐταὶ πρὸς αὐτάς
 d τὴν οὐσίαν ἔχουσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν
 εἴτε ὁμοιώματα εἴτε ὅπῃ δῆ τις αὐτὰ τίθεται, ὢν
 ἡμεῖς μετέχοντες εἶναι ἕκαστα ἐπονομαζόμεθα· τὰ
 δὲ παρ' ἡμῖν ταῦτα, ὁμώνυμα ὄντα ἐκείνοις, αὐτὰ
 αὖ πρὸς αὐτά ἐστιν ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὰ εἶδη, καὶ
 ἑαυτῶν ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνων ὅσα αὖ ὀνομάζεται οὕτως.
 πῶς λέγεις; φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη. οἷον, φάναι τὸν
 Παρμενίδην, εἴ τις ἡμῶν του δεσπότης ἢ δοῦλός
 ἐστιν, οὐκ αὐτοῦ Δεσπότης δῆ που, ὃ ἔστι Δεσπό-
 e τής, ἐκείνου δοῦλός ἐστιν, οὐδὲ αὐτοῦ Δούλου, ὃ ἔστι
 Δοῦλος, δεσπότης ὁ δεσπότης, ἀλλ' ἄνθρωπος ὢν ἀν-
 θρώπου ἀμφοτέρω ταῦτά ἐστιν· αὐτὴ δὲ Δεσποτεία
 αὐτῆς Δουλείας ἐστὶν ὃ ἐστι, καὶ δουλεία ὡσαύτως,
 αὐτὴ Δουλεία αὐτῆς Δεσποτείας, ἀλλ' οὐ τὰ ἐν
 ἡμῖν πρὸς ἐκεῖνα τὴν δύναμιν ἔχει οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνα

them, since
 an absolute
 object im-
 plies as its
 correlative
 a faculty of
 absolute
 know-
 ledge; and,
 conversely,
 Deity, as
 possessing
 absolute
 knowledge,
 could not
 have less
 than abso-
 lute know-
 ledge, that
 is, could
 not have
 our know-
 ledge, and
 therefore
 would be
 without
 some
 knowledge,
 which is
 absurd.

πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ἀλλ', ὃ λέγω, αὐτὰ αὐτῶν καὶ πρὸς
 αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνά τέ ἐστι, καὶ τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν ὡσαύτως 134
 πρὸς ἑαυτά· ἢ οὐ μανθάνεις ὃ λέγω; Πάνυ γ',
 εἰπεῖν τὸν Σωκράτη, μανθάνω. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐπισ-
 τήμη, φάναι, αὕτη μὲν ὃ ἔστιν Ἐπιστήμη τῆς ὃ
 ἔστιν Ἀλήθεια αὐτῆς ἂν ἐκείνης εἷη ἐπιστήμη;
 πάνυ γε. ἐκάστη δὲ αὖ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, ἢ ἔστιν,
 ἐκάστου τῶν ὄντων, ὃ ἔστιν, εἷη ἂν ἐπιστήμη· ἢ
 οὐ; ναί. ἢ δὲ παρ' ἡμῖν ἐπιστήμη οὐ τῆς παρ'
 ἡμῖν ἂν ἀληθείας εἷη, καὶ αὖ ἐκάστη ἢ παρ' ἡμῖν
 ἐπιστήμη τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν ὄντων ἐκάστου ἂν ἐπισ- b
 τήμη συμβαίνοι εἶναι; ἀνάγκη. ἀλλὰ μὴν αὐτά
 γε τὰ εἶδη, ὡς ὁμολογεῖς, οὔτε ἔχομεν οὔτε παρ'
 ἡμῖν οἷόν τε εἶναι. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. γινώσκεται δέ
 γέ που ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ εἶδους τοῦ τῆς Ἐπιστήμης
 αὐτὰ τὰ γένη ἃ ἔστιν ἕκαστα; ναί. ὃ γε ἡμεῖς
 οὐκ ἔχομεν. οὐ γάρ. οὐκ ἄρα ὑπό γε ἡμῶν γιγ-
 νώσκεται τῶν εἰδῶν οὐδέν, ἐπειδὴ αὐτῆς Ἐπιστήμης
 οὐ μετέχομεν. οὐκ ἔοικεν. ἄγνωστον ἄρα ἡμῖν
 ἐστὶ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ Καλὸν ὃ ἔστι καὶ τὸ Ἀγαθὸν
 καὶ πάντα ἃ δὴ ὡς ἰδέας αὐτὰς οὔσας ὑπολαμβάν- c
 νομεν. κινδυνεύει. ὄρα δὴ ἔτι τούτου δεινότερον
 τόδε. τὸ ποῖον; φαίης ἂν ἢ οὐ, εἵπερ ἔστιν αὐτό
 τι γένος Ἐπιστήμης, πολὺ αὐτὸ ἀκριβέστερον εἶναι
 ἢ τὴν παρ' ἡμῖν ἐπιστήμην; καὶ Κάλλος καὶ τᾶλλα
 πάντα οὕτως; ναί. οὐκοῦν εἵπερ τι ἄλλο αὐτῆς
 Ἐπιστήμης μετέχει, οὐκ ἂν τινα μᾶλλον ἢ θεὸν
 φαίης ἔχειν τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην ἐπιστήμην; ἀνάγκη.
 ἄρ' οὖν οἷός τε αὖ ἔσται ὁ θεὸς τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν d
 γινώσκειν αὐτὴν Ἐπιστήμην ἔχων; τί γὰρ οὐ;
 ὅτι, ἔφη ὁ Παρμενίδης, ὡμολόγηται ἡμῖν, ὦ Σώ-

κρατες, μήτ' ἐκεῖνα τὰ εἶδη πρὸς τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν
τὴν δύναμιν ἔχειν ἣν ἔχει, μήτε τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν
πρὸς ἐκεῖνα, ἀλλ' αὐτὰ πρὸς αὐτὰ ἐκάτερα. ὁμο-
λόγηται γάρ. οὐκοῦν εἰ παρὰ τῷ θεῷ αὕτη ἐστὶν
ἡ ἀκριβεστάτη Δεσποτεία καὶ αὕτη ἡ ἀκριβεστάτη
'Επιστήμη, οὐτ' ἂν ἡ Δεσποτεία ἡ ἐκείνων ἡμῶν
e ποτὲ ἂν δεσπόσειεν, οὐτ' ἂν ἡ 'Επιστήμη ἡμᾶς
γνοίῃ οὐδέ τι ἄλλο τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν, ἀλλὰ ὁμοίως
ἡμεῖς τ' ἐκείνων οὐκ ἄρχομεν τῇ παρ' ἡμῖν ἀρχῇ
οὐδὲ γιννώσκουμεν τοῦ θείου οὐδὲν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ
ἐπιστήμῃ, ἐκεῖνοί τε αὖ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον
οὔτε δεσπότηαι ἡμῶν εἰσὶν οὔτε γιννώσκουσι τὰ
ἀνθρώπεια πράγματα θεοὶ ὄντες. ἀλλὰ μὴ λίαν,
ἔφη, θαυμαστὸς ὁ λόγος ἦ, εἴ τις τὸν θεὸν ἀπο-
στερήσειε τοῦ εἰδέναι.

ταῦτα μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ Παρμενίδης, 11. With-
135 καὶ ἔτι ἄλλα πρὸς τούτοις πάνυ πολλὰ ἀναγκαῖον out εἶδη,
ἔχειν τὰ εἶδη, εἰ εἰσὶν αὐταὶ αἱ ἰδέαι τῶν ὄντων there can
καὶ ὁριεῖται τις αὐτό τι ἕκαστον εἶδος· ὥστε ἀπο- be no phi-
ρεῖν τε τὸν ἀκούοντα καὶ ἀμφισβητεῖν ὡς οὔτε losophy.
ἔστι ταῦτα, εἴτε ὅ τι μάλιστα εἴη, πολλὴ ἀνάγκη
αὐτὰ εἶναι τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει ἄγνωστα· καὶ
ταῦτα λέγοντα δοκεῖν τε τὶ λέγειν καί, ὃ ἄρτι
ἐλέγομεν, θαυμαστῶς ὡς δυσανάπειστον εἶναι· καὶ
ἀνδρὸς πάνυ μὲν εὐφυοῦς τοῦ δυνησομένου μαθεῖν
ὡς ἔστι γένος τι ἐκάστου καὶ οὐσία αὐτὴ καθ'
b αὐτήν, ἔτι δὲ θαυμαστοτέρου τοῦ εὐρήσοντος καὶ
ἄλλον δυνησομένου διδάξαι ταῦτα πάντα ἱκανῶς
διευκρινησάμενον. συγχωρῶ σοι, ἔφη, ὦ Παρ-
μενίδη, ὁ Σωκράτης· πάνυ γάρ μοι κατὰ νοῦν
λέγεις. ἀλλὰ μέντοι, εἶπεν ὁ Παρμενίδης, εἴ γέ

τις δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες, αὐτὸ μὴ ἐάσει εἶδη τῶν ὄντων εἶναι, εἰς πάντα τὰ νῦν δὴ καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα ἀποβλέψας, μηδέ τι ὀριεῖται εἶδος ἐνὸς ἐκάστου, οὐδὲ ὅποι τρέψει τὴν διάνοιαν ἔξει, μὴ ἐὼν ἰδέαν τῶν ὄντων ἐκάστου τὴν αὐτὴν αἰεὶ εἶναι, καὶ οὕτως τὴν τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμιν παντάπασι διαφθερεῖ. τοῦ τοιούτου μὲν οὖν μοι δοκεῖς καὶ μᾶλλον ῥηθῆσθαι ἀληθῆ λέγεις, φάναι.

12. Parmenides expounds the Method of philosophizing: every hypothesis should be argued affirmatively, i.e. supposing it to be true, and negatively, i.e. supposing it to be not true, and the consequences negative and positive should be compared. Socrates, continues Parmenides, had rightly conceived that the difficulties arising from Incompatibilities lay in the region of εἶδη, and not in the region of

τί οὖν ποιήσεις φιλοσοφίας πέρι; ποῖ τρέψει ἀγνοουμένων τούτων; οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκῶ καθορᾶν ἔν γε τῷ παρόντι. πρῶ γάρ, εἰπεῖν, πρὶν γυμνασθῆναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὀρίζεσθαι ἐπιχειρεῖς Καλόν τε τί καὶ Δίκαιον καὶ Ἀγαθόν καὶ ἐν ἑκάστον τῶν εἰδῶν ἐνενόησα γὰρ καὶ πρῶην σου ἀκούων διαλεγομένου ἀ ἐνθάδε Ἀριστοτέλει τῷδε. καλὴ μὲν οὖν καὶ θεία, εὖ ἴσθι, ἡ ὁρμή, ἣν ὁρμᾶς ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους· ἔλκυσον δὲ σαυτὸν καὶ γύμνασαι μᾶλλον διὰ τῆς δοκούσης ἀχρήστου εἶναι καὶ καλουμένης ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἀδολεσχίας, ἕως ἔτι νέος εἶ. εἰ δὲ μή, σὲ διαφεύζεται ἡ ἀλήθεια. τίς οὖν ὁ τρόπος, φάναι, ὦ Παρμενίδη, τῆς γυμνασίας; οὗτος, εἰπεῖν, ὄνπερ ἤκουσας Ζήνωνος. πλὴν τοῦτό γέ σου καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον ἠγάσθην εἰπόντος, ὅτι οὐκ εἷας ἐν τοῖς ὀρωμένοις οὐδὲ περὶ ταῦτα τὴν πλάνην ἐπισκοπεῖν, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἃ μάλιστα τις ἂν λόγῳ λάβοι καὶ εἶδη ἂν ἠγήσαιο εἶναι. δοκεῖ γάρ μοι, ἔφη, ταύτῃ γε οὐδὲν χαλεπὸν εἶναι καὶ ὅμοια καὶ ἀνόμοια καὶ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν τὰ ὄντα πάσχοντα ἀποφαίνειν. καὶ καλῶς γ', ἔφη. χρὴ δὲ καὶ τόδε ἔτι πρὸς τούτῳ ποιεῖν, μὴ μόνον εἰ ἔστιν ἑκάστον ὑποτιθέμενον σκοπεῖν τὰ ξυμβαίνοντα ἐκ τῆς ὑποθέσεως, 136

ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰ μὴ ἔστι τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὑποτίθεσθαι, sensible things. Parmenides exemplifies his method by supposing Zeno's thesis εἰ πολλά ἐστι applied to τὸ ἐν and to τὰ πολλά, and the counter thesis εἰ μὴ ἔστι πολλά applied to τὸ ἐν and τὰ πολλά, both by themselves and in combination.

εἰ βούλει μᾶλλον γυμνασθῆναι. πῶς λέγεις; φάναι. οἶον, ἔφη, εἰ βούλει περὶ ταύτης τῆς ὑποθέσεως, ἣν Ζήνων. ὑπέθετο, εἰ πολλά ἐστι, τί χρὴ ξυμβαίνειν καὶ αὐτοῖς τοῖς Πολλοῖς πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸ Ἐν καὶ τῷ Ἐνὶ πρὸς τε αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς τὰ Πολλά· καὶ αὖ εἰ μὴ ἐστι πολλά, πάλιν σκοπεῖν τί ξυμβήσεται καὶ τῷ Ἐνὶ καὶ τοῖς Πολλοῖς καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα· καὶ αὖθις αὖ ἐὰν ὑποθῇ, εἰ ἔστιν Ὁμοιότης ἢ εἰ μὴ ἔστι, τί ἐφ' ἐκατέρας τῆς ὑποθέσεως ξυμβήσεται καὶ αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὑποτεθείσιν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα. καὶ περὶ Ἀνομοίου ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, καὶ περὶ Κινήσεως καὶ Στάσεως, καὶ περὶ Γενέσεως καὶ Φθορᾶς, καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ Εἶναι καὶ τοῦ μὴ Εἶναι· καὶ ἐνὶ λόγῳ, περὶ ὅτου ἂν αἰεὶ ὑποθῇ ὡς ὄντος καὶ ὡς οὐκ ὄντος καὶ ὅτι οὐν ἄλλο πάθος πᾶσχοντος, δεῖ σκοπεῖν τὰ ξυμβαίνοντα πρὸς αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς ἓν ἕκαστον τῶν ἄλλων, ὃ τι ἂν προέλῃ, καὶ πρὸς πλείω καὶ πρὸς ξύμπαντα ὡσαύτως· καὶ τᾶλλα αὖ πρὸς αὐτά τε καὶ πρὸς ἄλλο ὃ τι ἂν προαιρῇ αἰεὶ, ἐὰν τε ὡς ὄν ὑποθῇ ὃ ὑπετίθεσο, ἐὰν τε ὡς μὴ ὄν, εἰ μέλλεις τελέως γυμνασάμενος κυρίως διόψεσθαι τὸ ἀληθές. ἀμήχανον, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὦ Παρμενίδη, πραγματεῖαν, καὶ οὐ σφόδρα μανθάνω· ἀλλὰ μοι τί οὐ διήλθες αὐτὸς ὑποθέμενός τι, ἵνα μᾶλλον καταμάθω; πολὺ ἔργον, φάναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, προστάττεις ὡς τηλικῶδε. ἀλλὰ σύ, εἰπεῖν τὸν Σωκράτη, Ζήνων, τί οὐ διήλθες ἡμῖν; καὶ τὸν Ζήνονα ἔφη γελάσαντα φάναι, αὐτοῦ, ὦ Σώκρατες, δεώμεθα Παρμενίδου· μὴ γὰρ οὐ φαῦλον

πολλαχοῦ ἂν αὐτοῦ ἄπτοιτο πολλοῖς· τοῦ δὲ ἐνός
 τε καὶ ἀμεροῦς καὶ κύκλου μὴ μετέχοντος ἀδύνατον
 πολλαχῇ κυκλῶ ἄπτεσθαι. ἀδύνατον. ἀλλὰ μὴν
 αὐτό γε ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὄν καὶ ἑαυτὸ εἶη περιέχον οὐκ
 ἄλλο ἢ αὐτό, εἴπερ καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἶη· ἐν τῷ γάρ ὅ
 τι εἶναι μὴ περιέχοντι ἀδύνατον. ἀδύνατον γάρ.
 οὐκοῦν ἕτερον μὲν ἂν τι εἶη αὐτὸ τὸ περιέχον,
 ἕτερον δὲ τὸ περιεχόμενον· οὐ γὰρ ὅλον γε ἅμφω
 ταῦτόν ἅμα πείσεται καὶ ποιήσεται· καὶ οὕτω Τὸ
 Ἐν οὐκ ἂν εἶη ἔτι ἐν ἀλλὰ δύο. οὐ γὰρ οὖν.
 οὐκ ἄρα ἐστί που Τὸ Ἐν, μήτε ἐν ἑαυτῷ μήτε ἐν
 ἄλλῳ ἐνόν. οὐκ ἔστιν. (7) ὅρα δὴ, οὕτως ἔχον
 εἰ οἶόν τέ ἐστιν ἐστάναι ἢ κινεῖσθαι. τί δὴ γὰρ
 οὐ; ὅτι κινούμενόν γε ἢ φέροιτο ἢ ἀλλοιοῖτο ἂν·
 αὐταὶ γὰρ μόναι κινήσεις. ναί. ἀλλοιούμενον δὲ
 Τὸ Ἐν ἑαυτοῦ ἀδύνατόν που ἐν ἔτι εἶναι. ἀδύνατον.
 οὐκ ἄρα κατ' ἀλλοίωσίν γε κινεῖται. οὐ φαίνεται.
 ἀλλ' ἄρα τῷ φέρεσθαι; ἴσως. καὶ μὴν εἰ φέροιτο
 τὸ ἐν, ἥτοι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἂν περιφέροιτο κύκλῳ ἢ
 μεταλλάττοι χώραν ἑτέραν ἐξ ἑτέρας. ἀνάγκη.
 οὐκοῦν κύκλῳ μὲν περιφερόμενον ἐπὶ μέσου βε-
 βηκέναι ἀνάγκη, καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸ μέσον φερόμενα
 ἄλλα μέρη ἔχειν ἑαυτοῦ· ὧ δὲ μήτε μέσου μήτε
 μερῶν προσήκει, τίς μηχανὴ τοῦτο κύκλῳ ποτὲ
 ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου ἐνεχθῆναι; οὐδεμία. ἀλλὰ δὴ χώραν
 ἀμείβον ἄλλοτ' ἄλλοθι γίγνεται καὶ οὕτω κινεῖται;
 εἴπερ γε δὴ. οὐκοῦν εἶναι μὲν που ἐν τινι αὐτὸ
 ἀδύνατον ἐφάνη; ναί. ἀρ' οὖν γίγνεσθαι ἔτι ἀδυ-
 νατώτερον; οὐκ ἐννοῶ ὅπῃ. εἰ ἐν τῷ τι γίγνεται,
 οὐκ ἀνάγκη μήτε πῶ ἐν ἐκείνῳ εἶναι ἔτι ἐγγιγνό-
 μενον, μήτ' ἔτι ἔξω ἐκείνου παντάπασιν, εἴπερ δὴ

(7) has no stationary state, has no motion-ary state—either by way of—(α) ἀλλοίωσις, modifica-tion, or (β) τὸ φέρεσ-θαι, motion, either cir-cular, or progres-sive, or qualita-tive;

ἐγγίγνεται; ἀνάγκη. εἰ ἄρα τι ἄλλο πείσεται
 οὗτο, ἐκεῖνο ἂν μόνον πάσχοι οὐ μέρη εἶη· τὸ
 μὲν γὰρ ἂν τι αὐτοῦ ἤδη ἐν ἐκείνῳ, τὸ δὲ ἔξω εἶη
 ἅμα· τὸ δὲ μὴ ἔχον μέρη οὐχ οἷόν τε που ἔσται
 τρόπῳ οὐδενὶ ὅλον ἅμα μήτε ἐντὸς εἶναι τινὸς μήτε
 ἔξω. ἀληθῆ. οὐ δὲ μήτε μέρη εἰσὶ μήθ' ὅλον
 τυγχάνει ὄν, οὐ πολὺ ἔτι ἀδυνατώτερον ἐγγίγνεσθαι
 που, μήτε κατὰ μέρη μήτε κατὰ ὅλον ἐγγιγνόμενον;
 139 φαίνεται. οὐτ' ἄρα ποιῶν καὶ ἐν τῷ γιγνόμενον
 χώραν ἀλλάττει, οὐτ' ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ περιφερόμενον,
 οὔτε ἀλλοιούμενον. οὐκ ἔοικεν. κατὰ πᾶσαν ἄρα
 κίνησιν τὸ Ἐν ἀκίνητον. ἀκίνητον. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ
 εἶναί γε φαμεν ἐν τινι αὐτὸ ἀδύνατον. φαμέν γάρ.
 οὐδ' ἄρα ποτὲ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐστίν. τί δή; ὅτι ἤδη ἂν
 ἐν ἐκείνῳ εἶη ἐν ᾧ τῷ αὐτῷ ἐστίν. πάννυ μὲν οὖν.
 ἀλλ' οὔτε ἐν ἑαυτῷ οὔτε ἐν ἄλλῳ οἷόν τε ἦν αὐτῷ
 ἐνεῖναι. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. οὐδέποτε ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ Ἐν
 ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, οὐκ ἔοικεν. ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε μηδέποτε
 ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὄν οὔθ' ἡσυχίαν ἄγει οὔθ' ἔστηκεν.
 οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε. τὸ Ἐν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὔθ'
 ἔστηκεν οὔτε κινεῖται. οὐκ οὖν δὴ φαίνεται γε.
 οὐδὲ μὴν ταῦτα, οὐθ' ἐτέρῳ οὔτε ἑαυτῷ
 οὔτε αὐτοῦ οὔτε ἐτέρου
 μὲν που ἑαυτοῦ ὄν ἐνὸς
 εἶη ἓν. ἀληθῆ. καὶ
 ἐκεῖνο, ἂν εἶη, αὐτὸ
 ὃ ἂν οὕτως εἶη ὅπερ
 οὐ γὰρ οὖν. ταῦτόν
 ἑαυτοῦ οὐκ ἔσται οὐ
 οὐκ ἔσται, ἕως ἂν
 ἐτέρῳ τινὸς εἶναι, ἀλλὰ

(8) has no
 Identity,
 therefore
 no Diver-
 sity; no
 Similarity,
 therefore
 no Dis-
 similarity;

μόνῳ ἐτέρῳ, ἄλλῳ δὲ οὐδενί. ὀρθῶς. τῷ μὲν
 ἄρα ἐν εἶναι οὐκ ἔσται ἕτερον· ἢ οἶει; οὐ δῆτα. d
 ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ μὴ τούτῳ, οὐχ ἑαυτῷ ἔσται· εἰ δὲ
 μὴ αὐτῷ, οὐδὲ αὐτό· αὐτὸ δὲ μηδαμῇ ὄν ἕτερον
 οὐδενὸς ἔσται ἕτερον. ὀρθῶς. οὐδὲ μὴν ταῦτόν
 ἑαυτῷ ἔσται. πῶς δ' οὐ; οὐχ ἥπερ Τοῦ Ἐνὸς
 φύσις, αὕτη δῆπου καὶ Τοῦ Ταύτου. τί δή; ὅτι
 οὐκ ἐπειδὰν ταῦτόν γένηται τῷ τι, ἐν γίγνεται.
 ἀλλὰ τί μὴν; Τοῖς Πολλοῖς ταῦτόν γε γινόμενον πολλὰ
 ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἓν. ἀληθῆ. ἀλλ' εἰ
 Τὸ Ἐν καὶ Τὸ Ταῦτόν μηδαμῇ διαφέρει, ὅποτε τι
 ταῦτόν ἐγίγνετο, αἰεὶ ἂν ἐν ἐγίγνετο, καὶ ὅποτε ἓν,
 ταῦτόν. πάνυ γε. εἰ ἄρα Τὸ Ἐν ἑαυτῷ ταῦτόν e
 ἔσται, οὐχ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔσται· καὶ οὕτως ἐν ὄν οὐχ
 ἐν ἔσται· ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε ἀδύνατον· ἀδύνατον
 ἄρα καὶ Τῷ Ἐνὶ ἢ ἐτέρου ἕτερον εἶναι ἢ ἑαυτῷ
 ταῦτόν. ἀδύνατον. οὕτω δὲ ἕτερόν γε ἢ ταῦτόν
 Τὸ Ἐν οὐτ' ἂν αὐτῷ οὐτ' ἂν ἐτέρῳ εἴη. οὐ γὰρ
 οὖν. οὐδὲ μὴν ὁμοίόν τινι ἔσται οὐδ' ἀνόμοιον
 οὐθ' ἑαυτῷ οὐθ' ἐτέρῳ. τί δή; ὅτι τὸ ταῦτόν που
 πεπονθὸς ὁμοιον. ναί. Τοῦ δέ γε Ἐνὸς χωρὶς
 ἐφάνη τὴν φύσιν Τὸ Ταῦτόν. ἐφάνη γάρ. ἀλλὰ 140
 μὴν εἴ τι πέπονθε χωρὶς τοῦ ἐν εἶναι Τὸ Ἐν, πλείω
 ἂν εἶναι πεπόνθοι ἢ ἓν· τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον. ναί.
 οὐδαμῶς ἔστιν ἄρα ταῦτόν πεπονθὸς εἶναι Τὸ Ἐν
 οὔτε ἄλλῳ οὐθ' ἑαυτῷ. οὐ φαίνεται. οὐδὲ ὁμοιον
 ἄρα δυνατόν αὐτὸ εἶναι οὔτε ἄλλῳ οὐθ' ἑαυτῷ. οὐκ
 ἔοικεν. οὐδὲ μὴν ἕτερόν γε πέπονθεν εἶναι Τὸ Ἐν·
 καὶ γὰρ οὕτω πλείω ἂν πεπόνθοι εἶναι ἢ ἓν. πλείω
 γάρ. τό γε μὴν ἕτερον πεπονθὸς ἢ ἑαυτοῦ ἢ ἄλλου
 ἀνόμοιον ἂν εἴη ἢ ἑαυτῷ ἢ ἄλλῳ, εἴπερ τὸ ταῦτόν b

πεπονθὸς ὁμοιον. ὀρθῶς. Τὸ δέ γε Ἐν, ὡς ἔοικεν,
 οὐδαμῶς ἕτερον πεπονθὸς οὐδαμῶς ἀνόμοιον ἐστίν
 οὐθ' ἐαυτῷ οὐθ' ἐτέρῳ. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. οὔτε ἄρα
 ὁμοιον οὔτε ἀνόμοιον οὐθ' ἐτέρῳ οὔτε ἐαυτῷ ἂν εἴη
 Τὸ Ἐν. οὐ φαίνεται. (9) καὶ μὴν τοιοῦτόν γε ὄν (9) no mode
 οὔτε ἴσον οὔτε ἄνισον ἔσται οὔτε ἐαυτῷ οὔτε ἄλλῳ. of Quan-
 πῇ; ἴσον μὲν ὄν τῶν αὐτῶν μέτρων ἔσται ἐκείνῳ ᾧ Equality,
 ἂν ἴσον ᾗ. ναί. μείζον δέ που ἢ ἔλαττον ὄν, οἷς or In-
 c μὲν ἂν ξύμμετρον ᾗ, τῶν μὲν ἐλαττόνων πλείω equality, or
 μέτρα ἔξει, τῶν δὲ μειζόνων ἐλάττω. ναί. οἷς δ' Excess ;
 ἂν μὴ σύμμετρον, τῶν μὲν σμικροτέρων, τῶν δὲ therefore
 μειζόνων μέτρων ἔσται. πῶς γὰρ οὐ; οὐκοῦν no Defect ;
 ἀδύνατον τὸ μὴ μετέχον Τοῦ Αὐτοῦ ἢ μέτρων τῶν
 αὐτῶν εἶναι ἢ ἄλλων ὄντινων οὖν τῶν αὐτῶν; ἀδύνα-
 τον. ἴσον μὲν ἄρα οὐτ' ἂν ἐαυτῷ οὔτε ἄλλῳ εἴη,
 μὴ τῶν αὐτῶν μέτρων ὄν. οὐκ οὖν φαίνεται γέ.
 ἀλλὰ μὴν πλειόνων γε μέτρων ὄν ἢ ἐλαττόνων,
 d ὅσων περ μέτρων, τοσούτων καὶ μερῶν ἂν εἴη· καὶ
 οὕτως αὖ οὐκέτι ἐν ἔσται, ἀλλὰ τοσαῦτα ὅσα περ
 καὶ τὰ μέτρα. ὀρθῶς. εἰ δέ γε ἐνὸς μέτρου εἴη,
 ἴσον ἂν γίγνοιτο τῷ μέτρῳ· τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον
 ἐφάνη, ἴσον τῷ αὐτὸ εἶναι. ἐφάνη γάρ. οὔτε ἄρα
 ἐνὸς μέτρου μετέχον οὔτε πολλῶν οὔτε ὀλίγων, οὔτε
 τὸ παράπαν Τοῦ Αὐτοῦ μετέχον, οὔτε ἐαυτῷ ποτε, ὡς
 ἔοικεν, ἔσται ἴσον οὔτε ἄλλῳ· οὐδ' αὖ μείζον οὐδὲ
 ἔλαττον οὔτε ἐαυτοῦ οὐθ' ἐτέρου. παντάπασιν μὲν
 e οὖν οὕτως. (10) τί δέ; πρεσβύτερον ἢ νεώτερον ἢ (10) no
 τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχειν Τὸ Ἐν δοκεῖ τῷ δυνατὸν mode of
 εἶναι; τί δὴ γὰρ οὐ; ὅτι που ἡλικίαν μὲν τὴν Time ;
 αὐτὴν ἔχον ἢ αὐτῷ ἢ ἄλλῳ ἰσότητος χρόνου καὶ
 ὁμοιότητος μεθέξει, ὣν ἐλέγομεν οὐ μετεῖναι Τῷ

Ἐνί, οὐθ' ὁμοιότητος οὔτε ἰσότητος. ἐλέγομεν γὰρ
 οὖν. καὶ μὴν καὶ ὅτι ἀνομοιότητός τε καὶ ἀνισότη-
 τος οὐ μετέχει, καὶ τοῦτο ἐλέγομεν. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
 πῶς οὖν οἶόν τε ἔσται τινὸς ἢ πρεσβύτερον ἢ νεώτε- 141
 ρον εἶναι, ἢ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχειν τῷ, τοιοῦτον ὄν ;
 οὐδαμῶς. οὐκ ἄρ' ἂν εἴη νεώτερον οὐδὲ πρεσβύτε-
 ρον οὐδὲ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχον Τὸ Ἐν οὔτε αὐτῷ
 οὔτε ἄλλῳ. οὐ φαίνεται. ἄρ' οὖν οὐδὲ ἐν χρόνῳ τὸ
 παράπαν δύναιτ' ἂν εἶναι Τὸ Ἐν, εἰ τοιοῦτον εἴη ;
 ἢ οὐκ ἀνάγκη, εἴαν τι ἢ ἐν χρόνῳ, ἀεὶ αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ
 πρεσβύτερον γίγνεσθαι ; ἀνάγκη. οὐκοῦν τό γε
 πρεσβύτερον ἀεὶ νεωτέρου πρεσβύτερον ; τί μὴν ;
 τὸ πρεσβύτερον ἄρα ἑαυτοῦ γιγνόμενον καὶ νεώτε- b
 ρον ἑαυτοῦ ἅμα γίγνεται, εἴπερ μέλλει ἔχειν ὅτου
 πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται. πῶς λέγεις ; ὦδε· διά-
 φορον ἕτερον ἐτέρου οὐδὲν δεῖ γίγνεσθαι ἤδη ὄντος
 διαφόρου, ἀλλὰ τοῦ μὲν ἤδη ὄντος ἤδη εἶναι, τοῦ
 δὲ γεγονότος γεγονέναι, τοῦ δὲ μέλλοντος μέλλειν,
 τοῦ δὲ γιγνομένου οὔτε γεγονέναι οὔτε μέλλειν οὔτε
 εἶναί πω διάφορον, ἀλλὰ γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἄλλως οὐκ
 εἶναι. ἀνάγκη γάρ. ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε πρεσβύτερον c
 διαφορότης νεωτέρου ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄλλου. ἔστι
 γάρ. τὸ ἄρα πρεσβύτερον ἑαυτοῦ γιγνόμενον ἀνά-
 γκη καὶ νεώτερον ἅμα ἑαυτοῦ γίγνεσθαι. ἔοικεν.
 ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ μήτε πλείῳ ἑαυτοῦ γίγνεσθαι χρόνον
 μήτ' ἐλάττω, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἴσον χρόνον καὶ γίγνεσθαι
 ἑαυτῷ καὶ εἶναι καὶ γεγονέναι καὶ μέλλειν ἔσεσθαι.
 ἀνάγκη γὰρ οὖν καὶ ταῦτα. ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἐστίν, ὥς
 ἔοικεν, ὅσα γε ἐν χρόνῳ ἐστὶ καὶ μετέχει τοῦ τοιού- d
 του, ἕκαστον αὐτῶν τὴν αὐτὴν τε αὐτὸ αὐτῷ ἡλικίαν
 ἔχειν καὶ πρεσβυτέρόν τε αὐτοῦ ἅμα καὶ νεώτερον

- γίγνεσθαι. κινδυνεύει. ἀλλὰ μὴν Τῷ γε Ἐνὶ τῶν
 τοιούτων παθημάτων οὐδὲν μετῆν. οὐ γὰρ μετῆν.
 οὐδὲ ἄρα χρόνου αὐτῷ μέτεστιν, οὐδ' ἔστιν ἔν τινι
 χρόνῳ. οὐκ οὖν δὴ, ὥς γε ὁ λόγος αἰρεῖ. (11) τί (11) no
Produc-
tion, nor
Existence;
 οὖν; τὸ ἦν καὶ τὸ γέγονε καὶ τὸ ἐγίγνετο οὐ χρόνου
 μέθεξιν δοκεῖ σημαίνειν τοῦ ποτὲ γεγονότος; καὶ
 e μάλα. τί δέ; τὸ ἔσται καὶ τὸ γενήσεται καὶ τὸ
 γενηθήσεται οὐ τοῦ ἔπειτά που μέλλοντος; ναί.
 τὸ δὲ δὴ ἔστι καὶ τὸ γίγνεται οὐ τοῦ νῦν παρόντος;
 πάννυ μὲν οὖν. εἰ ἄρα Τὸ Ἐν μηδαμῇ μηδενὸς
 μετέχει χρόνου, οὔτε ποτὲ γέγονει οὔτ' ἐγίγνετο
 οὔτ' ἦν ποτέ, οὔτε νῦν γέγονεν οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτ'
 ἔστιν, οὔτ' ἔπειτα γενήσεται οὔτε γενηθήσεται οὔτ'
 ἔσται. ἀληθέστατα. ἔστιν οὖν οὐσίας ὅπως ἂν
 τι μετάσχοι ἄλλως ἢ κατὰ τούτων τι; οὐκ ἔστιν.
 οὐδαμῶς ἄρα Τὸ Ἐν οὐσίας μετέχει. οὐκ ἔοικεν.
 οὐδαμῶς ἄρα ἔστι Τὸ Ἐν. οὐ φαίνεται. οὐδ' ἄρα
 οὕτως ἔστιν ὥστε ἔν εἶναι· εἴη γὰρ ἂν ἤδη ὄν καὶ
 οὐσίας μετέχον· ἀλλ' ὥς ἔοικε, Τὸ Ἐν οὔτε ἔν ἔστιν
 οὔτε ἔστιν, εἰ δεῖ τῷ τοιῷδε λόγῳ πιστεύειν. κιν-
 142 δυνεύει. (12) ὁ δὲ μὴ ἔστι, τούτῳ τῷ μὴ ὄντι εἴη (12) no
logical
accident
either of
Name or
Definition;
and no
psycho-
logical
correlative,
either as
Notion,
Perception,
or Concep-
tion. This
conclusion
is rejected.
 ἂν τι ἢ αὐτῷ ἢ αὐτοῦ; καὶ πῶς; οὐδ' ἄρα ὄνομα
 ἔστιν αὐτῷ οὐδὲ λόγος οὐδέ τις ἐπιστήμη οὐδὲ
 αἰσθησις οὐδὲ δόξα. οὐ φαίνεται. οὐδ' ὀνομάζε-
 ται ἄρα οὐδὲ λέγεται οὐδὲ δοξάζεται οὐδὲ γινώ-
 σκεται, οὐδέ τι τῶν ὄντων αὐτοῦ αἰσθάνεται. οὐκ
 ἔοικεν. ἢ δυνατόν οὖν περὶ Τὸ Ἐν ταῦθ' οὕτως
 ἔχειν; οὐκ οὖν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
 b βούλει οὖν ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς
 ἐπανέλθωμεν, εἴαν τι ἡμῖν ἐπανιοῦσιν ἀλλοῖον φανῇ;
 πάννυ μὲν οὖν βούλομαι. οὐκοῦν ἔν εἰ ἔστι,

The mean-
ing of the
Second
Hypo-
thesis.

φαμέν, τὰ συμβαίνοντα περὶ αὐτοῦ, ποῖά ποτε
τυγχάνει ὄντα, διομολογητέα ταῦτα· οὐχ οὕτως;
ναί. ὅρα δὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆς. ἔν εἰ ἔστιν, ἄρα οἷόν τε
αὐτὸ εἶναι μέν, οὐσίας δὲ μὴ μετέχειν; οὐχ οἷόν
τε. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ οὐσία Τοῦ Ἐνὸς εἶη ἅν, οὐ ταῦτὸν
οὔσα Τῷ Ἐνί; οὐ γὰρ ἅν ἐκείνη ἦν ἐκείνου οὐσία,
οὐδ' ἅν ἐκείνο Τὸ Ἐν ἐκείνης μετείχεν, ἀλλ' ὅμοιον
ἅν ἦν λέγειν ἔν τε εἶναι καὶ ἐν ἔν. νῦν δὲ οὐχ
αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ὑπόθεσις, εἰ ἐν ἔν, τί χρὴ συμβαί-
νειν, ἀλλ' εἰ ἐν ἔστιν· οὐχ οὕτως; πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
οὐκοῦν ὥς ἄλλο τι σημαῖνον τὸ ἔστι τοῦ ἔν;
ἀνάγκη. ἄρ' οὖν ἄλλο ἢ ὅτι οὐσίας μετέχει Τὸ
Ἐν, τοῦτ' ἅν εἶη τὸ λεγόμενον, ἐπειδάν τις συλ-
λήβδην εἶπη ὅτι ἐν ἔστιν; πάνυ γε.

II. *The
Second Hy-
pothesis:*
ἐν εἰ ἔστι
= εἰ Τὸ Ἐν
ἐστὶν ὄν
= εἰ Τὸ Ἐν
οὐσίας με-
τέχει, Τὸ
Ἐν admits
all con-
trary pre-
dicates.

(1) If the
One exist,
that is, par-
ticipate in
existence,
then the
One is in-
finite in
quantity.

Πάλιν (1) δὴ λέγωμεν, ἐν εἰ ἔστι, τί συμβήσεται.
σκόπει οὖν, εἰ οὐκ ἀνάγκη ταύτην τὴν ὑπόθεσιν
τοιούτου ὄν Τὸ Ἐν σημαίνειν, οἷον μέρη ἔχειν;
πῶς; ὧδε. εἰ τὸ ἔστι Τοῦ Ἐνὸς ὄντος λέγεται καὶ
Τὸ Ἐν τοῦ ὄντος ἑνός, ἔστι δὲ οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ Ἡ τε
Οὐσία καὶ Τὸ Ἐν, τοῦ αὐτοῦ δὲ ἐκείνου, οὐ ὑπεθέ-
μεθα, τοῦ ἑνὸς ὄντος, ἄρα οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὸ μὲν ὅλον
ἐν ὄν εἶναι αὐτό, τούτου δὲ γίγνεσθαι μόρια Τό τε
Ἐν καὶ Τὸ εἶναι; ἀνάγκη. πότερον οὖν ἐκάτερον
τῶν μορίων τούτων μόριον μόνον προσερούμεν, ἢ
τοῦ ὅλου μόριον τό γε μόριον προσρητέον; τοῦ
ὅλου. καὶ ὅλον ἄρα ἐστὶν ὃ ἅν ἐν ἦ, καὶ μόριον
ἔχει. πάνυ γε. τί οὖν; τῶν μορίων ἐκάτερον
τούτων τοῦ Ἐνὸς ὄντος, τό τε ἐν καὶ τὸ ὄν, ἄρα
ἀπολείπεσθον ἢ Τὸ Ἐν Τοῦ εἶναι μόριον ἢ Τὸ Ὄν
Τοῦ Ἐνὸς μορίου; οὐκ ἅν εἶη. πάλιν ἄρα καὶ τῶν
μορίων ἐκάτερον τό τε ἐν ἴσχει καὶ τὸ ὄν, καὶ

γίγνεται τὸ ἐλάχιστον ἐκ δυοῖν αὖ μορίοις τὸ
 μόριον, καὶ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον οὕτως αἰεί, ὃ τί
 περ ἂν μόριον γένηται, τούτῳ τὸ μόριον αἰεί ἴσχει·
 Τό τε γὰρ Ἐν Τὸ Ὀν αἰεί ἴσχει καὶ Τὸ Ὀν Τὸ Ἐν·
 143 ὥστε ἀνάγκη δύ' αἰεί γιγνόμενον μηδέποτε ἓν
 εἶναι. παντάπασιν μὲν οὖν. οὐκοῦν ἄπειρον ἂν τὸ
 πλῆθος οὕτω Τὸ Ἐν ὄν εἴη; ἔοικεν. (2) ἴθι δὴ (2) If the
 καὶ τῇδε ἔτι. πῇ; οὐσίας φαμὲν μετέχειν Τὸ Ἐν, One parti-
 διό ἔστιν; ναί. καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δὴ Τὸ Ἐν ὄν πολλὰ Existence,
 ἐφάνη. οὕτως. τί δέ; αὐτὸ Τὸ Ἐν, ὃ δὴ φαμεν Number
 οὐσίας μετέχειν, εἰ ἂν αὐτὸ τῇ διανοίᾳ μόνον καθ' must exist.
 αὐτὸ λάβωμεν ἄνευ τούτου οὐ φαμὲν μετέχειν, ἀρά
 γε ἓν μόνον φανήσεται ἢ καὶ πολλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο;
 b ἓν, οἶμαι ἔγωγε. ἴδωμεν δὴ· ἄλλο τι ἕτερον μὲν
 ἀνάγκη τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ εἶναι, ἕτερον δὲ αὐτό;
 εἴπερ μὴ Οὐσία Τὸ Ἐν, ἀλλ' ὥς ἓν οὐσίας μετέσχεν.
 ἀνάγκη. οὐκοῦν εἰ ἕτερον μὲν Ἡ Οὐσία, ἕτερον δὲ
 Τὸ Ἐν, οὔτε τῷ ἓν Τὸ Ἐν τῆς Οὐσίας ἕτερον οὔτε
 τῷ οὐσία εἶναι Ἡ Οὐσία τοῦ Ἐνὸς ἄλλο, ἀλλὰ τῷ
 Ἐτέρῳ τε καὶ Ἄλλῳ ἕτερα ἀλλήλων. πάννυ μὲν
 οὖν. ὥστε οὐ ταυτόν ἐστιν οὔτε τῷ Ἐνὶ οὔτε τῇ
 Οὐσίᾳ Τὸ Ἐτερον. πῶς γάρ; τί οὖν; εἰ ἂν προελώ-
 c μεθα αὐτῶν εἴτε βούλει τὴν Οὐσίαν καὶ Τὸ Ἐτερον
 εἴτε τὴν Οὐσίαν καὶ Τὸ Ἐν εἴτε Τὸ Ἐν καὶ Τὸ
 Ἐτερον, ἀρ' οὐκ ἐν ἐκάστη τῇ προαιρέσει προαιρού-
 μεθά τινε ὧ ὀρθῶς ἔχει καλεῖσθαι ἀμφοτέρῳ; πῶς;
 ὧδε· ἔστιν οὐσίαν εἰπεῖν; ἔστιν. καὶ αὖθις εἰπεῖν
 ἓν; καὶ τοῦτο. ἀρ' οὖν οὐχ ἐκάτερον αὐτοῖν
 εἴρηται; ναί. τί δ' ὅταν εἴπω οὐσία τε καὶ ἓν,
 ἀρα οὐκ ἀμφοτέρῳ; πάννυ γε. οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰ ἂν
 οὐσία τε καὶ ἕτερον ἢ ἕτερόν τε καὶ ἓν, καὶ οὕτω

πανταχῶς ἐφ' ἐκάστου ἄμφω λέγω; ναί. ὦ δ' ἂν d
 ἄμφω ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύησθον, ἄρα οἷόν τε ἄμφω
 μὲν αὐτὸ εἶναι, δύο δὲ μή; οὐχ οἷόν τε. ὦ δ' ἂν
 δύο ἦτον, ἔστι τις μηχανὴ μὴ οὐχ ἐκάτερον αὐτοῖν
 ἐν εἶναι; οὐδεμία. τούτων ἄρα ἐπείπερ σύνδυο
 ἕκαστα ξυμβαίνει εἶναι, καὶ ἐν ἂν εἷη ἕκαστον.
 φαίνεται. εἰ δὲ ἐν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἐστί, συντε-
 θέντος ἑνὸς ὁποιοῦν ἡτινιοῦν συζυγία οὐ τρία
 γίγνεται τὰ πάντα; ναί. τρία δὲ οὐ περιττά, καὶ
 δύο ἄρτια; πῶς δ' οὐ; τί δέ; δυοῖν ὄντων οὐκ
 ἀνάγκη εἶναι καὶ δῖς, καὶ τριῶν ὄντων τρίς, εἵπερ e
 ὑπάρχει τῷ τε δύο τὸ δῖς ἐν καὶ τῷ τρία τὸ τρίς
 ἐν; ἀνάγκη. δυοῖν δὲ ὄντων καὶ δῖς οὐκ ἀνάγκη
 δύο δῖς εἶναι; καὶ τριῶν καὶ τρίς οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὖ
 τρία τρίς εἶναι; πῶς δ' οὐ; τί δέ; τριῶν ὄντων
 καὶ δῖς ὄντων, καὶ δυοῖν ὄντων καὶ τρίς ὄντων, οὐκ
 ἀνάγκη τε τρία δῖς εἶναι καὶ δύο τρίς; πολλή γε.
 ἄρτιά τε ἄρα ἀρτιάκεις ἂν εἷη καὶ περιττὰ περιττάκεις
 καὶ ἄρτια περιττάκεις καὶ περιττὰ ἀρτιάκεις. ἔστιν 144
 οὕτως. εἰ οὖν ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, οἷει τινὰ ἀριθμὸν
 ὑπολείπεσθαι, ὃν οὐκ ἀνάγκη εἶναι; οὐδαμῶς
 γε. εἰ ἄρα ἔστιν ἓν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἀριθμὸν εἶναι.
 ἀνάγκη. (3) ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀριθμοῦ γε ὄντος πόλλ' ἂν
 εἷη καὶ πλῆθος ἄπειρον τῶν ὄντων· ἢ οὐκ ἄπειρος
 ἀριθμὸς πλήθει καὶ μετέχων οὐσίας γίγνεται; καὶ
 πάνυ γε. οὐκοῦν εἰ πᾶς ἀριθμὸς οὐσίας μετέχει,
 καὶ τὸ μόριον ἕκαστον τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ μετέχει ἂν
 αὐτῆς; ναί. ἐπὶ πάντα ἄρα πολλὰ ὄντα Ἡ Οὐσία b
 νενέμηται καὶ οὐδενὸς ἀποστατεῖ τῶν ὄντων, οὔτε
 τοῦ σμικροτάτου οὔτε τοῦ μεγίστου; ἢ τοῦτο μὲν
 καὶ ἄλογον ἐρέσθαι; πῶς γὰρ ἂν δὴ οὐσία γε τῶν

(3) If
 Number
 participate
 in Exist-
 ence,
 Existence
 is distribu-
 table to
 Infinity.

ὄντων του ἀποστατοῖ; οὐδαμῶς. κατακεκερμάτισ-
ται ἄρα ὡς οἶόν τε σμικρότατα καὶ μέγιστα καὶ
πανταχῶς ὄντα, καὶ μεμέρισται πάντων μάλιστα,
c καὶ ἔστι μέρη ἀπέραντα Τῆς Οὐσίας. ἔχει οὕτως.
πλείστα ἄρα ἐστὶ τὰ μέρη αὐτῆς. πλείστα μέντοι.

(4) τί οὖν; ἔστι τι αὐτῶν, ὃ ἔστι μὲν μέρος Τῆς
Οὐσίας, οὐδὲν μέντοι μέρος; καὶ πῶς ἂν τοιοῦτο γέ-
νοιτο; ἀλλ' εἴπερ γε, οἶμαι, ἔστιν, ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ αἰεί,
ἕωςπερ ἂν ᾗ, ἐν γέ τι εἶναι, μηδὲν δὲ ἀδύνατον.
ἀνάγκη. πρὸς ἅπαντι ἄρα ἐκάστω τῷ Τῆς Οὐσίας
μέρει πρόσεστι Τὸ Ἔν, οὐκ ἀπολειπόμενον οὔτε σμι-
κροτέρου οὔτε μείζονος μέρους οὔτε ἄλλου οὐδενός.
d οὕτως. ἄρα οὖν ἐν ὃν πολλαχοῦ ἅμα ὅλον ἐστί;
τοῦτο ἄθρει. ἀλλ' ἀθρῶ, καὶ ὁρῶ ὅτι ἀδύνατον. με-
μερισμένον ἄρα, εἴπερ μὴ ὅλον· ἄλλως γάρ που οὐ-
δαμῶς ἅμα ἅπασι τοῖς Τῆς Οὐσίας μέρεσι παρέσ-
ται, ἢ μεμερισμένον. ναί. καὶ μὴν τό γε μεριστὸν
πολλὴ ἀνάγκη εἶναι τοσαῦτα ὅσαπερ μέρη. ἀνάγκη.
οὐκ ἄρ' ἀληθῆ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν, λέγοντες ὡς πλείστα
μέρη Ἡ Οὐσία νενεμημένη εἴη. οὐδὲ γὰρ πλείω
e Τοῦ Ἐνὸς νενέμηται, ἀλλ' ἴσα, ὡς ἔοικε, τῷ Ἐνί.
οὔτε γὰρ Τὸ Ὀν Τοῦ Ἐνὸς ἀπολείπεται οὔτε Τὸ
Ἐν Τοῦ Ὀντος, ἀλλ' ἐξισοῦσθον δύ' ὄντε αἰεὶ παρὰ
πάντα. παντάπασιν οὕτω φαίνεται. Τὸ Ἐν ἄρ'
αὐτὸ κεκερματισμένον ὑπὸ Τῆς Οὐσίας πολλά τε
καὶ ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆθός ἐστιν. φαίνεται. οὐ μόνον
ἄρα τὸ ὃν ἐν πολλά ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸ Τὸ Ἐν
ὑπὸ Τοῦ Ὀντος διανενεμημένον πολλὰ ἀνάγκη εἶναι.
παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. (5) καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε ὅλου τὰ
μόρια μόρια, πεπερασμένον ἂν εἴη κατὰ τὸ ὅλον
Τὸ Ἐν· ἢ οὐ περιέχεται ὑπὸ τοῦ ὅλου τὰ μόρια;

(4) If
Existence
be dis-
tributable
to Infinity,
the One
must be
distribu-
table like-
wise.

(5) The
One must
exhibit
Rest and
Motion.

ἀνάγκη. ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε περιέχον πέρας ἂν εἴη. 145
 πῶς δ' οὐ; Τὸ Ἐν ἄρα ὄν ἐν τέ ἐστί που καὶ
 πολλά, καὶ ὅλον καὶ μόρια, καὶ πεπερασμένον καὶ
 ἄπειρον πλήθει. φαίνεται. ἄρ' οὖν οὐκ, ἐπείπερ
 πεπερασμένον, καὶ ἔσχατα ἔχον; ἀνάγκη. τί δ';
 ὅλον ὄν οὐκ ἀρχὴν ἂν ἔχοι καὶ μέσον καὶ τελευτήν;
 ἢ οἷόν τέ τι ὅλον εἶναι ἄνευ τριῶν τούτων; καὶ του
 ἐν ὁτιοῦν αὐτῶν ἀποστατῇ, ἐθελήσει ἔτι ὅλον εἶναι;
 οὐκ ἐθελήσει. καὶ ἀρχὴν δὴ, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ τελευτὴν
 καὶ μέσον ἔχοι ἂν Τὸ Ἐν. ἔχοι. ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε b
 μέσον ἴσον τῶν ἐσχάτων ἀπέχει· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλως
 μέσον εἴη. οὐ γάρ. καὶ σχήματος δὴ τινος, ὡς
 ἔοικε, τοιοῦτον ὄν μετέχοι ἂν Τὸ Ἐν, ἥτοι εὐθέος
 ἢ στρογγύλου ἢ τινος μικτοῦ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν. μετέχοι
 γὰρ ἂν. ἄρ' οὖν οὕτως ἔχον οὐκ αὐτό τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ
 ἔσται καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ; πῶς; τῶν μερῶν που ἕκαστον
 ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ ἐστί καὶ οὐδὲν ἐκτὸς τοῦ ὅλου. οὕτως.
 πάντα δὲ τὰ μέρη ὑπὸ τοῦ ὅλου περιέχεται; ναί.
 καὶ μὴν τά γε πάντα μέρη τὰ αὐτοῦ Τὸ Ἐν ἐστί, c
 καὶ οὔτε τι πλεόν οὔτε ἔλαττον ἢ πάντα. οὐ γάρ.
 οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ὅλον Τὸ Ἐν ἐστίν; πῶς δ' οὐ; εἰ
 ἄρα πάντα τὰ μέρη ἐν ὅλῳ τυγχάνει ὄντα, ἐστί δὲ
 τά τε πάντα Τὸ Ἐν καὶ αὐτὸ Τὸ Ὅλον, περιέχεται
 δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ Ὀλου τὰ πάντα, ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἐνὸς ἂν
 περιέχοιτο Τὸ Ἐν, καὶ οὕτως ἂν ἤδη Τὸ Ἐν αὐτὸ
 ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἴη. φαίνεται. ἀλλὰ μέντοι τό γε ὅλον
 αὖ οὐκ ἐν τοῖς μέρεσιν ἐστίν, οὔτε ἐν πᾶσιν οὔτε
 ἐν τινί. εἰ γὰρ ἐν πᾶσιν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν ἐνί. ἐν d
 τινι γὰρ ἐνὶ μὴ ὄν οὐκ ἂν ἔτι που δύναίτο ἐν γε
 ἅπασιν εἶναι· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο μὲν τὸ ἐν τῶν ἀπάντων
 ἐστί, τὸ δὲ ὅλον ἐν τούτῳ ἐνί, πῶς ἔτι ἐν γε τοῖς

πᾶσιν ἐνέσται ; οὐδαμῶς. οὐδὲ μὴν ἐν τισὶ τῶν
 μερῶν. εἰ γὰρ ἐν τισὶ τὸ ὅλον εἶη, τὸ πλεον
 ἂν ἐν τῷ ἐλάττονι εἶη, ὃ ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον. ἀδύνα-
 τον γάρ· μὴ ὄν δ' ἐν πλείοσι μηδ' ἐν ἐνὶ μηδ' ἐν
 ἅπασι τοῖς μέρεσι τὸ ὅλον οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἐν ἐτέρῳ
 ε τινὶ εἶναι, ἢ μηδαμοῦ ἔτι εἶναι ; ἀνάγκη. οὐκοῦν
 μηδαμοῦ μὲν ὄν οὐδὲν ἂν εἶη, ὅλον δὲ ὄν, ἐπειδὴ
 οὐκ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστίν, ἀνάγκη ἐν ἄλλῳ εἶναι ; πάννυ
 γε. ἢ μὲν ἄρα Τὸ Ἐν ὅλον, ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐστίν· ἢ δὲ
 τὰ πάντα μέρη ὄντα τυγχάνει, αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ· καὶ
 οὕτω Τὸ Ἐν ἀνάγκη αὐτό τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἶναι καὶ ἐν
 ἐτέρῳ. ἀνάγκη. οὕτω δὴ πεφυκὸς Τὸ Ἐν ἄρ' οὐκ
 ἀνάγκη καὶ κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἐστάναι ; πῇ ; ἔστηκε μὲν
 που, εἴπερ αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐστίν. ἐν γὰρ ἐνὶ ὄν καὶ
 146 ἐκ τούτου μὴ μεταβαῖνον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἂν εἶη, ἐν
 ἑαυτῷ. ἔστι γάρ. τὸ δέ γε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἀεὶ ὄν
 ἐστὸς δήπου ἀνάγκη ἀεὶ εἶναι. πάννυ γε. τί δέ ;
 τὸ ἐν ἐτέρῳ ἀεὶ ὄν οὐ τὸ ἐναντίον ἀνάγκη μηδέποτ'
 ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ εἶναι, μηδέποτε δὲ ὄν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μηδὲ
 ἐστάναι, μὴ ἐστὸς δὲ κινεῖσθαι ; οὕτως. ἀνάγκη
 ἄρα Τὸ Ἐν, αὐτό τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἀεὶ ὄν καὶ ἐν ἐτέρῳ,
 ἀεὶ κινεῖσθαί τε καὶ ἐστάναι. φαίνεται. (6) καὶ
 μὴν ταυτόν γε δεῖ εἶναι αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ καὶ ἕτερον
 b ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὡσαύτως ταυτόν τε καὶ
 ἕτερον εἶναι, εἴπερ καὶ τὰ πρόσθεν πέπονθεν. πῶς ;
 πᾶν που πρὸς ἅπαν ὧδε ἔχει· ἢ ταυτόν ἐστὶν ἢ
 ἕτερον· ἢ εἰ μὴ ταυτόν ἢ μηδ' ἕτερον, μέρος ἂν
 εἶη τούτου, πρὸς ὃ οὕτως ἔχει, ἢ ὡς πρὸς μέρος
 ὅλον ἂν εἶη. φαίνεται. ἄρ' οὖν Τὸ Ἐν αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ
 μέρος ἐστίν ; οὐδαμῶς. οὐδ' ἄρα ὡς πρὸς μέρος
 αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ὅλον ἂν εἶη, πρὸς ἑαυτὸ μέρος ὄν. οὐ

(6) The
 One must
 exhibit
 Identity
 and Diver-
 sity with
 regard to—
 (α) itself,
 and (β)
 ἅλλα,
 everything
 else besides
 τὸ Ἐν.

γὰρ οἶόν τε. ἀλλ' ἄρα ἕτερόν ἐστιν ἐνὸς Τὸ Ἐν;
 οὐ δῆτα. οὐδ' ἄρα ἑαυτοῦ γε ἕτερον ἂν εἴη. οὐ
 μέντοι. εἰ οὖν μήτε ἕτερον μήθ' ὅλον μήτε μέρος
 αὐτὸ πρὸς ἑαυτό ἐστιν, οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἤδη ταῦτον
 εἶναι αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ; ἀνάγκη. τί δέ; τὸ ἐτέρωθι ὃν
 αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὄντος ἑαυτῷ οὐκ ἀνάγκη
 αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἕτερον εἶναι, εἴπερ καὶ ἐτέρωθι ἔσται;
 ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. οὕτω μὲν ἐφάνη ἔχον Τὸ Ἐν, αὐτό
 τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὃν ἅμα καὶ ἐν ἐτέρῳ. ἐφάνη γάρ.
 ἕτερον ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἴη ταύτῃ ἂν ἑαυτοῦ Τὸ Ἐν.
 ἔοικεν. τί οὖν; εἴ τού τι ἕτερόν ἐστιν, οὐχ ἐτέρου
 ὄντος ἕτερον ἔσται; ἀνάγκη. οὐκοῦν ὅσα μὴ ἐν
 ἐστιν, ἅπανθ' ἕτερα τοῦ ἑνός, καὶ Τὸ Ἐν τῶν μὴ
 ἐν; πῶς δ' οὐ; ἕτερον ἄρα ἂν εἴη Τὸ Ἐν τῶν Ἄλλων.
 ἕτερον. ὅρα δὴ· αὐτό τε Ταῦτον καὶ Τὸ Ἐτερον
 ἂρ' οὐκ ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις; πῶς δ' οὐ; ἢ οὖν ἐθε-
 λήσει Ταῦτον ἐν τῷ Ἐτέρῳ ἢ Τὸ Ἐτερον ἐν Ταύτῳ
 ποτὲ εἶναι; οὐκ ἐθελήσει. εἰ ἄρα Τὸ Ἐτερον ἐν
 Ταύτῳ μηδέποτε ἔσται, οὐδὲν ἔστι τῶν ὄντων ἐν ᾧ
 ἐστὶ Τὸ Ἐτερον χρόνον οὐδένα. εἰ γὰρ ὄντινούν
 εἴη ἐν τῷ, ἐκείνον ἂν τὸν χρόνον ἐν Ταύτῳ εἴη Τὸ
 Ἐτερον. οὐχ οὕτως; οὕτως. ἐπειδὴ δ' οὐδέποτε
 ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐστίν, οὐδέποτε ἐν τινι τῶν ὄντων ἂν
 εἴη Τὸ Ἐτερον. ἀληθῆ. οὕτ' ἄρα ἐν τοῖς μὴ ἐν
 οὔτε ἐν τῷ Ἐνὶ ἐνείη ἂν Τὸ Ἐτερον. οὐ γὰρ οὖν.
 οὐκ ἄρα τῷ Ἐτέρῳ γ' ἂν εἴη Τὸ Ἐν τῶν μὴ ἐν
 οὐδὲ τὰ μὴ ἐν τοῦ ἑνὸς ἕτερα. οὐ γάρ. οὐδὲ
 μὲν ἑαυτοῖς γε ἕτερ' ἂν εἴη ἀλλήλων, μὴ μετέ-
 χοντα τοῦ Ἐτέρου. πῶς γάρ; εἰ δὲ μήτε αὐτοῖς
 ἕτερά ἐστι μήτε τῷ Ἐτέρῳ, οὐ πάντῃ ἤδη ἂν
 ἐκφεύγοι τὸ μὴ ἕτερα εἶναι ἀλλήλων; ἐκφεύγοι.

ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ Τοῦ Ἑνὸς γε μετέχει τὰ μὴ ἔν· οὐ
 γὰρ ἂν μὴ ἐν ᾗν, ἀλλά πη ἂν ἐν ᾗν. ἀληθῆ. οὐδ'
 ἂν ἀριθμὸς εἴη ἄρα τὰ μὴ ἔν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν οὕτω
 μὴ ἐν ᾗν παντάπασιν, ἀριθμὸν γε ἔχοντα. οὐ γὰρ
 οὖν. τί δέ; τὰ μὴ ἐν Τοῦ Ἑνὸς ἄρα μόριά ἐστιν;
 ἢ καὶ οὕτω μετεῖχε Τοῦ Ἑνὸς τὰ μὴ ἔν; μετεῖχεν.
 b εἰ ἄρα πάντα τὸ μὲν ἐν ἐστι, τὰ δὲ μὴ ἔν, οὐτ' ἂν
 μόριον τῶν μὴ ἐν Τὸ Ἐν εἴη οὐθ' ὅλον ὡς μορίων·
 οὔτε αὖ τὰ μὴ ἐν Τοῦ Ἑνὸς μόρια, οὐθ' ὅλα ὡς
 μορίῳ Τῷ Ἑνί. σὺ γάρ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔφαμεν τὰ
 μήτε μόρια μήθ' ὅλα μήθ' ἕτερα ἀλλήλων ταῦτα
 ἔσεσθαι ἀλλήλοις. ἔφαμεν γάρ. φῶμεν ἄρα καὶ
 Τὸ Ἐν πρὸς τὰ μὴ ἐν οὕτως ἔχον τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι
 αὐτοῖς; φῶμεν. Τὸ Ἐν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἕτερόν τε
 Τῶν Ἄλλων ἐστὶ καὶ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ταῦτόν ἐκείνοις τε
 c καὶ ἑαυτῷ. κινδυνεύει φαίνεσθαι ἔκ γε τοῦ λόγου.
 ἄρ' οὖν καὶ ὁμοίόν τε καὶ ἀνόμοιον ἑαυτῷ τε καὶ
 Τοῖς Ἄλλοις; ἴσως. ἐπειδὴ γοῦν ἕτερον Τῶν Ἄλλων
 ἐφάνη, καὶ Τᾶλλα που ἕτερ' ἂν ἐκείνου εἴη. τί
 μὴν; οὐκοῦν οὕτως ἕτερον Τῶν Ἄλλων, ὥσπερ καὶ
 Τᾶλλα ἐκείνου, καὶ οὔτε μᾶλλον οὐθ' ἥττον; τί γὰρ
 ἂν; εἰ ἄρα μήτε μᾶλλον μήθ' ἥττον, ὁμοίως. ναί.
 οὐκοῦν ἢ ἕτερον εἶναι πέπονθε Τῶν Ἄλλων, καὶ
 Τᾶλλα ἐκείνου ὡσαύτως, ταύτῃ ταῦτόν ἂν πεπονθότα
 d εἶεν Τό τε Ἐν Τοῖς Ἄλλοις καὶ Τᾶλλα Τῷ Ἑνί. πῶς
 λέγεις; ὦδε· ἕκαστον τῶν ὀνομάτων οὐκ ἐπὶ τινι
 καλεῖς; ἔγωγε. τί οὖν; τὸ αὐτὸ ὄνομα εἴποις ἂν
 πλεονάκεις ἢ ἅπαξ; ἔγωγε. πότερον οὖν εἰάν μὲν
 ἅπαξ εἴπῃς, ἐκείνο προσαγορεύεις οὐπὲρ ἐστι τοῦ-
 νομα, εἰάν δὲ πολλάκεις, οὐκ ἐκείνο; ἢ εἰάν τε ἅπαξ
 εἰάν τε πολλάκεις τὸ αὐτὸ ὄνομα φθέγγῃ, πολλή

ἀνάγκη σε τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ λέγειν αἰεὶ; τί μήν; οὐκοῦν
 καὶ τὸ ἕτερον ὄνομά ἐστιν ἐπὶ τινι; πάνυ γε. ὅταν
 ἄρα αὐτὸ φθέγγῃ, εἴαν τε ἅπαξ εἴαν τε πολλάκις, οὐκ
 ἐπ' ἄλλῳ οὐδὲ ἄλλο τι ὀνομάζεις ἢ ἐκείνο οὐπὲρ ἦν
 ὄνομα. ἀνάγκη. ὅταν δὴ λέγωμεν ὅτι ἕτερον μὲν
 Τᾶλλα Τοῦ Ἑνός, ἕτερον δὲ Τὸ Ἐν Τῶν Ἄλλων, δις
 τὸ ἕτερον εἰπόντες οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἐπ' ἄλλῃ ἀλλ'
 ἐπ' ἐκείνῃ τῇ φύσει αὐτὸ αἰεὶ λέγομεν, ἥσπερ ἦν
 τοῦνομα. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ἢ ἄρα ἕτερον Τῶν Ἄλλων
 Τὸ Ἐν καὶ Τᾶλλα Τοῦ Ἑνός, κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ἕτερον 148
 πεπονθέναι οὐκ ἄλλο ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἂν πεπονθὸς εἴη
 Τὸ Ἐν Τοῖς Ἄλλοις· τὸ δέ που ταῦτόν πεπονθὸς
 ὁμοιον· οὐχί; ναί. ἢ δὴ Τὸ Ἐν ἕτερον Τῶν Ἄλλων
 πέπονθεν εἶναι, κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἅπαν ἅπασιν ὁμοιον
 ἂν εἴη· ἅπαν γὰρ ἀπάντων ἕτερόν ἐστιν. ἔοικεν.
 ἀλλὰ μήν τό γε ὁμοιον τῷ ἀνομοίῳ ἐναντίον. ναί.
 οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον τῷ αὐτῷ. καὶ τοῦτο. ἀλλὰ
 μήν καὶ τοῦτό γ' ἐφάνη, ὥς ἄρα Τὸ Ἐν Τοῖς Ἄλλοις
 ταῦτόν. ἐφάνη γάρ. τοῦναντίον δέ γε πάθος ἐστὶ b
 τὸ εἶναι ταῦτόν Τοῖς Ἄλλοις τῷ ἕτερον εἶναι Τῶν
 Ἄλλων. πάνυ γε. ἢ γε μήν ἕτερον, ὁμοιον ἐφάνη.
 ναί. ἢ ἄρα ταῦτόν, ἀνόμοιον ἔσται κατὰ τοῦναν-
 τίον πάθος τῷ ὁμοιοῦντι πάθει. ὁμοίου δέ που τὸ
 ἕτερον; ναί. ἀνομοιώσει ἄρα ταῦτόν, ἢ οὐκ ἐναν-
 τίον ἔσται τῷ ἐτέρῳ. ἔοικεν. ὁμοιον ἄρα καὶ
 ἀνόμοιον ἔσται Τὸ Ἐν Τοῖς Ἄλλοις, ἢ μὲν ἕτερον, c
 ὁμοιον, ἢ δὲ ταῦτόν, ἀνόμοιον. ἔχει γὰρ οὖν δὴ,
 ὥς ἔοικε, καὶ τοιοῦτον λόγον. καὶ γὰρ τόνδε ἔχει.
 τίνα; ἢ ταῦτόν πέπονθε, μὴ ἄλλοιον πεπονθέναι, μὴ
 ἄλλοιον δὲ πεπονθὸς μὴ ἀνόμοιον, μὴ ἀνόμοιον δὲ
 ὁμοιον εἶναι· ἢ δ' ἄλλο πέπονθεν, ἄλλοιον, ἄλλοιον δὲ

ὃν ἀνόμοιον εἶναι. ἀληθῇ λέγεις. ταῦτόν τε ἄρα ὃν
 Τὸ Ἐν τοῖς Ἄλλοις καὶ ὅτι ἕτερόν ἐστι, κατ' ἀμφό-
 τερα καὶ καθ' ἐκάτερον, ὁμοίον τε ἂν εἴη καὶ
 d ἀνόμοιον τοῖς ἄλλοις. πάνυ γε. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐαυτῷ
 ὡσαύτως, ἐπεὶ ἕτερόν τε ἐαυτοῦ καὶ ταῦτόν ἐαυτῷ
 ἐφάνη, κατ' ἀμφότερα καὶ ἐκάτερον ὁμοίον τε καὶ
 ἀνόμοιον φανήσεται; ἀνάγκη. (7) τί δὲ δή; περὶ (7) The
 τοῦ ἄπτεσθαι Τὸ Ἐν αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν Ἄλλων καὶ One must
 τοῦ μὴ ἄπτεσθαι πέρι, πῶς ἔχει; σκόπει. σκοπῶ. be in com-
 αὐτὸ γάρ που ἐν ἐαυτῷ ὄλω Τὸ Ἐν ἐφάνη ὃν. Tάλλα, munion
 ὀρθῶς. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν τοῖς Ἄλλοις τὸ ἔν; ναί. ἦ with itself
 e μὲν ἄρα ἐν τοῖς Ἄλλοις, τῶν Ἄλλων ἄπτοιτ' ἂν. ἦ and with
 δὲ αὐτὸ ἐν ἐαυτῷ, τῶν μὲν Ἄλλων ἀπείργοιτο Tάλλα, everything
 ἄπτεσθαι, αὐτὸ δὲ αὐτοῦ ἄπτοιτ' ἂν ἐν ἐαυτῷ ὃν. else; and
 φαίνεται. οὕτω μὲν δὴ ἄπτοιτ' ἂν Τὸ Ἐν αὐτοῦ τε the One
 καὶ τῶν Ἄλλων. ἄπτοιτο. τί δὲ τῇδε; ἄρ' οὐ πάν must be
 τὸ μέλλον ἄψεσθαί τινος ἐφεξῆς δεῖ κείσθαι ἐκείνῳ out of com-
 οὗ μέλλει ἄπτεσθαι, ταύτην τὴν ἔδραν κατέχον ἢ munion
 ἂν μετ' ἐκείνην ἢ ἔδρα, ἢ ἂν κέηται οὗ ἄπτεται; with itself
 ἀνάγκη. καὶ Τὸ Ἐν ἄρα εἰ μέλλει αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἄψεσ- and Tάλλα,
 θαι, ἐφεξῆς δεῖ εὐθύς μεθ' ἐαυτὸ κείσθαι, τὴν everything
 ἐχομένην χώραν κατέχον ἐκείνης, ἢ αὐτό ἐστιν. δεῖ else.
 149 γὰρ οὖν. οὐκοῦν δύο μὲν ὃν Τὸ Ἐν ποιήσειεν ἂν
 ταῦτα καὶ ἐν δυοῖν χώραιν ἅμα γένοιτο· ἕως δ' ἂν ἢ
 ἔν, οὐκ ἐθελήσει; οὐ γὰρ οὖν. ἢ αὕτη ἄρα ἀνάγκη
 τῷ Ἐνὶ μήτε δύο εἶναι μήθ' ἄπτεσθαι αὐτῷ αὐτοῦ.
 ἢ αὕτη. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μὴν τῶν Ἄλλων ἄψεται. τί δή;
 ὅτι, φαμέν, τὸ μέλλον ἄψεσθαι χωρὶς ὃν ἐφεξῆς δεῖ
 ἐκείνῳ εἶναι, οὗ μέλλει ἄψεσθαι, τρίτον δὲ αὐτῶν
 ἐν μέσῳ μηδὲν εἶναι. ἀληθῇ. δύο ἄρα δεῖ τὸ
 ὀλίγιστον εἶναι, εἰ μέλλει ἄψις εἶναι. δεῖ. εἰ δὲ

τοῖν δυοῖν ὅροιν τρίτον προσγένηται ἐξῆς, αὐτὰ μὲν ^b
 τρία ἔσται, αἱ δὲ ἄψεις δύο. ναί. καὶ οὕτω δὴ αἰεί,
 ἐνὸς προσγιγνομένου, μία καὶ ἄψις προσγίγνεται,
 καὶ συμβαίνει τὰς ἄψεις τοῦ πλήθους τῶν ἀριθμῶν
 μιᾷ ἐλάττους εἶναι. ὧ γὰρ τὰ πρῶτα δύο ἐπλεονέκ-
 τησε τῶν ἄψεων εἰς τὸ πλείω εἶναι τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἢ
 τὰς ἄψεις, τῷ ἴσῳ τούτῳ καὶ ὁ ἔπειτα ἀριθμὸς πᾶς
 πασῶν τῶν ἄψεων πλεονεκτεῖ. ἤδη γὰρ τὸ λοιπὸν
 ἅμα ἔν τε τῷ ἀριθμῷ προσγίγνεται καὶ μία ἄψις ^c
 ταῖς ἄψεσιν. ὀρθῶς. ὅσα ἄρα ἐστὶ τὰ ὄντα τὸν
 ἀριθμόν, αἰεὶ μιᾷ αἱ ἄψεις ἐλάττους εἰσὶν αὐτῶν.
 ἀληθῆ. εἰ δέ γε ἔν μόνον ἐστί, δυὰς δὲ μὴ ἔστιν,
 ἄψις οὐκ ἂν εἴη. πῶς γάρ; οὐκοῦν, φαμέν, Τὰ Ἄλλα
 Τοῦ Ἐνὸς οὔτε ἔν ἐστιν οὔτε μετέχει αὐτοῦ, εἴπερ
 ἄλλα ἐστίν. οὐ γάρ. οὐκ ἄρα ἔνεστιν ἀριθμὸς ἐν
 τοῖς Ἄλλοις, ἐνὸς μὴ ἐνότος ἐν αὐτοῖς. πῶς γάρ;
 οὔτ' ἄρα ἔν ἐστι Τᾶλλα οὔτε δύο οὔτε ἄλλου ἀριθμοῦ
 ἔχοντα ὄνομα οὐδέν. οὔ. Τὸ Ἐν ἄρα μόνον ἐστὶν ^d
 ἔν, καὶ δυὰς οὐκ ἂν εἴη. οὐ φαίνεται. ἄψις ἄρα
 οὐκ ἔστι, δυοῖν μὴ ὄντοι. οὐκ ἔστιν. οὔτ' ἄρα
 Τὸ Ἐν τῶν Ἄλλων ἄπτεται οὔτε Τὰ Ἄλλα Τοῦ Ἐνός,
 ἐπεὶπερ ἄψις οὐκ ἔστιν. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. οὕτω δὴ κατὰ
 πάντα ταῦτα Τὸ Ἐν τῶν τε Ἄλλων καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἄπτε-
 ταί τε καὶ οὐχ ἄπτεται. ἔοικεν. (8) ἄρ' οὖν καὶ
 ἴσον ἐστὶ καὶ ἄνισον αὐτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς Ἄλλοις; πῶς;
 εἰ μείζον εἴη Τὸ Ἐν ἢ Τᾶλλα ἢ ἔλαττον, ἢ αὖ Τᾶλλα ^e
 Τοῦ Ἐνὸς μείζω ἢ ἐλάττω, ἄρ' οὐκ ἂν τῷ μὲν ἔν εἶναι
 Τὸ Ἐν καὶ Τὰ Ἄλλα ἄλλα Τοῦ Ἐνὸς οὔτε τι μείζω
 οὔτε τι ἐλάττω ἂν εἴη ἀλλήλων αὐταῖς γε ταύταις
 ταῖς οὐσίαις· ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν πρὸς τῷ τοιαύτ' εἶναι
 ἐκάτερα ἰσότητα ἔχοιεν, ἴσα ἂν εἴη πρὸς ἀλλήλα·

(8) The One admits of the modes of quantity, Equal, Greater, and Less, both with regard to itself and Τᾶλλα, everything else.

εἰ δὲ τὰ μὲν μέγεθος, τὸ δὲ σμικρότητα, ἢ καὶ
 μέγεθος μὲν Τὸ Ἐν, σμικρότητα δὲ Τᾶλλα, ὅποτέρῳ
 μὲν τῷ εἶδει μέγεθος προσείη, μείζον ἂν εἴη, ᾧ δὲ
 σμικρότης, ἔλαττον; ἀνάγκη. οὐκοῦν ἐστὸν γέ τινε
 τούτῳ εἶδῃ, Τό τε Μέγεθος καὶ Ἡ Σμικρότης; οὐ
 γὰρ ἂν που, μὴ ὄντε γε, ἐναντίῳ τε ἀλλήλοιον εἴτην
 150 καὶ ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἐγγιγνοίσθην. πῶς γὰρ ἂν; εἰ
 ἄρα ἐν Τῷ Ἐνὶ σμικρότης ἐγγίγνεται, ἥτοι ἐν ὅλῳ ἂν
 ἢ ἐν μέρει αὐτοῦ ἐνείη. ἀνάγκη. τί δ' εἰ ἐν ὅλῳ
 ἐγγίγνοιτο; οὐχὶ ἢ ἐξ ἴσου ἂν Τῷ Ἐνὶ δι' ὅλου
 αὐτοῦ τεταμένη εἴη ἢ περιέχουσα αὐτό; δῆλον δῆ.
 ἄρ' οὖν οὐκ ἐξ ἴσου μὲν οὖσα Ἡ Σμικρότης Τῷ Ἐνὶ
 ἴσῃ ἂν αὐτῷ εἴη, περιέχουσα δὲ μείζων; πῶς δ' οὐ;
 δυνατὸν οὖν Σμικρότητα ἴσην τῷ εἶναι ἢ μείζω τινός,
 καὶ πράττειν γε τὰ Μεγέθους τε καὶ Ἰσότητος, ἀλλὰ
 b μὴ τὰ ἑαυτῆς; ἀδύνατον. ἐν μὲν ὅλῳ ἄρα Τῷ Ἐνὶ
 οὐκ ἂν εἴη Σμικρότης, ἀλλ' εἵπερ, ἐν μέρει. ναί.
 οὐδέ γε ἐν παντὶ αὖ τῷ μέρει· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ταῦτα
 ποιήσῃ ἄπερ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον· ἴση ἔσται ἢ μείζων τοῦ
 μέρους, ἐν ᾧ ἂν αἰεὶ ἐνῇ. ἀνάγκη. οὐδενί ποτε
 ἄρα ἐνέσται τῶν ὄντων Σμικρότης, μήτ' ἐν μέρει
 μήτ' ἐν ὅλῳ ἐγγιγνομένη· οὐδέ τι ἔσται σμικρὸν
 πλὴν αὐτῆς Σμικρότητος. οὐκ ἔοικεν. οὐδ' ἄρα
 μέγεθος ἐνέσται ἐν αὐτῷ. μείζον γὰρ ἂν τι εἴη
 c ἄλλο, καὶ πλὴν αὐτοῦ Μεγέθους, ἐκείνο ἐν ᾧ Τὸ
 Μέγεθος ἐνείη, καὶ ταῦτα σμικροῦ αὐτοῦ οὐκ ὄντος,
 οὐδ' ἀνάγκη ὑπερέχειν, ἐάνπερ ἢ μέγα· τοῦτο δὲ
 ἀδύνατον, ἐπειδὴ Σμικρότης οὐδαμοῦ ἐνι. ἀληθῆ.
 ἀλλὰ μὴν αὐτὸ Μέγεθος οὐκ ἄλλου μείζον ἢ αὐτῆς
 Σμικρότητος, οὐδὲ Σμικρότης ἄλλου ἔλαττον ἢ αὐτοῦ
 Μεγέθους. οὐ γάρ. οὔτε ἄρα Τὰ Ἄλλα μείζω Τοῦ

Ἐνὸς οὐδὲ ἐλάττω, μήτε Μέγεθος μήτε Σμικρότητα
 ἔχοντα, οὔτε αὐτὸ τούτῳ πρὸς Τὸ Ἐν ἔχεται τὴν d
 δύναμιν τὴν τοῦ ὑπερέχειν καὶ ὑπερέχεσθαι ἀλλὰ
 πρὸς ἀλλήλῳ, οὔτε αὖ Τὸ Ἐν τούτοις οὐδὲ Τῶν
 Ἄλλων μείζον ἂν οὐδ' ἔλαττον εἴη, μήτε Μέγεθος
 μήτε Σμικρότητα ἔχον. οὐκ οὖν φαίνεται γε. ἀρ'
 οὖν εἰ μήτε μείζον μήτε ἔλαττον Τὸ Ἐν Τῶν Ἄλλων,
 ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ ἐκείνων μήτε ὑπερέχειν μήθ' ὑπερέ-
 χεσθαι; ἀνάγκη. οὐκοῦν τό γε μήτε ὑπερέχον μήθ'
 ὑπερεχόμενον πολλὴ ἀνάγκη ἐξ ἴσου εἶναι, ἐξ ἴσου
 δὲ ὄν ἴσον εἶναι. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; καὶ μὴν καὶ αὐτό e
 γε Τὸ Ἐν πρὸς ἑαυτὸ οὕτως ἂν ἔχοι· μήτε Μέγεθος
 ἐν ἑαυτῷ μήτε Σμικρότητα ἔχον οὔτ' ἂν ὑπερέχοιτο
 οὔτ' ἂν ὑπερέχοι ἑαυτοῦ, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἴσου ὄν ἴσον ἂν εἴη
 ἑαυτῷ. πάννυ μὲν οὖν. Τὸ Ἐν ἄρα ἑαυτῷ τε καὶ
 τοῖς Ἄλλοις ἴσον ἂν εἴη. φαίνεται. καὶ μὴν αὐτό.
 γε ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὄν καὶ περὶ ἑαυτὸ ἂν εἴη ἔξωθεν, καὶ
 περιέχον μὲν μείζον ἂν ἑαυτοῦ εἴη, περιεχόμενον
 δὲ ἔλαττον, καὶ οὕτω μείζον ἂν καὶ ἔλαττον εἴη 151
 αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ Τὸ Ἐν. εἴη γὰρ ἄν. οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε
 ἀνάγκη, μηδὲν εἶναι ἐκτὸς τοῦ Ἐνός τε καὶ Τῶν
 Ἄλλων. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ εἶναί που δεῖ
 τό γε ὄν αἰεὶ. ναί. οὐκοῦν τό γε ἔν τῷ ὄν ἐν
 μείζονι ἔσται ἔλαττον ὄν; οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλως ἕτερον
 ἐν ἑτέρῳ εἴη. οὐ γάρ. ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐδὲν ἕτερόν
 ἐστι χωρὶς Τῶν Ἄλλων καὶ τοῦ Ἐνός, δεῖ δὲ αὐτὰ
 ἐν τῷ εἶναι, οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἤδη ἐν ἀλλήλοις εἶναι, τά
 τε Ἄλλα ἐν τῷ Ἐνὶ καὶ Τὸ Ἐν ἐν τοῖς Ἄλλοις,
 ἢ μηδαμοῦ εἶναι; φαίνεται. ὅτι μὲν ἄρα Τὸ Ἐν b
 ἐν τοῖς Ἄλλοις ἔνεστι, μείζω ἂν εἴη τὰ Ἄλλα τοῦ
 Ἐνός, περιέχοντα αὐτό, Τὸ δὲ Ἐν ἔλαττον Τῶν

Ἄλλων, περιεχόμενον· ὅτι δὲ τὰ Ἄλλα ἐν τῷ Ἐνί,
 τὸ Ἐν τῶν Ἄλλων κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον μείζον
 ἂν εἴη, τὰ δὲ Ἄλλα τοῦ Ἐνὸς ἐλάττω. ἔοικεν. τὸ
 Ἐν ἄρα ἴσον τε καὶ μείζον καὶ ἑλαττόν ἐστιν αὐτό
 τε αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν Ἄλλων. φαίνεται. καὶ μὴν εἴπερ
 μείζον καὶ ἑλαττον καὶ ἴσον, ἴσων ἂν εἴη μέτρων
 c καὶ πλειόνων καὶ ἑλαττόνων αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς Ἄλλοις,
 ἐπειδὴ δὲ μέτρων, καὶ μερῶν. πῶς δ' οὐ; ἴσων
 μὲν ἄρα μέτρων ὄν καὶ πλειόνων καὶ ἑλαττόνων, καὶ
 ἀριθμῷ ἑλαττον ἂν καὶ πλεόν εἴη αὐτό τε αὐτοῦ
 καὶ τῶν Ἄλλων, καὶ ἴσον αὐτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς Ἄλλοις
 κατὰ ταῦτά. πῶς; ὥνπερ μείζον ἐστι, πλειόνων
 που καὶ μέτρων ἂν εἴη αὐτῶν· ὅσων δὲ μέτρων, καὶ
 μερῶν· καὶ ὥν ἑλαττον, ὡσαύτως· καὶ οἷς ἴσον,
 κατὰ ταῦτά. οὕτως. οὐκοῦν ἑαυτοῦ μείζον καὶ
 d ἑλαττον ὄν καὶ ἴσον ἴσων ἂν εἴη μέτρων καὶ πλειό-
 νων καὶ ἑλαττόνων αὐτῷ· ἐπειδὴ δὲ μέτρων, καὶ
 μερῶν; πῶς δ' οὐ; ἴσων μὲν ἄρα μερῶν ὄν αὐτῷ
 ἴσον ἂν τὸ πλῆθος αὐτῷ εἴη, πλειόνων δὲ πλεόν,
 ἑλαττόνων δὲ ἑλαττον τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτοῦ. φαίνεται.
 οὐκοῦν καὶ πρὸς τὰ Ἄλλα ὡσαύτως ἔξει τὸ Ἐν· ὅτι
 μὲν μείζον αὐτῶν φαίνεται, ἀνάγκη πλεόν εἶναι καὶ
 τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτῶν· ὅτι δὲ σμικρότερον, ἑλαττον·
 ὅτι δὲ ἴσον μεγέθει, ἴσον καὶ τὸ πλῆθος εἶναι τοῖς
 e Ἄλλοις; ἀνάγκη. οὕτω δὴ αὖ, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ Ἐν καὶ
 ἴσον καὶ πλεόν καὶ ἑλαττον τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτό τε
 αὐτοῦ ἔσται καὶ τῶν Ἄλλων. ἔσται. (9) ἄρ' οὖν
 καὶ χρόνου μετέχει τὸ Ἐν, καὶ ἔστι τε καὶ γίγνεται
 νεώτερόν τε καὶ πρεσβύτερον αὐτό τε αὐτοῦ καὶ
 τῶν Ἄλλων, καὶ οὔτε νεώτερον οὔτε πρεσβύτερον
 οὔτε ἑαυτοῦ οὔτε τῶν Ἄλλων, χρόνου μετέχον; πῶς;

(9) The
 One admits
 of the
 modes of
 duration,
 Prior,
 Simul-
 taneous,
 and Sub-

sequent,
both with
regard to
itself and
ἄλλα,
everything
else.

εἶναι μὲν πού αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει, εἴπερ ἐν ἔστιν. ναί.
τὸ δὲ εἶναι ἄλλο τί ἐστὶν ἢ μέθεξις οὐσίας μετὰ
χρόνου τοῦ παρόντος, ὥσπερ τὸ ἦν μετὰ τοῦ παρε- 152
ληλυθότος καὶ αὖ τὸ ἔσται μετὰ τοῦ μέλλοντος
οὐσίας ἐστὶ κοινωνία; ἔστι γάρ. μετέχει μὲν ἄρα
χρόνου, εἴπερ καὶ τοῦ εἶναι. πάνυ γε. οὐκοῦν
πορευομένου τοῦ χρόνου; ναί. ἀεὶ ἄρα πρεσβύτε-
ρον γίγνεται ἑαυτοῦ, εἴπερ προέρχεται κατὰ χρόνον.
ἀνάγκη. ἄρ' οὖν μεμνήμεθα, ὅτι νεωτέρου γι-
γνομένου τὸ πρεσβύτερον πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται;
μεμνήμεθα. οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ πρεσβύτερον ἑαυτοῦ b
γίγνεται τὸ Ἐν, νεωτέρου ἂν γιγνομένου ἑαυτοῦ
πρεσβύτερον γίγνοιτο; ἀνάγκη. γίγνεται μὲν δὴ
νεώτερόν τε καὶ πρεσβύτερον αὐτοῦ οὕτως. ναί.
ἔστι δὲ πρεσβύτερον ἄρ' οὐχ ὅταν κατὰ τὸν νῦν
χρόνον ἢ γιγνόμενον, τὸν μεταξὺ τοῦ ἦν τε καὶ
ἔσται; οὐ γάρ πού πορευόμενόν γε ἐκ τοῦ ποτὲ
εἰς τὸ ἔπειτα ὑπερβήσεται τὸ νῦν. οὐ γάρ. ἄρ'
οὖν οὐκ ἐπίσχει τότε τοῦ γίγνεσθαι πρεσβύτερον,
ἐπειδὴν τῷ νῦν ἐντύχη, καὶ οὐ γίγνεται ἀλλ' ἔστι c
τότ' ἤδη πρεσβύτερον; προῖόν γάρ οὐκ ἂν ποτε
ληφθείη ὑπὸ τοῦ νῦν. τὸ γὰρ προῖόν οὕτως ἔχει
ὥς ἀμφοτέρων ἐφάπτεσθαι, τοῦ τε νῦν καὶ τοῦ
ἔπειτα, τοῦ μὲν νῦν ἀφιέμενον, τοῦ δ' ἔπειτα ἐπιλαμ-
βανόμενον, μεταξὺ ἀμφοτέρων γιγνόμενον, τοῦ τε
ἔπειτα καὶ τοῦ νῦν. ἀληθῆ. εἰ δέ γε ἀνάγκη μὴ
παρελθεῖν τὸ νῦν πᾶν τὸ γιγνόμενον, ἐπειδὴν κατὰ
τοῦτο ἢ, ἐπίσχει ἀεὶ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἔστι τότε
τοῦτο ὅ τι ἂν τύχη γιγνόμενον. φαίνεται. καὶ τὸ d
Ἐν ἄρα, ὅταν πρεσβύτερον γιγνόμενον ἐντύχη τῷ
νῦν, ἐπέσχε τοῦ γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἔστι τότε πρεσβύ-

τερον. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. οὐκοῦν οὐπερ ἐγίγνετο
 πρεσβύτερον, τούτου καὶ ἔστιν· ἐγίγνετο δὲ αὐτοῦ;
 ναί. ἔστι δὲ τὸ πρεσβύτερον νεωτέρου πρεσβύ-
 τερον; ἔστιν. καὶ νεώτερον ἄρα τότε αὐτοῦ ἐστὶ
 Τὸ Ἐν, ὅταν πρεσβύτερον γιγνόμενον ἐντύχη τῷ
 e νῦν. ἀνάγκη. τό γε μὴν νῦν αἰὲ πάρεστι τῷ Ἐνὶ
 διὰ παντὸς τοῦ εἶναι· ἔστι γὰρ αἰὲ νῦν ὅτανπερ ᾗ.
 πῶς γὰρ οὐ; αἰὲ ἄρα ἐστὶ τε καὶ γίγνεται πρεσβύ-
 τερον ἑαυτοῦ καὶ νεώτερον Τὸ Ἐν. ἔοικεν. πλείω
 δὲ χρόνον αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔστιν ἢ γίγνεται, ἢ τὸν ἴσον;
 τὸν ἴσον. ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸν γε ἴσον χρόνον ἢ γιγνό-
 μενον ἢ ὄν τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχει. πῶς δ' οὐ; τὸ
 δὲ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχον οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε
 νεωτερόν ἐστιν. οὐ γάρ. Τὸ Ἐν ἄρα τὸν ἴσον
 χρόνον αὐτῷ καὶ γιγνόμενον καὶ ὄν οὔτε
 νεώτερον οὔτε πρεσβύτερον ἑαυτοῦ ἐστὶν οὐδὲ γί-
 153 γνεται. οὐ μοι δοκεῖ. τί δέ; Τῶν Ἄλλων; οὐκ ἔχω
 λέγειν. τόδε γε μὴν ἔχεις λέγειν, ὅτι Τὰ Ἄλλα
 Τοῦ Ἐνός, εἴπερ ἕτερά ἐστιν ἀλλὰ μὴ ἕτερον, πλείω
 ἐστὶν ἐνός· ἕτερον μὲν γὰρ ὄν ἐν ἂν ᾗν, ἕτερα δὲ
 ὄντα πλείω ἐνός ἐστι καὶ πλῆθος ἂν ἔχοι. ἔχοι
 γὰρ ἂν. πλῆθος δὲ ὄν ἀριθμοῦ πλείονος ἂν μετέχοι
 ἢ Τοῦ Ἐνός. πῶς δ' οὐ; τί οὖν; ἀριθμοῦ φήσομεν
 τὰ πλείω γίγνεσθαι τε καὶ γεγονέναι πρότερον, ἢ
 τὰ ἐλάττω; τὰ ἐλάττω. τὸ ὀλίγιστον ἄρα πρῶτον·
 b τοῦτο δ' ἔστι Τὸ Ἐν· ἢ γάρ; ναί. πάντων ἄρα
 Τὸ Ἐν πρῶτον γέγονε τῶν ἀριθμὸν ἐχόντων. ἔχει
 δὲ καὶ Τὰ Ἄλλα πάντα ἀριθμόν, εἴπερ ἄλλα καὶ μὴ
 ἄλλο ἐστίν. ἔχει γάρ. πρῶτον δέ γε, οἶμαι, γεγο-
 νός πρότερον γέγονε, Τὰ δὲ Ἄλλα ὕστερον· τὰ δ'
 ὕστερον γεγονότα νεώτερα τοῦ πρότερον γεγονότος·

καὶ οὕτως ἂν εἴη Τᾶλλα νεώτερα Τοῦ Ἑνός, Τὸ δὲ Ἐν πρεσβύτερον Τῶν Ἄλλων. εἴη γὰρ ἂν. τί δὲ τόδε; ἄρ' ἂν εἴη Τὸ Ἐν παρὰ φύσιν τὴν αὐτοῦ γεγονός, ἢ ἀδύνατον; ἀδύνατον. ἀλλὰ μὴν μέρη c γε ἔχον ἐφάνη Τὸ Ἐν, εἰ δὲ μέρη, καὶ ἀρχὴν καὶ τελευτὴν καὶ μέσον. ναί. οὐκοῦν πάντων πρῶτον ἀρχὴ γίγνεται, καὶ αὐτοῦ Τοῦ Ἑνός καὶ ἐκάστου Τῶν Ἄλλων, καὶ μετὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα μέχρι τοῦ τέλους; τί μὴν; καὶ μὴν μόριά γε φήσομεν ταῦτ' εἶναι πάντα Τᾶλλα Τοῦ Ὀλου τε καὶ Ἑνός, αὐτὸ δὲ ἐκείνο ἅμα τῇ τελευτῇ γεγονέναι ἔν τε καὶ ὄλον. φήσομεν γάρ. τελευτὴ δὲ οἶμαί γε ὕστατον γίγνεται· τούτῳ δ' ἅμα Τὸ Ἐν πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι· ὥστ' εἴπερ ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ Τὸ Ἐν μὴ παρὰ φύσιν d γίγνεσθαι, ἅμα τῇ τελευτῇ ἂν γεγονὸς ὕστατον ἂν Τῶν Ἄλλων πεφυκὸς εἴη γίγνεσθαι. φαίνεται. νεώτερον ἄρα Τῶν Ἄλλων Τὸ Ἐν ἐστι, Τὰ δ' Ἄλλα Τοῦ Ἑνός πρεσβύτερα. οὕτως αὖ μοι φαίνεται. τί δὲ δή; ἀρχὴν ἢ ἄλλο μέρος ὀτιοῦν Τοῦ Ἑνός ἢ ἄλλου ὀτιοῦν, ἐάνπερ μέρος ἢ ἀλλὰ μὴ μέρη, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἔν εἶναι, μέρος γε ὄν; ἀνάγκη. οὐκοῦν Τὸ Ἐν ἅμα τε τῷ πρώτῳ γιγνομένῳ γίγνοιτ' ἂν καὶ e ἅμα τῷ δευτέρῳ, καὶ οὐδενὸς ἀπολείπεται τῶν ἄλλων γιγνομένων, ὃ τι περ ἂν προσγίγνηται ὀτῳοῦν, ἕως ἂν πρὸς τὸ ἔσχατον διελθὼν ὄλον ἔν γένηται, οὔτε μέσου οὔτε πρώτου οὔτε ἐσχάτου οὔτε ἄλλου οὐδενὸς ἀπολειφθὲν ἔν τῇ γενέσει. ἀληθῆ. πᾶσιν ἄρα Τοῖς Ἄλλοις τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἴσχει Τὸ Ἐν. ὥστ' εἰ μὴ παρὰ φύσιν πέφυκεν αὐτὸ Τὸ Ἐν, οὔτε πρότερον οὔθ' ὕστερον Τῶν Ἄλλων γεγονὸς ἂν εἴη, ἀλλ' ἅμα. καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον Τὸ Ἐν Τῶν Ἄλλων 154

οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε νεώτερον ἂν εἴη, οὐδὲ Τᾶλλα
 Τοῦ Ἑνός· κατὰ δὲ τὸν πρόσθεν πρεσβύτερόν τε
 καὶ νεώτερον, καὶ Τᾶλλα ἐκείνου ὡσαύτως. πάνυ
 μὲν οὖν. ἔστι μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἔχον τε καὶ γεγονός.
 ἀλλὰ τί αὖ περὶ τοῦ γίνεσθαι αὐτὸ πρεσβύτερόν
 τε καὶ νεώτερον Τῶν Ἑλλων καὶ Τᾶλλα Τοῦ Ἑνός,
 καὶ μήτε νεώτερον μήτε πρεσβύτερον γίνεσθαι;
 ἄρα ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ εἶναι, οὕτω καὶ περὶ τοῦ γίν-
 εσθαι ἔχει, ἢ ἐτέρως; οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν. ἀλλ' ἐγὼ
 τοσόνδε γε, ὅτι εἰ καὶ ἔστι πρεσβύτερον ἕτερον
 ἐτέρου, γίνεσθαί τε αὐτὸ πρεσβύτερον ἔτι, ἢ ὡς
 τὸ πρῶτον εὐθύς γενόμενον διήνεγκε τῇ ἡλικίᾳ, οὐκ
 ἂν ἔτι δύναίτο, οὐδ' αὖ τὸ νεώτερον ὃν ἔτι νεώτερον
 γίνεσθαι· ἀνίσοις γὰρ ἴσα προστιθέμενα, χρόνῳ
 τε καὶ ἄλλῳ ὁτῶν, ἴσῳ ποιεῖ διαφέρειν ἀεὶ ὅσῳ περ
 ἂν τὸ πρῶτον διενέγκῃ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ; οὐκ ἄρα τό
 γε ὃν τοῦ ὄντος γίγνοιτ' ἂν ποτε πρεσβύτερον οὐδὲ
 νεώτερον, εἴπερ ἴσῳ διαφέρει ἀεὶ τὴν ἡλικίαν· ἀλλ'
 ἔστι καὶ γέγονε πρεσβύτερον, τὸ δὲ νεώτερον,
 γίγνεται δ' οὐ. ἀληθῆ. καὶ Τὸ Ἑν ἄρα ὃν Τῶν
 Ἑλλων ὄντων οὔτε πρεσβύτερόν ποτε οὔτε νεώτερον
 γίγνεται. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. ὄρα δὲ εἰ τῇδε πρεσβύτερα
 καὶ νεώτερα γίγνεται. πῇ δὴ; ἢ Τό τε Ἑν Τῶν
 Ἑλλων ἐφάνη πρεσβύτερον καὶ Τᾶλλα Τοῦ Ἑνός.
 τί οὖν; ὅταν Τὸ Ἑν Τῶν Ἑλλων πρεσβύτερον ᾖ,
 πλείῳ που χρόνον γέγονεν ἢ Τὰ Ἑλλα. ναί.
 πάλιν δὴ σκόπει· ἐὰν πλέονι καὶ ἐλάττονι χρόνῳ
 προστιθῶμεν τὸν ἴσον χρόνον, ἄρα τῷ ἴσῳ μορίῳ
 διοίσει τὸ πλεόν τοῦ ἐλάττονος ἢ σμικροτέρῳ;
 σμικροτέρῳ. οὐκ ἄρα ἔσται, ὅ τι περ τὸ πρῶτον
 ἦν πρὸς Τᾶλλα ἡλικία διαφέρον Τὸ Ἑν, τοῦτο καὶ

εἰς τὸ ἔπειτα, ἀλλὰ ἴσον λαμβάνον χρόνον τοῖς
 ἄλλοις ἔλαττον αἰὲς τῇ ἡλικίᾳ διοίσει αὐτῶν ἢ πρό-
 τερον ἢ οὐ; ναί. οὐκοῦν τό γε ἔλαττον διαφέρειν
 ἡλικία πρὸς τι ἢ πρότερον νεώτερον γίγνοιτ' ἂν ἢ e
 ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν πρὸς ἐκεῖνα, πρὸς ἃ ἦν πρεσβύτερον
 πρότερον; νεώτερον. εἰ δὲ ἐκεῖνο νεώτερον, οὐκ
 ἐκεῖνα αὖ τᾶλλα πρὸς τὸ Ἐν πρεσβύτερα ἢ πρό-
 τερον; πάνυ γε. τὸ μὲν νεώτερον ἄρα γεγονὸς πρε-
 σβύτερον γίγνεται πρὸς τὸ πρότερον γεγονός τε καὶ
 πρεσβύτερον ὄν, ἔστι δὲ οὐδέποτε πρεσβύτερον, ἀλλὰ
 γίγνεται αἰὲς ἐκείνου πρεσβύτερον· ἐκεῖνο μὲν γὰρ
 ἐπὶ τὸ νεώτερον ἐπιδίδωσι, τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τὸ πρεσβύτερον.
 τὸ δ' αὖ πρεσβύτερον τοῦ νεωτέρου νεώτερον γί- 155
 γνεται ὡσαύτως. ἰόντε γὰρ αὐτοῖν εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον
 τὸ ἐναντίον ἀλλήλοις γίγνεσθον, τὸ μὲν νεώτερον
 πρεσβύτερον τοῦ πρεσβυτέρου, τὸ δὲ πρεσβύτερον
 νεώτερον τοῦ νεωτέρου· γενέσθαι δὲ οὐκ ἂν οἶω τε
 εἶτην. εἰ γὰρ γένοιντο, οὐκ ἂν ἔτι γίγνοιντο ἀλλ'
 εἶεν ἄν, νῦν δὲ γίγνονται μὲν πρεσβύτερα ἀλλήλων
 καὶ νεώτερα· τὸ μὲν Ἐν τῶν ἄλλων νεώτερον
 γίγνεται, ὅτι πρεσβύτερον ἐφάνη ὄν καὶ πρότερον
 γεγονός, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τοῦ Ἐνὸς πρεσβύτερα, ὅτι b
 ὕστερα γέγονε. κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ τᾶλλα
 οὕτω πρὸς τὸ Ἐν ἴσχει, ἐπειδήπερ αὐτοῦ πρε-
 σβύτερα ἐφάνη καὶ πρότερα γεγονότα. φαίνεται
 γὰρ οὕτως. οὐκοῦν ἢ μὲν οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἑτέρου
 πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται οὐδὲ νεώτερον, κατὰ τὸ ἴσῳ
 ἀριθμῷ ἀλλήλων αἰὲς διαφέρειν, οὔτε τὸ Ἐν τῶν
 ἄλλων πρεσβύτερον γίγνοιτ' ἂν οὐδὲ νεώτερον, οὔτε
 τᾶλλα τοῦ Ἐνός· ἢ δὲ ἄλλῳ αἰὲς μορίῳ διαφέρειν
 ἀνάγκη τὰ πρότερα τῶν ὑστέρων γεγόμενα καὶ τὰ c

ὕστερα τῶν προτέρων, ταύτη δὴ ἀνάγκη πρεσβύτερά τε καὶ νεώτερα ἀλλήλων γίνεσθαι Τά τε Ἐν Ἰδὸς καὶ Τὸ Ἐν Τῶν Ἄλλων; πάνυ μὲν οὖν. κατὰ δὴ πάντα ταῦτα Τὸ Ἐν αὐτό τε αὐτοῦ καὶ Τῶν Ἄλλων πρεσβύτερον καὶ νεώτερον ἔστι τε καὶ γίγνεται, καὶ οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε νεώτερον οὔτ' ἔστιν οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτε αὐτοῦ οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων. παντελῶς μὲν οὖν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ χρόνου μετέχει Τὸ Ἐν καὶ τοῦ d πρεσβυτέρον τε καὶ νεώτερον γίνεσθαι, ἄρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ τοῦ ποτὲ μετέχειν καὶ τοῦ ἔπειτα καὶ τοῦ νῦν, εἴπερ χρόνου μετέχει; ἀνάγκη. ἦν ἄρα Τὸ Ἐν καὶ ἔστι καὶ ἔσται καὶ ἐγίγνετο καὶ γίγνεται καὶ γενήσεται. τί μήν; καὶ εἴη ἂν τι ἐκείνῳ καὶ ἐκείνου, καὶ ἦν καὶ ἔστι καὶ ἔσται. πάνυ γε. καὶ ἐπιστήμη δὴ εἴη ἂν αὐτοῦ καὶ δόξα καὶ αἴσθησις, εἴπερ καὶ νῦν ἡμεῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ πάντα ταῦτα πράττομεν. ὀρθῶς λέγεις. καὶ ὄνομα δὴ καὶ λόγος ἔστιν αὐτῷ, καὶ ὀνομάζεται καὶ λέγεται· καὶ ὅσαπέρ e καὶ περὶ Τὰ Ἄλλα τῶν τοιούτων τυγχάνει ὄντα, καὶ περὶ Τὸ Ἐν ἔστιν. παντελῶς μὲν οὖν ἔχει οὕτως.

ἔτι δὴ τὸ τρίτον λέγωμεν. (1) Τὸ Ἐν εἰ ἔστιν οἷον διεληλύθαμεν, ἄρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὐτό, ἔν τε ὃν καὶ πολλὰ καὶ μήτε ἔν μήτε πολλὰ καὶ μετέχον χρόνου, ὅτι μὲν ἔστιν ἔν, οὐσίας μετέχειν ποτέ, ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἔστι, μὴ μετέχειν αὐτὸ ποτὲ οὐσίας; ἀνάγκη. ἄρ' οὖν ὅτε μετέχει, οἷόν τε ἔσται τότε μὴ μετέχειν, ἢ ὅτε μὴ μετέχει, μετέχειν; οὐχ οἷόν τε. ἐν ἄλλῳ ἄρα χρόνῳ μετέχει καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ οὐ μετέχει· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν μόνως τοῦ αὐτοῦ μετέχοι τε καὶ οὐ μετέχοι. 156 ὀρθῶς. οὐκοῦν ἔστι καὶ οὗτος χρόνος ὅτε μεταλαμ-

(III.) The Third Hypothesis:

εἰ ἐν ἔστι = εἰ ἐν οὐσίας μετέχει, (1) the One admits of contrary predicates by means of the achronic Point of Indifference,

(2) in which, it admits of neither contrary.

βάνει τοῦ εἶναι καὶ ὅτε ἀπαλλάττεται αὐτοῦ; ἢ πῶς οἶόν τε ἔσται τοτὲ μὲν ἔχειν τὸ αὐτό, τοτὲ δὲ μὴ ἔχειν, εἰ μὴ ποτε καὶ λαμβάνῃ αὐτὸ καὶ ἀφίῃ; οὐδαμῶς. τὸ δὴ οὐσίας μεταλαμβάνειν ἄρ' οὐ γίγνεσθαι καλεῖς; ἔγωγε. τὸ δὲ ἀπαλλάττεσθαι οὐσίας ἄρ' οὐκ ἀπόλλυσθαι; καὶ πάνυ γε. Τὸ ἔν δὴ, ὡς ἔοικε, λαμβάνον τε καὶ ἀφιέν οὐσίαν γίγνεταιί τε καὶ ἀπόλλυται. ἀνάγκη. (2) ἐν δὲ καὶ πολλὰ ὄν, καὶ γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, ἄρ' οὐχ, b ὅταν μὲν γίγνηται ἐν, τὸ πολλὰ εἶναι ἀπόλλυται, ὅταν δὲ πολλὰ, τὸ ἐν εἶναι ἀπόλλυται; πάνυ γε. ἐν δὲ γιγνόμενον καὶ πολλὰ ἄρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη διακρίνεσθαί τε καὶ συγκρίνεσθαι; πολλή γε. καὶ μὴν ἀνόμοιόν γε καὶ ὅμοιον ὅταν γίγνηται, ὁμοιοῦσθαί τε καὶ ἀνομοιοῦσθαι; ναί. καὶ ὅταν μείζον καὶ ἔλαττον καὶ ἴσον, αὐξάνεσθαί τε καὶ φθίνειν καὶ ἰσοῦσθαι; οὕτως. ὅταν δὲ κινούμενόν τε ἴσθηται c καὶ ὅταν ἐστὸς ἐπὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι μεταβάλλῃ, δεῖ δὴ πού αὐτό γε μηδ' ἐν ἐνὶ χρόνῳ εἶναι. πῶς δὴ; ἐστὸς τε πρότερον ὕστερον κινεῖσθαι καὶ πρότερον κινούμενον ὕστερον ἐστάναι, ἄνευ μὲν τοῦ μεταβάλλειν οὐχ οἶόν τε ἔσται ταῦτα πάσχειν. πῶς γάρ; χρόνος δέ γε οὐδεὶς ἔστιν, ἐν ᾧ τι οἶόν τε ἅμα μήτε κινεῖσθαι μήθ' ἐστάναι. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μὴν μεταβάλλει ἄνευ τοῦ μεταβάλλειν. οὐκ εἰκός. πότ' οὖν μεταβάλλει; οὔτε γὰρ ἐστὸς ἂν οὔτε κινούμενον d μεταβάλλοι, οὔτ' ἐν χρόνῳ ὄν. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. ἄρ' οὖν ἔστι τὸ ἄτοπον τοῦτο, ἐν ᾧ τότ' ἂν εἴη, ὅτε μεταβάλλει; τὸ ποῖον δὴ; τὸ ἐξαίφνης. τὸ γὰρ ἐξαίφνης τοιόνδε τι ἔοικε σημαίνειν, ὡς ἐξ ἐκείνου μεταβάλλον εἰς ἐκάτερον. οὐ γὰρ ἔκ γε τοῦ ἐστάναι

ἑστῶτος ἔτι μεταβάλλει, οὐδ' ἐκ τῆς κινήσεως κινου-
 μένης ἔτι μεταβάλλει· ἀλλ' ἡ ἐξαίφνης αὕτη φύσις
 ἄτοπός τις ἐγκάθηται μεταξύ τῆς κινήσεώς τε καὶ
 e στάσεως, ἐν χρόνῳ οὐδενὶ οὔσα, καὶ εἰς ταύτην δὴ
 καὶ ἐκ ταύτης τό τε κινούμενον μεταβάλλει ἐπὶ τὸ
 ἑστάναι καὶ τὸ ἑστὸς ἐπὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι. κινδυνεύει.
 καὶ Τὸ Ἐν δὴ, εἴπερ ἔστηκέ τε καὶ κινεῖται, μετα-
 βάλλοι ἂν ἐφ' ἐκάτερα· μόνως γὰρ ἂν οὕτως ἀμφό-
 τερα ποιεῖ· μεταβάλλον δ' ἐξαίφνης μεταβάλλει,
 καὶ ὅτε μεταβάλλει, ἐν οὐδενὶ χρόνῳ ἂν εἴη, οὐδὲ
 κινοῖτ' ἂν τότε, οὐδ' ἂν σταίη. οὐ γάρ. ἄρ' οὖν
 οὕτω καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας μεταβολὰς ἔχει, ὅταν ἐκ
 157 τοῦ εἶναι εἰς τὸ ἀπόλλυσθαι μεταβάλλῃ ἢ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ
 εἶναι εἰς τὸ γίγνεσθαι, μεταξύ τινων τότε γίγνεται
 κινήσεών τε καὶ στάσεων, καὶ οὔτε ἔστι τότε οὔτε
 οὐκ ἔστι, οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτε ἀπόλλυται; ἔοικε γοῦν.
 κατὰ δὴ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς ἐπὶ πολλὰ ἰὸν
 καὶ ἐκ πολλῶν ἐφ' ἑν οὔτε ἑν ἔστιν οὔτε πολλά, οὔτε
 διακρίνεται οὔτε συγκρίνεται. καὶ ἐξ ὁμοίου ἐπὶ
 ἀνόμοιον καὶ ἐξ ἀνομοίου ἐπὶ ὁμοιον ἰὸν οὔτε ὁμοιον
 οὔτε ἀνόμοιον, οὔτε ὁμοιούμενον οὔτε ἀνομοιούμενον.
 b καὶ ἐκ σμικροῦ ἐπὶ μέγα καὶ ἐπὶ ἴσον καὶ εἰς τὰ
 ἐναντία ἰὸν οὔτε σμικρὸν οὔτε μέγα οὔτε ἴσον, οὔτε
 αὐξανόμενον οὔτε φθίνον οὔτε ἰσούμενον εἴη ἂν.
 οὐκ ἔοικε. ταῦτα δὴ τὰ παθήματα πάντ' ἂν πάσχοι
 Τὸ Ἐν, εἰ ἔστιν. πῶς δ' οὔ;

τί δὲ Τοῖς Ἄλλοις προσήκοι ἂν πάσχειν, Ἐν εἰ
 ἔστιν, ἄρα οὐ σκεπτέον; σκεπτέον. (1) λέγωμεν
 δὴ, ἑν εἰ ἔστι, Τάλλα Τοῦ Ἐνὸς τί χρή πεπονθέναι;
 λέγωμεν. οὐκοῦν ἐπείπερ ἄλλα Τοῦ Ἐνός ἔστιν,
 οὔτε Τὸ Ἐν ἔστι Τάλλα· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλα Τοῦ Ἐνός

(IV.) The
 Fourth Hy-
 pothesis:
 the effect of
 the exist-
 ence of the
 One on
 Τάλλα:
 they

admit contrary predicates.

(1) If the One exist, Τάλλα will not be one; but (2) Τάλλα cannot be altogether unconnected with the One, but (3) will bear to it the relation of Fractional Parts to an Integral Whole; and in the same way (4) each Part is related to Unity as the Parts of the Whole are related to Unity; and, therefore,

(5) as Τάλλα both in the Whole and in the Parts cannot be Unity, Τάλλα, when considered alone, can only have the relation of Indefinite

ἦν. ὀρθῶς. (2) οὐδὲ μὴν στéρεταιί γε παντάπασι c
 Τοῦ Ἐνὸς Τάλλα, ἀλλὰ μετέχει πῃ. πῇ δὴ; (3) ὅτι
 ποῦ Τὰ Ἄλλα Τοῦ Ἐνὸς μόρια ἔχοντα ἄλλα ἐστίν·
 εἰ γὰρ μόρια μὴ ἔχοι, παντελῶς ἂν ἔν εἴη. ὀρθῶς.
 (4) μόρια δέ γε, φαμέν, τούτου ἐστίν ὃ ἂν ὅλον ᾗ.
 φαμέν γάρ. ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε ὅλον ἔν ἐκ πολλῶν
 ἀνάγκη εἶναι, οὐ ἔσται μόρια τὰ μόρια. ἕκαστον
 γὰρ τῶν μορίων οὐ πολλῶν μόριον χρή εἶναι, ἀλλὰ
 ὅλον. πῶς τοῦτο; εἴ τι πολλῶν μόριον εἴη, ἐν οἷς
 αὐτὸ εἴη, ἑαυτοῦ τε δὴ πού μοριον ἔσται, ὃ ἐστίν d
 ἀδύνατον, καὶ Τῶν Ἄλλων δὴ ἐνὸς ἐκάστου, εἴπερ
 καὶ πάντων. ἐνὸς γὰρ μὴ ὄν μόριον, πλὴν τούτου
 Τῶν Ἄλλων ἔσται, καὶ οὕτως ἐνὸς ἐκάστου οὐκ ἔσται
 μόριον, μὴ ὄν δὲ μόριον ἐκάστου οὐδενὸς τῶν
 πολλῶν ἔσται. μηδενὸς δὲ ὄν πάντων τούτων τι
 εἶναι, ὣν οὐδενὸς οὐδέν ἐστι, καὶ μόριον καὶ ἄλλο
 ὅτιοῦν ἀδύνατον εἶναι. φαίνεταιί γε δὴ. οὐκ ἄρα
 τῶν πολλῶν οὐδὲ πάντων τὸ μόριον μόριον, ἀλλὰ
 μιᾶς τινὸς ιδέας καὶ ἐνός τινος, ὃ καλοῦμεν ὅλον, e
 ἐξ ἀπάντων ἔν τέλειον γεγονός, τούτου μόριον ἂν
 τὸ μόριον εἴη. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. εἰ ἄρα Τάλλα
 μόρια ἔχει, καὶ Τοῦ Ὀλοῦ τε καὶ Ἐνὸς μετέχοι. πάνυ
 γε. ἔν ἄρα ὅλον τέλειον μόρια ἔχον ἀνάγκη εἶναι
 Τάλλα Τοῦ Ἐνός. ἀνάγκη. (5) καὶ μὴν καὶ περὶ
 τοῦ μορίου γε ἐκάστου ὃ αὐτὸς λόγος. καὶ γὰρ
 τοῦτο ἀνάγκη μετέχειν Τοῦ Ἐνός. εἰ γὰρ ἕκαστον
 αὐτῶν μόριον ἐστι, τό γε ἕκαστον εἶναι ἔν δὴ πού 158
 σημαίνει, ἀφωρισμένον μὲν Τῶν Ἄλλων, καθ' αὐτὸ
 δὲ ὄν, εἴπερ ἕκαστον ἔσται. ὀρθῶς. μετέχοι δέ γε
 ἂν Τοῦ Ἐνός δηλόν ὅτι ἄλλο ὄν ἢ ἔν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν
 μετεῖχεν, ἀλλ' ἦν ἂν αὐτὸ ἔν· νῦν δὲ ἐνὶ μὲν εἶναι

πλὴν αὐτῷ Τῷ Ἐνὶ ἀδύνατόν που. ἀδύνατον. μετέ- Quantity
to an index,
therefore
 χειν δὲ Τοῦ Ἐνὸς ἀνάγκη τῷ τε ὅλῳ καὶ τῷ μορίῳ.
 τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ὅλον ἔσται, οὐ μόρια τὰ μόρια· τὸ
 δ' αὖ ἕκαστον ἐν μόριον τοῦ ὅλου, οὐ ἂν ᾗ μόριον
 b ὅλου. οὕτως. (6) οὐκοῦν ἕτερα ὄντα Τοῦ Ἐνὸς (6) Τάλλα
will be,
when taken
apart from
Unity, in-
definite;
and when
taken in
conjunc-
tion with
Unity,
definite;
and, there-
fore,
 μεθέξει τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτοῦ; πῶς δ' οὐ; τὰ δ' ἕτερα
 Τοῦ Ἐνὸς πολλά που ἂν εἴη. εἰ γὰρ μήθ' ἐν μήθ'
 ἐνὸς πλείω εἴη Τάλλα Τοῦ Ἐνός, οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη. οὐ
 γὰρ οὖν. ἐπεὶ δέ γε πλείω ἐνός ἐστι τά τε Τοῦ
 Ἐνὸς μορίου καὶ τὰ Τοῦ Ἐνὸς ὅλου μετέχοντα, οὐκ
 ἀνάγκη ἤδη πλήθει ἄπειρα εἶναι αὐτά γε ἐκείνα
 τὰ μεταλαμβάνοντα Τοῦ Ἐνός; πῶς; ὧδε ἴδωμεν.
 ἄλλο τι οὐχ ἐν ὄντα οὐδὲ μετέχοντα τοῦ ἐνὸς τότε,
 c ὅτε μεταλαμβάνει αὐτοῦ, μεταλαμβάνει; δῆλα δῆ.
 οὐκοῦν πλήθη ὄντα, ἐν οἷς Τὸ Ἐν οὐκ ἓν; πλήθη
 μέντοι. τί οὖν; εἰ ἐθέλοιμεν τῇ διανοίᾳ τῶν τοιού-
 των ἀφελεῖν ὥς οἰοί τέ ἐσμεν ὃ τι ὀλίγιστον, οὐκ
 ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ ἀφαιρεθὲν ἐκείνο, εἴπερ Τοῦ Ἐνὸς
 μὴ μετέχοι, πλήθος εἶναι καὶ οὐχ ἓν; ἀνάγκη.
 οὐκοῦν οὕτως αἰεὶ σκοποῦντι αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν τὴν
 ἑτέραν φύσιν τοῦ εἶδους, ὅσον ἂν αὐτῆς αἰεὶ ὁρῶμεν,
 ἄπειρον ἔσται πλήθει; παντάπασιν μὲν οὖν. καὶ
 d μὴν ἐπειδάν γε ἐν ἕκαστον μόριον μόριον γένηται,
 πέρας ἤδη ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον, καὶ
 τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὰ μόρια. κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν. Τοῖς
 Ἄλλοις δὲ Τοῦ Ἐνὸς συμβαίνει ἐκ μὲν Τοῦ Ἐνὸς
 καὶ ἐξ ἑαυτῶν κοινωνησάντων, ὥς ἔοικεν, ἕτερόν τι
 γίνεσθαι ἐν ἑαυτοῖς, ὃ δὲ πέρας παρέσχε πρὸς
 ἄλληλα· ἢ δ' ἑαυτῶν φύσις καθ' ἑαυτὰ ἀπειρίαν.
 φαίνεται. οὕτω δὲ Τὰ Ἄλλα Τοῦ Ἐνὸς καὶ ὅλα καὶ
 κατὰ μόρια ἄπειρά τέ ἐστι καὶ πέρατος μετέχει.

(7) Τάλλα will admit of the opposite predicates of Similarity and Dissimilarity, and of the other modes of Quality above enumerated.

πάννυ γε. (7) οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁμοιά τε καὶ ἀνόμοια ἐ ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ ἑαυτοῖς; πῇ δὴ; ἥ μὲν που ἄπειρά ἐστι κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν φύσιν πάντα, ταῦτὸν πεπονθότα ἂν εἴη ταύτη. πάννυ γε. καὶ μὴν ἥ γε ἅπαντα πέρατος μετέχει, καὶ ταύτη πάντ' ἂν εἴη ταῦτὸν πεπονθότα. πῶς δ' οὐ; ἥ δέ γε πεπερασμένα τε εἶναι καὶ ἄπειρα πέπονθεν, ἐναντία πάθῃ ἀλλήλοις ὄντα ταῦτα τὰ πάθῃ πέπονθεν. ναί. τὰ δ' ἐναντία 159 γε ὡς οἶόν τε ἀνομοιότατα. τί μὴν; κατὰ μὲν ἄρα ἐκάτερον τὸ πάθος ὁμοία ἂν εἴη αὐτά τε αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀλλήλοις, κατὰ δ' ἀμφοτέρω ἀμφοτέρως ἐναντιώτατά τε καὶ ἀνομοιότατα. κινδυνεύει. οὕτω δὲ Τὰ Ἄλλα αὐτά τε αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀλλήλοις ὁμοιά τε καὶ ἀνόμοια ἂν εἴη. οὕτως. καὶ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ ἕτερα ἀλλήλων, καὶ κινούμενα καὶ ἐστῶτα, καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐναντία πάθῃ οὐκέτι χαλεπῶς εὐρήσομεν πεπονθότα Τάλλα Τοῦ Ἐνός, ἐπείπερ καὶ ταῦτα ἐφάνη πεπονθότα. b ὁρθῶς λέγεις.

(V.) The Fifth Hypothesis: ἐν εἰ ἐστι: the effect of the existence of the One on Τάλλα further considered, i. e., Τάλλα owe their contrary and all other predicates to Τὸ Ἐν.

(1) If Τάλλα be distinct from the One, and if

οὐκοῦν ταῦτα μὲν ἤδη ἐῷμεν ὡς φανερά, ἐπισκοπῶμεν δὲ πάλιν, ἐν εἰ ἐστίν, ἄρα καὶ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει Τὰ Ἄλλα Τοῦ Ἐνός ἢ οὕτω μόνον; πάννυ μὲν οὖν. λέγωμεν δὲ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ἐν εἰ ἐστι, τί χρὴ Τὰ Ἄλλα Τοῦ Ἐνός πεπονθέναι. λέγωμεν γάρ. (1) ἄρ' οὖν οὐ χωρὶς μὲν Τὸ Ἐν Τῶν Ἄλλων, χωρὶς δὲ Τάλλα Τοῦ Ἐνός εἶναι; τί δὴ; ὅτι που οὐκ ἐστι παρὰ ταῦτα ἕτερον, ὃ ἄλλο μὲν ἐστι Τοῦ Ἐνός, ἄλλο δὲ Τῶν Ἄλλων. πάντα γὰρ εἴρηται, ὅταν ῥηθῇ Τό c τε Ἐν καὶ Τάλλα. πάντα γάρ. οὐκ ἄρα ἔτ' ἐστίν ἕτερον τούτων, ἐν ᾧ Τό τε Ἐν ἂν εἴη τῷ αὐτῷ, καὶ Τάλλα. οὐ γάρ. οὐδέποτε ἄρα ἐν ταύτῳ ἐστὶ Τὸ Ἐν καὶ Τάλλα. οὐκ ἔοικεν. χωρὶς ἄρα; ναί.

(2) οὐδὲ μὴν μόριά γε ἔχειν φαμέν Τὸ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἔν. πῶς γάρ; οὐτ' ἄρα ὅλον εἶη ἂν Τὸ Ἐν ἐν Τοῖς Ἄλλοις οὔτε μόρια αὐτοῦ, εἰ χωρίς τέ ἐστι Τῶν Ἄλλων καὶ μόρια μὴ ἔχει. πῶς γάρ; οὐδενὶ ἄρα
 d τρόπῳ μετέχοι ἂν Τάλλα Τοῦ Ἐνός, μήτε κατὰ μόριόν τι αὐτοῦ μήτε κατὰ ὅλον μετέχοντα. οὐκ ἔοικεν. οὐδαμῇ ἄρα ἐν Τάλλα ἐστίν, οὐδ' ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἐν οὐδέν. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. οὐδ' ἄρα πολλά ἐστι Τάλλα. ἐν γὰρ ἂν ἦν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν μόριον τοῦ ὅλου, εἰ πολλὰ ἦν· νῦν δὲ οὐθ' ἐν οὔτε πολλὰ οὐθ' ὅλον οὔτε μόριά ἐστι Τάλλα Τοῦ Ἐνός, ἐπειδὴ αὐτοῦ οὐδαμῇ μετέχει. ὀρθῶς. (3) οὐδ' ἄρα δύο οὐδὲ τρία οὔτε αὐτά ἐστι Τὰ Ἄλλα οὔτε ἔνεστιν
 e ἐν αὐτοῖς, εἴπερ Τοῦ Ἐνός πανταχῇ στέρεται. οὕτως. (4) οὐδὲ ὅμοια ἄρα καὶ ἀνόμοια οὔτε αὐτά ἐστι Τῷ Ἐνὶ Τάλλα, οὔτε ἔνεστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς ὁμοιότης καὶ ἀνομοιότης. εἰ γὰρ ὅμοια καὶ ἀνόμοια αὐτὰ εἶη ἢ ἔχοι ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ὁμοιότητα καὶ ἀνομοιότητα, δύο που εἶδη ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις ἔχοι ἂν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς Τὰ Ἄλλα Τοῦ Ἐνός. φαίνεται. ἦν δέ γε ἀδύνατον δυοῖν τينوῖν μετέχειν ἢ μὴδ' ἐνὸς μετέχοι. ἀδύνατον. οὐτ' ἄρα ὅμοια οὐτ' ἀνόμοιά ἐστίν οὐτ' ἀμφοτέρα
 160 Τάλλα. ὅμοια μὲν γὰρ ὄντα ἢ ἀνόμοια ἐνὸς ἂν τοῦ ἑτέρου εἶδους μετέχοι, ἀμφοτέρα δὲ ὄντα δυοῖν τοῖν ἐναντίοι· ταῦτα δὲ ἀδύνατα ἐφάνη. ἀληθῆ. οὐδ' ἄρα Τὰ αὐτὰ οὐδ' ἕτερα, οὐδὲ κινούμενα οὐδὲ ἐστῶτα, οὐδὲ γιγνόμενα οὐδὲ ἀπολλύμενα, οὐδὲ μείζω οὐδὲ ἐλάττω οὐδὲ ἴσα· οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν πέπονθε τῶν τοιούτων. εἰ γάρ τι τοιοῦτον πεπονθέναι ὑπομένει Τὰ Ἄλλα, καὶ ἐνὸς καὶ δυοῖν καὶ τριῶν καὶ περιττοῦ καὶ ἀρτίου μεθέξει, ὧν αὐτοῖς ἀδύνατον

the One and Τάλλα be an exhaustive division, there can be no middle term between the two, therefore, (2) Τάλλα can in no way admit the One, either fractionally or integrally, nor can Τάλλα admit Plurality, which is a mode of the One, and, therefore, (3) not Two, or any other number, each of which is a repetition of Unity; and, therefore, (4) not of Similarity or Dissimilarity, or any other mode of Quality whatsoever, if the One be completely eliminated. The conclusion of the four last hypotheses is: that, if the One exist, the One must exist as all actual individual

existences, and the One, being so far pluralized, cannot be one; and both these propositions hold, with regard to the One when considered both apart from Τάλλα, and likewise in relation to Τάλλα (Hypotheses 2 and 3): and both these propositions hold, with regard to Τάλλα when considered both in relation to the One (Hypothesis 4), and also when considered apart from the One (Hypothesis 5).

(B.) The negative argument. The meaning of Negation: Negation implies knowledge and difference.

(VI.) The Sixth Hypothesis: $\epsilon\acute{\nu} \epsilon\acute{\iota} \mu\eta \epsilon\acute{\sigma}\tau\iota = \epsilon\acute{\iota} \tau\acute{o} \epsilon\acute{\nu} \epsilon\acute{\sigma}\tau\iota \mu\eta$

ἐφάνη μετέχειν, Τοῦ Ἐνός γε πάντα πάντως ὅστερομένοις. ἀληθέστατα. οὕτω δὲ ἔν ἐἴ ἐστι, πάντα τέ ἐστι Τὸ Ἐν καὶ οὐδέν ἐστι καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ καὶ πρὸς Τὰ Ἄλλα ὡσαύτως. παντελῶς μὲν οὖν.

εἴεν· εἰ δὲ δὴ μὴ ἐστι Τὸ Ἐν, τί χρὴ συμβαίνειν, ἄρ' οὐ σκεπτέον μετὰ ταῦτα; σκεπτέον γάρ. τίς οὖν ἂν εἴη αὕτη ἢ ὑπόθεσις, εἰ ἔν μὴ ἐστιν; ἄρά τι διαφέρει τῆσδε, εἰ μὴ ἔν μὴ ἐστιν; διαφέρει μέντοι. διαφέρει μόνον, ἢ καὶ πᾶν τοῦναντίον ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν, εἰ μὴ ἔν μὴ ἐστι, τοῦ εἰ ἔν μὴ ἐστιν; πᾶν τοῦναντίον. τί δ' εἴ τις λέγοι, εἰ Μέγεθος μὴ ἐστιν ἢ Σμικρότης μὴ ἐστιν ἢ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων, ἄρα ἐφ' ἐκάστου ἂν δηλοῖ, ὅτι ἕτερόν τι λέγοι τὸ μὴ ὄν; πάνυ γε. οὐκοῦν καὶ νῦν δηλοῖ, ὅτι ἕτερον λέγει Τῶν Ἄλλων τὸ μὴ ὄν, ὅταν εἴπῃ ἔν ἐἴ μὴ ἐστι, καὶ ἴσμεν ὃ λέγει; ἴσμεν. πρῶτον μὲν ἄρα γνωστόν τι λέγει, ἔπειτα ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων, ὅταν εἴπῃ ἔν, εἴτε τὸ εἶναι αὐτῷ προσθεῖς εἴτε τὸ μὴ εἶναι· οὐδέν γὰρ ἡττον γιννώσκεται, τί τὸ λεγόμενον μὴ εἶναι, καὶ ὅτι διάφορον τῶν ἄλλων. ἢ οὐ; ἀνάγκη.

ὧδε ἄρα λεκτέον ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ἔν ἐἴ μὴ ἐστι, τί χρὴ εἶναι. (1) πρῶτον μὲν οὖν αὐτῷ τοῦτο ὑπάρχειν δεῖ, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἶναι αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμην, ἢ μηδὲ ὅ τι λέγεται γιννώσκεσθαι, ὅταν τις εἴπῃ ἔν ἐἴ μὴ ἐστιν. ἀληθῆ. (2) οὐκοῦν καὶ Τὰ Ἄλλα ἕτερόν αὐτοῦ εἶναι, ἢ μηδὲ ἐκεῖνο ἕτερον Τῶν Ἄλλων λέγεσθαι; πάνυ γε. καὶ ἑτεροειότης ἄρα ἐστὶν αὐτῷ πρὸς τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ. οὐ γὰρ τὴν Τῶν Ἄλλων ἑτεροειότητα λέγει, ὅταν Τὸ Ἐν ἕτερον Τῶν Ἄλλων λέγῃ, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐκείνου. φαίνεται. (3) καὶ μὴν τοῦ γε ἐκείνου

- καὶ τοῦ τινὸς καὶ τούτου καὶ τούτῳ καὶ τούτων καὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων μετέχει τὸ μὴ ὄν ἓν. οὐ γὰρ ἂν Τὸ Ἐν ἐλέγετο οὐδ' ἂν Τοῦ Ἐνὸς ἕτερα, οὐδ' ἐκείνῳ ἂν τι ᾗν οὐδ' ἐκείνου, οὐδ' ἂν τι ἐλέγετο, εἰ μήτε τοῦ τινὸς αὐτῷ μετῆν μήτε τῶν ἄλλων τούτων. ὀρθῶς. εἶναι μὲν δὴ Τῷ Ἐνὶ οὐχ οἷόν τε, εἴπερ γε μὴ ἔστι, μετέχειν δὲ πολλῶν οὐδὲν κωλύει, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ Τό γε Ἐν ἐκείνο καὶ μὴ ἄλλο μὴ ἔστιν. εἰ μέντοι μήτε Τὸ Ἐν μήτ' ἐκείνο μὴ ἔσται, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἄλλου του ὁ λόγος, οὐδὲ φθέγγεσθαι δεῖ οὐδέν· εἰ δὲ Τὸ Ἐν ἐκείνο καὶ μὴ ἄλλο ὑπόκειται μὴ εἶναι, καὶ τοῦ ἐκείνου καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ μετεῖναι. καὶ πάνυ γε. (4) καὶ Ἀνομοιότης ἅρ' ἔστιν αὐτῷ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα. Τὰ γὰρ Ἄλλα, Τοῦ Ἐνὸς ἕτερα ὄντα, ἑτεροῖα καὶ εἶη ἂν. ναί. τὰ δ' ἑτεροῖα οὐκ ἄλλοῖα; πῶς δ' οὐ; τὰ δ' ἄλλοῖα οὐκ ἀνόμοια; ἀνόμοια μὲν οὖν. οὐκοῦν εἴπερ Τῷ Ἐνὶ ἀνόμοιά ἐστι, δῆλον ὅτι ἀνομοίῳ τά γε ἀνόμοια ἀνόμοια ἂν εἶη. δῆλον. εἶη δὴ ἂν καὶ Τῷ Ἐνὶ ἀνομοιότης, πρὸς ᾗν Τὰ Ἄλλα ἀνόμοια αὐτῷ ἐστίν. ἔοικεν. εἰ δὲ δὴ Τῶν Ἄλλων ἀνομοιότης ἔστιν αὐτῷ, ἅρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἑαυτοῦ ὁμοιότητα αὐτῷ εἶναι; πῶς; εἰ ἑνὸς ἀνομοιότης ἔστι Τῷ Ἐνὶ, οὐκ ἂν που περὶ τοῦ τοιούτου ὁ λόγος εἶη οἷου Τοῦ Ἐνός, οὐδ' ἂν ἡ ὑπόθεσις εἶη περὶ ἑνός, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἄλλου ἢ ἑνός. πάνυ γε. οὐ δεῖ δέ γε. οὐ δῆτα. δεῖ ἅρ' ὁμοιότητα Τῷ Ἐνὶ αὐτοῦ ἑαυτῷ εἶναι. δεῖ. (5) καὶ μὴν οὐδ' αὖ ἴσον ἐστὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις. εἰ γὰρ εἶη ἴσον, εἶη τε ἂν ἥδη καὶ ὅμοιον ἂν εἶη αὐτοῖς κατὰ τὴν ἰσότητα· ταῦτα δ' ἀμφοτέρωθεν ἀδύνατα, εἴπερ μὴ ἔστιν ἓν. ἀδύνατα.

ὄν, if the One is non-existent—
μὴ ὄν—τὸ Ἐν μὴ ὄν admits of the contrary predicates, Production and Destruction, and is subject to neither Production nor Destruction.
(1) Non-existence implies Knowledge, and
(2) Difference, and, therefore, the non-existent One must be distinguished from Ἄλλα, everything else :
(3) the non-existent One admits of the various relations
(4) of Dissimilarity to Ἄλλα, everything else, and therefore of Similarity with itself :

(5) of Equality, Excess, and Defect ;

(6) of Existence, and, therefore,

ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐκ ἔστι τοῖς ἄλλοις ἴσον, ἀρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ τᾶλλ' ἐκείνῳ μὴ ἴσα εἶναι; ἀνάγκη. τὰ δὲ μὴ ἴσα οὐκ ἄνισα; ναί. τὰ δὲ ἄνισα οὐ τῷ Ἀνίσῳ ἄνισα; πῶς δ' οὐ; καὶ Ἀνισότητος δὴ μετέχει τὸ Ἐν, πρὸς ἣν τᾶλλ' αὐτῷ ἐστὶν ἄνισα; d μετέχει. ἀλλὰ μέντοι Ἀνισότητός γ' ἐστὶ μέγεθος τε καὶ Σμικρότης. ἔστι γάρ. ἔστιν ἄρα καὶ μέγεθος τε καὶ Σμικρότης τῷ τοιούτῳ ἐνί; κινδυνεύει. μέγεθος μὲν καὶ Σμικρότης αἰεὶ ἀφύστατον ἀλλήλοιν. πάνυ γε. μεταξὺ ἄρα τι αὐτοῖν αἰεὶ ἐστίν. ἔστιν. ἔχεις οὖν τι ἄλλο εἰπεῖν μεταξὺ αὐτοῖν ἢ Ἰσότητα; οὐκ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο. ὅτῳ ἄρα ἔστι μέγεθος καὶ Σμικρότης, ἔστι καὶ Ἰσότης αὐτῷ, μεταξὺ τούτοις οὖσα. φαίνεται. τῷ δὲ Ἐνὶ μὴ e ὄντι, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ Ἰσότητος ἂν μετεΐη καὶ μεγέθους καὶ Σμικρότητος. ἔοικεν. (6) καὶ μὲν καὶ οὐσίας γε δεῖ αὐτὸ μετέχειν πῃ. πῶς δὴ; ἔχειν αὐτὸ δεῖ οὕτως ὡς λέγομεν. εἰ γὰρ μὴ οὕτως ἔχοι, οὐκ ἂν ἀληθῆ λέγοιμεν ἡμεῖς λέγοντες τὸ Ἐν μὴ εἶναι· εἰ δὲ ἀληθῆ, δῆλον ὅτι ὄντα αὐτὰ λέγομεν ἢ οὐχ οὕτως; οὕτω μὲν οὖν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ φάμεν ἀληθῆ λέγειν, ἀνάγκη ἡμῖν φάναι καὶ ὄντα λέγειν. ἀνάγκη. ἔστιν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ Ἐν οὐκ ὄν. εἰ 162 γὰρ μὴ ἔσται μὴ ὄν, ἀλλὰ τι τοῦ εἶναι ἀνήσει πρὸς τὸ μὴ εἶναι, εὐθὺς ἔσται ὄν. παντάπασιν μὲν οὖν. δεῖ ἄρα αὐτὸ δεσμὸν ἔχειν τοῦ μὴ εἶναι τὸ εἶναι μὴ ὄν, εἰ μέλλει μὴ εἶναι, ὁμοίως ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν τὸ μὴ ὄν ἔχειν μὴ εἶναι, ἵνα τελέως αὐτὸ εἶναι ᾗ. οὕτως γὰρ ἂν τό τε ὄν μάλιστα ἂν εἴη καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν οὐκ ἂν εἴη, μετέχοντα τὸ μὲν ὄν οὐσίας τοῦ εἶναι ὄν, μὴ οὐσίας δὲ τοῦ εἶναι μὴ ὄν, εἰ μέλλει τελέως b

εἶναι, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν μὴ οὐσίας μὲν τοῦ μὴ εἶναι μὴ ὄν, οὐσίας δὲ τοῦ εἶναι μὴ ὄν, εἰ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν αὐτὸ τελέως μὴ ἔσται. ἀληθέστατα. οὐκοῦν ἐπεὶ τῷ τε ὄντι τοῦ μὴ εἶναι καὶ τῷ μὴ ὄντι τοῦ εἶναι μέτεστι, καὶ τῷ Ἐνί, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἔστι, τοῦ εἶναι ἀνάγκη μετεῖναι εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι. ἀνάγκη. καὶ οὐσία δὴ φαίνεται τῷ Ἐνί, εἰ μὴ ἔστιν. φαίνεται. καὶ μὴ οὐσία ἄρα, εἴπερ μὴ ἔστιν. πῶς δ' οὐ;
 (7) οἷόν τε οὖν τὸ ἔχον πῶς μὴ ἔχειν οὕτω, μὴ μεταβάλλον ἐκ ταύτης τῆς ἕξεως; οὐχ οἷόν τε. πάν
 c ἄρα τὸ τοιοῦτον μεταβολὴν σημαίνει, ὃ ἂν οὕτω τε καὶ μὴ οὕτως ἔχῃ. πῶς δ' οὐ; μεταβολὴ δὲ κίνησις, ἣ τί φήσομεν; κίνησις. οὐκοῦν τὸ Ἐν ὄν τε καὶ οὐκ ὄν ἐφάνη; ναί. οὕτως ἄρα καὶ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχον φαίνεται. ἔοικεν. καὶ κινούμενον ἄρα τὸ οὐκ ὄν ἐν πέφανται, ἐπεὶ καὶ μεταβολὴν ἐκ τοῦ εἶναι ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἔχον. κινδυνεύει. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ μηδαμοῦ γέ ἐστι τῶν ὄντων, ὥς οὐκ ἔστιν, εἴπερ μὴ ἔστιν, οὐδ' ἂν μεθίσταίτο ποθέν ποι. πῶς γάρ; οὐκ ἄρα τῷ γε μεταβαίνειν κινεῖται ἂν. οὐ
 d γάρ. οὐδὲ μὴν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἂν στρέφοιτο· ταύτου γὰρ οὐδαμοῦ ἄπτεται. ὄν γάρ ἐστι τὸ ταῦτόν· τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν ἐν τῷ τῶν ὄντων ἀδύνατον εἶναι. ἀδύνατον γάρ. οὐκ ἄρα τὸ Ἐν μὴ ὄν στρέφεσθαι ἂν δύναίτο ἐν ἐκείνῳ ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἔστιν. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. οὐδὲ μὴν ἀλλοιοῦνται που τὸ Ἐν ἑαυτοῦ, οὔτε τὸ ὄν οὔτε τὸ μὴ ὄν. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἦν ὁ λόγος ἔτι περὶ τοῦ Ἐνός, εἴπερ ἡλλοιοῦτο αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἄλλου τινός. ὀρθῶς. εἰ δὲ μήτ' ἀλλοιοῦνται μήτε ἐν ταύτῳ στρέφεται μήτε μεταβαίνει, ἄρ' ἂν πῃ ἔτι κινεῖτο; πῶς
 e γάρ; τό γε μὴν ἀκίνητον ἀνάγκη ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν,

(7) of transition from its essence, Non-existence, to its accident, Existence, and, therefore,

(8) of all the other predicates of modification, Motion, and Production in either direction.

τὸ δὲ ἡσυχάζον ἐστάναι. ἀνάγκη. Τὸ Ἐν ἄρα, ὥς ἔοικεν, οὐκ ὄν ἔστηκέ τε καὶ κινεῖται. ἔοικεν. (8) καὶ μὴν εἴπερ γε κινεῖται, μεγάλη ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι. ὅπη γὰρ ἂν τι κινήθῃ, κατὰ τοσοῦτον 163 οὐκέθ' ὡσαύτως ἔχει ὥς εἶχεν, ἀλλ' ἐτέρως. οὕτως. κινούμενον δὴ Τὸ Ἐν καὶ ἀλλοιοῦται. ναί. καὶ μὴν μηδαμῇ γε κινούμενον οὐδαμῇ ἂν ἀλλοιοῖτο. οὐ γάρ. ἥ μὲν ἄρα κινεῖται τὸ οὐκ ὄν, ἀλλοιοῦται· ἥ δὲ μὴ κινεῖται, οὐκ ἀλλοιοῦται. οὐ γάρ. Τὸ Ἐν ἄρα μὴ ὄν ἀλλοιοῦταί τε καὶ οὐκ ἀλλοιοῦται. φαίνεται. τὸ δ' ἀλλοιούμενον ἄρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη γίνεσθαι μὲν ἕτερον ἢ πρότερον, ἀπόλλυσθαι δὲ ἐκ τῆς προτέρας ἕξεως· τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀλλοιούμενον μήτε b γίνεσθαι μήτε ἀπόλλυσθαι; ἀνάγκη. καὶ Τὸ Ἐν ἄρα μὴ ὄν ἀλλοιούμενον μὲν γίγνεται τε καὶ ἀπόλλυται, μὴ ἀλλοιούμενον δὲ οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτε ἀπόλλυται· καὶ οὕτω Τὸ Ἐν μὴ ὄν γίγνεται τε καὶ ἀπόλλυται, καὶ οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτ' ἀπόλλυται. οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

(VII.) *The Seventh Hypothesis*: ἔν εἰ μὴ ἔστι = οὐ πη μετέχει οὐσίας: Τὸ Ἐν admits of no relation or predicate whatsoever.

(1) If non-existence mean the absence of Existence, the non-existent One cannot in any way

αὐθις δὴ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἴωμεν πάλιν, ὁψόμενοι εἰ ταῦτα ἡμῖν φανείται ἅπερ καὶ νῦν, ἢ ἕτερα. ἀλλὰ χρή. οὐκοῦν ἔν εἰ μὴ ἔστι, φαμέν, τί χρή c περὶ αὐτοῦ συμβαίνειν; ναί. (1) τὸ δὲ μὴ ἔστιν ὅταν λέγωμεν, ἄρα μή τι ἄλλο σημαίνει ἢ οὐσίας ἀπουσίαν τούτῳ ᾧ ἂν φῶμεν μὴ εἶναι; οὐδὲν ἄλλο. πρότερον οὖν, ὅταν φῶμεν μὴ εἶναί τι, πῶς οὐκ εἶναί φαμεν αὐτό, πῶς δὲ εἶναι; ἢ τοῦτο τὸ μὴ ἔστι λεγόμενον ἀπλῶς σημαίνει ὅτι οὐδαμῶς οὐδαμῇ ἔστιν οὐδέ πη μετέχει οὐσίας τό γε μὴ ὄν; ἀπλούστατα μὲν οὖν. οὔτε ἄρα εἶναι δύναίτο ἂν τὸ μὴ ὄν οὔτε ἄλλως οὐδαμῶς οὐσίας μετέχειν. οὐ γάρ. d

(2) τὸ δὲ γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὸ ἀπόλλυσθαι μή τι ἄλλο partake of Existence, and, therefore, (2) the non-existent One cannot partake of any mode of Quality in the way of Production, Modification, Rest, or Motion, nor ἢ, ἢ τὸ μὲν οὐσίας μεταλαμβάνειν, τὸ δ' ἀπολλύναι οὐσίαν; οὐδὲν ἄλλο. ὧ δέ γε μηδὲν τούτου μέτεστιν, οὐτ' ἂν λαμβάνοι οὐτ' ἀπολλύοι αὐτό. πῶς γάρ; Τῷ Ἐνὶ ἄρα, ἐπειδὴ οὐδαμῇ ἔστιν, οὐθ' ἐκτέον οὔτε ἀπαλλακτέον οὔτε μεταληπτέον οὐσίας οὐδαμῶς. εἰκός. οὐτ' ἄρ' ἀπόλλυται τὸ μὴ ὄν ἐν οὔτε γίγνεται, ἐπεὶπερ οὐδαμῇ μετέχει οὐσίας. οὐ φαίνεται. οὐδ' ἄρ' ἀλλοιοῦνται οὐδαμῇ· ἤδη γὰρ ἂν γίγνοιτό τε καὶ ἀπολλύοιτο τοῦτο πάσχον. ἀληθῆ. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀλλοιοῦνται, οὐκ ἀνάγκη μηδὲ κινεῖσθαι; ἀνάγκη. οὐδὲ μὴν ἐστάναι φήσομεν τὸ μηδαμοῦ ὄν. τὸ γὰρ ἐστὸς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τινὶ δεῖ εἶναι. τῷ αὐτῷ πῶς γὰρ οὐ; οὕτω δὴ αὐτὸ μὴ ὄν μήτε ποθ' ἐστάναι μήτε κινεῖσθαι λέγωμεν. μὴ γὰρ οὔν. (3) ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἔστι γε αὐτῷ τι τῶν ὄντων. ἤδη γὰρ ἂν του μετέχον ὄντος οὐσίας μετέχοι. (3) of any mode of Quantity by way of Equality, Excess, or Defect, nor (4) of their results—Similarity or Diversity—and, 164 δῆλον. οὔτε ἄρα Μέγεθος οὔτε Σμικρότης οὔτε Ἰσότης αὐτῷ ἔστιν. οὐ γάρ. (4) οὐδὲ μὴν Ὀμοιότης γε οὐδὲ Ἑτεροιότης οὔτε πρὸς αὐτὸ οὔτε πρὸς ἄλλα εἶη ἂν αὐτῷ. οὐ φαίνεται. τί δέ; Τᾶλλα ἔσθ' ὅπως ἂν εἶη αὐτῷ, εἰ μηδὲν αὐτῷ δεῖ εἶναι; οὐκ ἔστιν. οὐτ' ἄρ' ὅμοια οὔτε ἀνόμοια, οὔτε ταῦτ' οὐθ' ἕτερά ἐστιν αὐτῷ Τὰ Ἄλλα. οὐ γάρ. (5) τί δέ; τὸ ἐκείνου ἢ τὸ ἐκείνῳ, ἢ τὸ τί, ἢ τὸ τοῦτο ἢ τὸ τούτου, ἢ ἄλλου ἢ ἄλλῳ, ἢ ποτὲ ἢ ἔπειτα ἢ νῦν, ἢ ἐπιστήμη ἢ δόξα ἢ αἴσθησις ἢ λόγος ἢ ὄνομα ἢ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν τῶν ὄντων περὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν ἔσται; οὐκ ἔσται. οὕτω δὴ ἐν οὐκ ὄν οὐκ ἔχει πως οὐδαμῇ. οὐκ οὐκ δὴ εἰκὲς γε οὐδαμῇ ἔχειν. (5) therefore, as a general conclusion the One, as non-existent, cannot exist in any possible way.

ἔτι δὴ λέγωμεν, ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστι, Τὰ Ἄλλα τί χρὴ (VIII.) The

Eighth Hypothesis: ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστι = εἰ τὸ ἐν ἔστι μὴ-ὄν; the effect of the non-existence of the One on Τάλλα—everything else, i.e., Τάλλα admits of contrary predicates, but these predicates will be phenomenal only.

(1) If the One be non-existent, Τάλλα, everything else, must be different; and (2) if different, Τάλλα must be distinct, and, therefore, (3) distinct from something, and, therefore, (4) distinct *inter se* in some way or other, since the One does not exist; and, therefore, (5) as Unity is non-existent, Τάλλα can only be distinguished *inter se* as

πεπονθέναι. λέγωμεν γάρ. (1) ἄλλα μὴν που δεῖ αὐτὰ εἶναι· εἰ γὰρ μηδὲ ἄλλα ἐστίν, οὐκ ἂν περὶ τῶν Ἑλλων λέγοιτο. οὕτως. (2) εἰ δὲ περὶ τῶν Ἑλλων ὁ λόγος, Τά γε Ἑλλα ἕτερά ἐστιν. ἢ οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ καλεῖς Τό τε Ἑλλο καὶ Τὸ Ἑτερον; ἐγώ γε. ἕτερον δέ γέ πού φαμεν τὸ ἕτερον εἶναι ἑτέρου, καὶ τὸ ἄλλο δὴ ἄλλο εἶναι ἄλλου; ναί. καὶ τοῖς Ἑλλοις ἄρα, εἰ μέλλει ἄλλα εἶναι, ἔστι τι οὐ ἄλλα ἔσται. ἀνάγκη. (3) τί δὴ οὖν ἂν εἴη; τοῦ μὲν γὰρ Ἑνὸς οὐκ ἔσται ἄλλα, μὴ ὄντος γε. οὐ γάρ. ἀλλήλων ἄρα ἐστί· τοῦτο γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἔτι λείπεται, ἢ μηδενὸς εἶναι ἄλλοις. ὀρθῶς. (4) κατὰ πλήθη ἄρ' ἕκαστα ἀλλήλων ἄλλα ἐστί. καθ' ἐν γὰρ οὐκ ἂν οἶά τε εἴη, μὴ ὄντος ἑνός· ἀλλ' ἕκαστος, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὁ ὄγκος αὐτῶν ἄπειρός ἐστι πλήθει, καὶ τὸ σμικρότατον δοκοῦν εἶναι λάβη τις, ὥσπερ ὄναρ ἐν ὕπνῳ φαίνεται ἐξαίφνης ἀνθ' ἑνὸς δόξαντος εἶναι πολλὰ καὶ ἀντὶ σμικροτάτου παμμέγεθες πρὸς τὰ κερματιζόμενα ἐξ αὐτοῦ. ὀρθότατα. τοιούτων δὴ ὄγκων ἄλλα ἀλλήλων ἂν εἴη Τάλλα, εἰ ἑνὸς μὴ ὄντος ἄλλα ἐστίν. κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν. οὐκοῦν πολλοὶ ὄγκοι ἔσονται, εἰς ἕκαστος φαινόμενος, ὧν δὲ οὐ, εἴπερ ἐν μὴ ἔσται; οὕτως. (5) καὶ ἀριθμὸς δὲ εἶναι αὐτῶν δόξει, εἴπερ καὶ ἐν ἕκαστον, πολλῶν ὄντων. πάνυ γε. καὶ τὰ μὲν δὴ ἄρτια, τὰ δὲ περιττὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς ὄντα οὐκ ἀληθῶς φαίνεται, εἴπερ ἐν μὴ ἔσται. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. (6) καὶ μὴν καὶ σμικρότατόν γε, φαμέν, δόξει ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐνείναι· φαίνεται δὲ τοῦτο πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα πρὸς ἕκαστον τῶν πολλῶν ὡς σμικρῶν ὄντων. πῶς δ' οὐ; καὶ ἴσος μὴν τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ σμικροῖς ἕκαστος ὄγκος δοξασθήσεται

εἶναι. οὐ γὰρ ἂν μετέβαινεν ἐκ μείζονος εἰς ἔλαττον φαινόμενος, πρὶν εἰς τὸ μεταξὺ δόξειν ἔλθειν· τοῦτο δ' εἴη ἂν φάντασμα ἰσότητος. εἰκός. οὐκοῦν καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον ὄγκον πέρας ἔχων, αὐτός γε πρὸς αὐτὸν οὔτε ἀρχὴν οὔτε πέρας οὔτε μέσον ἔχων; πῇ δὴ; ὅτι αἰὲ αὐτῶν ὅταν τίς τι λάβῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ ὥς τι τούτων ὄν, πρό τε τῆς ἀρχῆς ἄλλη αἰὲ φαίνεται
b ἀρχή, μετὰ τε τὴν τελευτὴν ἑτέρα ὑπολειπομένη τελευτή, ἔν τε τῷ μέσῳ ἄλλα μεσαίτερα τοῦ μέσου, σμικρότερα δέ, διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἑνὸς αὐτῶν ἐκάστου λαμβάνεσθαι, ἅτε οὐκ ὄντος τοῦ ἑνός. ἀληθέστατα. θρύπτεσθαι δὴ, οἶμαι, κερματιζόμενον ἀνάγκη πᾶν τὸ ὄν, ὃ ἂν τις λάβῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ. ὄγκος γάρ που ἄνευ ἑνὸς λαμβάνοιτ' ἂν. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. (7) οὐκοῦν τό γε τοιοῦτον πόρρωθεν μὲν
c ὁρῶντι καὶ ἀμβλὺ ἐν φαίνεσθαι ἀνάγκη, ἐγγύθεν δὲ καὶ ὁξὺ νοοῦντι πλήθει ἄπειρον ἐν ἑκάστον φανῆναι, εἴπερ στέρεται Τοῦ Ἑνὸς μὴ ὄντος; ἀναγκαιότατον μὲν οὖν. οὕτω δὴ ἄπειρά τε καὶ πέρας ἔχοντα καὶ ἐν καὶ πολλὰ ἕκαστα Τᾶλλα δεῖ φαίνεσθαι, ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν, ἄλλα δὲ τοῦ ἑνός. δεῖ γάρ. (8) οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁμοιά τε καὶ ἀνόμοια δόξει εἶναι; πῇ δὴ; οἷον ἐσκιαγραφημένα ἀποστάντι μὲν
d ἐν πάντα φαινόμενα ταῦτὸν φαίνεσθαι πεπονθέναι καὶ ὁμοια εἶναι. πάνυ γε. προσελθόντι δέ γε πολλὰ καὶ ἕτερα καὶ τῷ τοῦ ἑτέρου φαντάσματος ἑτεροῖα καὶ ἀνόμοια ἑαυτοῖς. οὕτως. (9) καὶ ὁμοίους δὴ καὶ ἀνομοίους τοὺς ὄγκους αὐτοὺς τε ἑαυτοῖς ἀνάγκη φαίνεσθαι καὶ ἀλλήλοις. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. οὐκοῦν καὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καὶ ἑτέρους ἀλλήλων, καὶ ἀπτομένους καὶ χωρὶς ἑαυτῶν, καὶ κινουμένους

masses, and not as genuine pluralities; and, therefore, (6) Number and its modes will only have an *apparent* existence, and, therefore, (7) there will be the appearance of a Minimum, which in turn will appear a *Majus* as contrasted with a still smaller *Minus*, and so on to infinity; hence, (8) in the absence of real unity, Unity will be a mere confused view arising from imperfect vision, closer inspection suggesting an infinite *Minus* as before; hence, (9) Similarity and Dissimilarity, and the other modes of Modification and Quality, will have an *apparent* exis-

tence only,
for there is
no unity to
give them
cohesion.

(IX.) *The
Ninth Hy-*
pothesis:

ἐν εἰ μὴ
ἔστι = εἰ
τὸ Ἐν οὐ
πῶς οὐσίας
μετέχει;
the effect of
the non-
existence of
Unity on
τὰλλα,
i. e.,
τὰλλα
lose their
phenomenal
existence,
and the
result is
absolute
Nothing.
(1) In the
total ab-
sence of
Unity, the
notion of
Unity and
therefore of
Plurality is
impossible,
and, there-
fore,

(2) of Simi-
larity and
Dissimi-
larity, and
of all other
modes of
Quality
and Quan-
tity which
are based
on Unity.

πάσας κινήσεις καὶ ἐστῶτας πάντη, καὶ γιγνο-
μένους καὶ ἀπολλυμένους καὶ μηδέτερα, καὶ πάντα
που τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἃ διελθεῖν εὐπετέες ἤδη ἡμῖν, εἰ ἐ
ένος μὴ ὄντος πολλὰ ἔστιν. ἀληθέστατα μὲν οὖν.

ἔτι δὴ ἅπαξ ἐλθόντες πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν εἴπω-
μεν, ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστι, Τὰλλα δὲ τοῦ Ἐνός, τί χρὴ
εἶναι. εἴπωμεν γὰρ οὖν. (1) οὐκοῦν ἐν μὲν οὐκ
ἔσται Τὰλλα. πῶς γάρ; οὐδὲ μὴν πολλά γε ἐν
γὰρ πολλοῖς οὖσιν ἐνείη ἂν καὶ ἐν. εἰ γὰρ μηδὲν
αὐτῶν ἐστὶν ἐν, ἅπαντα οὐδὲν ἐστίν, ὥστε οὐδ' ἂν
πολλὰ εἴη. ἀληθῆ. μὴ ἐνόητος δὲ ἐνός ἐν τοῖς
ἄλλοις, οὔτε πολλὰ οὔθ' ἐν ἐστὶ Τὰλλα. οὐ γάρ.
οὐδέ γε φαίνεται ἐν οὐδὲ πολλά. τί δὴ; ὅτι Τὰλλα 166
τῶν μὴ ὄντων οὐδενὶ οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς οὐδεμίαν
κοινωνίαν ἔχει, οὐδέ τι τῶν μὴ ὄντων παρὰ τῶν
ἄλλων τῷ ἐστίν. οὐδὲν γὰρ μέρος ἐστὶ τοῖς μὴ
οὖσιν. ἀληθῆ. οὐδ' ἄρα δόξα τοῦ μὴ ὄντος παρὰ
τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐστὶν οὐδέ τι φάντασμα, οὐδὲ δοξά-
ζεται οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς τὸ μὴ ὄν ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων.
οὐ γὰρ οὖν. ἐν ἄρα εἰ μὴ ἔστιν, οὐδὲ δοξάζεται
τι τῶν ἄλλων ἐν εἶναι οὐδὲ πολλά. ἄνευ γὰρ ἐνός
πολλὰ δοξάσαι ἀδύνατον. ἀδύνατον γάρ. ἐν ἄρα
εἰ μὴ ἔστι, Τὰλλα οὔτε ἔστιν οὔτε δοξάζεται ἐν
οὐδὲ πολλά. οὐκ ἔοικεν. (2) οὐδ' ἄρα ὅμοια οὐδὲ
ἀνόμοια. οὐ γάρ. οὐδὲ μὴν τὰ αὐτά γε οὐδ' ἕτερα,
οὐδὲ ἀπτόμενα οὐδὲ χωρίς, οὐδὲ ἄλλα ὅσα ἐν τοῖς
πρόσθεν διήλθομεν ὡς φαινόμενα αὐτά, τούτων
οὔτε τι ἔστιν οὔτε φαίνεται Τὰλλα, ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν.
ἀληθῆ. οὐκοῦν καὶ συλλήβδην εἰ εἴπομεν, ἐν εἰ
μὴ ἔστιν, οὐδὲν ἐστίν, ὀρθῶς ἂν εἴπομεν; παντά-
πασι μὲν οὖν.

εἰρήσθω τοίνυν τοῦτό τε καὶ ὅτι, ὡς ἔοικεν, Ἐν εἴτ' ἔστιν εἴτε μὴ ἔστιν, αὐτό τε καὶ Τάλλα καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα πάντα πάντως ἐστί τε καὶ οὐκ ἔστι καὶ φαίνεται τε καὶ οὐ φαίνεται. ἀληθέστατα.

The sum of the affirmative and negative arguments is: **affirmatively**, that if the One exists, the One, both in re-

lation to itself and in relation to Τάλλα, exists in every mode of conditioned existence, and in its opposite, and so, the One is not unconditioned or absolute unity, so far as it exists in these modes: **negatively**, if the One does not exist, then all existence both in relation to Unity, and in itself, is phenomenal, and this phenomenal existence, when closely scrutinized, is entirely destitute of even phenomenal Unity, and therefore of all categories of Quantity and Quality whatsoever. The conclusion therefore is: the Universe—Τὸ Πᾶν—is neither ἐν alone nor πολλὰ alone, but ἐν-καὶ-πολλὰ.

NOTES.

NOTES.

THE piece is a monologue by Cephalus of Clazomenae. The conversation between the philosophers is supposed to have been originally reported by Pythodorus, a friend of Zeno to Antiphon, half-brother of Plato, and then retailed by Antiphon to Cephalus. Plato, by selecting Antiphon, who is a sporting character, fond of horses (126 c), perhaps wishes to hint that Antiphon has not tampered with the dialogue, ἡκιστα γὰρ ἂν πολυπραγμονοῖ, as he says of Aristotle (137 b), and thus offers it as the exposition of his own views. He may also have wished to compliment his half-brother Antiphon, just as he introduces Glauco and Adimantus in the *Republic*. The monologue is thus, on the face of it, a hearsay of a hearsay. Hermann, to get rid of some chronological difficulties, which are insuperable, makes Glauco and Adimantus cousins, and not brothers, of Antiphon. But it is vain to look for the precision of modern history in an ancient imaginative composition. Such exactness is the result of matter-of-fact habits, and of abundant means of verification, such as books of reference, &c. No such habits or means existed till the other day. A strong proof of this is the inaccuracy of quotation, common to all ancient writers, even professed critics.

126 a.

Κλαζομενῶν.

Stallbaum points out that some people in Clazomenae, townspeople, and perhaps followers of Anaxagoras, would

naturally take an interest in the discussion. The influence of Anaxagoras on Platonic thought is evidenced by the *Phaedo*. To Anaxagoras, Mind owes the recognition of nearly all its metaphysical prerogatives. He set it in a sphere apart, and assigned to it unique properties. Mind alone was strictly infinite, *i.e.* unlimited or untrammelled by anything else, and subsisted by its own inherent strength. Mind was homogeneous, and was the only real existence. Plato is fond of putting doctrines which he adopts into the mouth of a person of the original school. Thus Timæus expounds physics, and the Eleatic Stranger metaphysics, and the more practical Socrates ethics.

126 c.

Ζήνων καὶ Παρμενίδης.

Parmenides and Zeno are described by Strabo as ἄνδρες Πυθαγόρειοι, vi. 1. Their connexion with Pythagoreanism is philosophically real, as one column of the Pythagorean στοιχία is reducible to τὸ πέρας, and the other to τὸ ἄπειρον.

127 b.

Πολὺ γὰρ ἔφη ἔργον εἶναι.

Such a feat of memory, though here a dramatic fiction, cf. *Symp.* 172 a, is rendered plausible by Niceratus's statement that he could repeat the whole *Iliad* and *Odyssey*: Xen. *Conv.* iii. 5. Many rhapsodists could do the same: *ibid.* 6.

127 b.

παιδικά.

λέγεσθαι γεγονέναι show that Stallbaum's charitable explanation is untenable. There is no doubt suggested of their present friendship: Ζήνων ὅδε οὐ μόνον τῇ ἄλλῃ σου φιλίᾳ βούλεται ὑπεικῶσθαι ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ συγγράμματι, 128 a.

127 e.

εἰ πολλά ἐστὶ τὰ ὄντα.

The argument is as follows :—In the order of Time or subjectivity, the perception of difference between two things A and B precedes the perception of their similarity ; but in the order of existence or objectivity, the differentia of each of the differents depends on the individual peculiarities of each different. Each of the relatives thus exhibits Identity in relation to itself, and Difference in relation to the other, and so to all other things. If we assume, then, with Zeno, for argument's sake, τὸ πᾶν—existence—τὰ ὄντα—to be plural, each of τὰ ὄντα is *per se* ὁμοιον ; but the aggregate is plural, and therefore τὰ ὄντα being plural are distinct, and therefore *inter se* ἀνόμοια. Zeno accordingly agrees with Leibnitz as to the identity of indiscernibles, thus : Indiscernibles are identical, and therefore non-plural, since primordial things cannot be differenced *inter se* without having been previously differenced *per se*. The Platonist and Hegelian say Plurality is subsumed by Unity without being destroyed by it. The *Aufhebung* settles everything.

127 e.

Τὰ ἀνόμοια.

Stallbaum remarks : Zeno callida conclusione effecit, non esse multa, quum hoc tantum consequatur, non posse huic eidemque rei eadem spectatae ratione plura eaque contraria attribui. To a Greek, the order of Notions would be Motion, Change, Plurality ; Motion denoting not merely physical Motion, ποθέν ποι, but the notional movement of Metaphysics. The identity, in the Hegelian sense, of Cause and Effect, is the notion which brings the scientific order of Time into harmony with the order of Logic.

128 d.

εἰ ἓν ἐστὶ.

Sc. τὸ Πᾶν. This is the Subject of the Proposition, for which Philosophy undertakes to find the Predicate :

τὸ πᾶν is ἓν, said the Eleatic; it is πολλά, said the Ionic: it is ἓν καὶ πολλά, said Plato, and to prove this is the gist of the *Parmenides*.

128 d.

εἰ πολλά ἐστίν: sc. τὸ Πᾶν.

The gist of Zeno's argument has been perpetually mistaken: Zeno does not deny Motion as a fact, but argues that as implying change, and therefore dissimilarity, it conflicts with the changeless uniformity of the One. In the One there is no contrariety, while contrariety is the essence of Motion. It may be remarked that, if Zeno's two moving bodies be made conscious, one will have double the consciousness of the other. The order of analysis is—Motion implies change, and change plurality. (See Appendix A.)

129 d.

ἐπτά ἡμῶν ὄντων.

This is irreconcilable with ἀφικέσθαι τὸν τε Σωκράτη καὶ ἄλλους τινὰς μετ' αὐτοῦ πολλούς, 127 c. If we leave out Cephalus the reciter and Glaucus, who does not speak, we can count up seven persons, viz., Adimantus and Antiphon in the introduction; Pythodorus, Socrates, Zeno, Parmenides, and Aristotle in the discussion. Ἐπτά shows that Plato either forgot the original plan or did not care to adhere to it—another proof of the historical unreality of the piece.

130 b.

Χωρίς.

Χωρίς, a notion derived from physical separation: things are properly χωρίς which are not ἀπτόμενα, and then the word is applied to things which, as existing under totally distinct conditions, differ in kind. It should be recollected that all notions which differ in any degree are metaphysically distinct, *e.g.* 3 and 4 are as distinct as 3 and 4 millions.

Moderns look principally to the origin or genesis of things and notions in determining their resemblance or difference, and not to their characteristics when matured.

131 d.

τούτου δὲ αὐτοῦ.

With Hermann, I retain the Vulgate τούτου δὲ αὐτοῦ. Heindorf's τούτου δὲ αὐτὸ is plainly wrong. The argument is: If any of us shall have a fragment of smallness, the real smallness will be bigger, because it is the whole, of which the fragment is a part.

131 e.

μεταλαμβάνειν.

μεταλαμβάνειν is a more material expression than μετέχειν. Both, however, express the truth, that the Sensible element, in cognition, without the Intelligible, is inconceivable. Professor Huxley invests Sensation with all the Categories, and then tells us we do not want them. Sensibles have, in Hegel's words, *Richtigkeit*, and not *Wahrheit*.

132 a, b.

The unique εἶδος.

This passage gives the reason why the εἶδος is unique:—In referring an object to a class we have two things in hand, the particular instance and the genus, *e.g.* the particular man, Socrates, and the genus man, *i.e.* the first and second intentions. Parmenides argues, that to connect the particular with the genus there must be a third concept or notion, and then another to comprehend the three, and so on to infinity. If this be so, εἶδος is not unique, but ἄπειρον. Now, ἄπειρον denotes privation of all πέρας, Limitation, therefore of Form, therefore of all Cogitability. But every thing must be either ἐν or ἄπειρον, as follows:—In strict logic, the contrary of τὸ ἄπειρον is τὸ πεπερασμένον; but τὸ πεπερασμένον yields on analysis—(1) τὸ πέρας; and (2)

something which is not τὸ πέρας, and so ἄπειρον. What is τὸ πέρας, when out of any definite relation to τὸ πεπερασμένον? It must be quantifying power, and we must hold that power to be not plural, but unique; for plural equipollent powers, if adverse, cancel; and if corroborative, result in unity. Τὸ πέρας, therefore, must be ἓν, and therefore Τὸ "Εν; for the ultimate Form must be one, and, without τὸ ἓν, as Plato afterwards proves, οὐδὲ φαίνεται τι. The εἶδος, therefore, since it is Form, cannot be ἄπειρον, and therefore must be one. This is Plato's answer to the objections urged in *pars.* 7 and 9, and known to Greek Logicians as ὁ τρίτος ἄνθρωπος. "We may remark," says Mr. Jowett, "that the process which is thus described has no real existence. The mind, after having obtained a general idea, does not really go on to form another which includes that, and all the individuals contained under it, and another and another without end," *III.* p. 237. Plato, in the *Philebus*, gives the rationale of the Universal. (See Appendix B.)

132 c.

Objection to Conceptualism.

Either each thing consists of νοήματα, *i. e.* acts of intelligence, and therefore each thing is the being intelligent, *i. e.* intelligence, or if it be an act of intelligence, it is unintelligent, *q. a. e.* This argument is a case of the Platonic principle ὁμοιον ὁμοίῳ γιγνώσκεται. It is substantially the same as Berkeley's position that mind is mind, that therefore nothing but mind is mind, and, as a further consequence, that nothing but mind can have the properties of mind; it is therefore illogical to ascribe to that which is not mind the properties of mind. Plato does not hold νοῦς to be the ultimate existence either in the moral or in the physical sphere. In the ethical sphere we have Τάγαθόν, *Rep.* vi. 509 b; in the physical, ψυχή: Τούτῳ δέ [*sc.* νοῦς ἐπιστήμη τε] ἐν ᾧ τῶν ὄντων ἐγγίγνεσθον, ἂν ποτέ τις αὐτὸ ἀλλὸ πλὴν ψυχὴν, πᾶν μᾶλλον ἢ τὰληθὲς ἐρεῖ, *Tim.* 36 c; σοφία

μὴν καὶ νοῦς ἄνευ ψυχῆς οὐκ ἂν ποτε γενοίσθην, *Phil.* 30 c. M. Ribot overlooks Plato when he says, "Since Will is the centre of ourselves and of all things, we must give it the first rank. It is its due, though since Anaxagoras Intelligence has usurped its place" (*La Philosophie de Schopenhauer*, p. 69, cited in H. Zimmern's *Sch.* p. 102). The same doctrine is developed as to the priority of ψυχὴ—Motive and Vital Energy—in the *Laws*, written in the "sunset of life."—x. 891 e, *sqq.*

133 c.

ἀπίθανος = δυσανάπειστος, 135 a.

133 d.

οὕτω and οὕτως.

With regard to the orthography of these words, the insertion of ς before a vowel is plausible. But we must recollect that we can prove that τί was not elided, and that μέχρῃ and ἄχρῃ had no ς.

134 c. *Objection to the Absolute from the subjective side.*

This brings out the true sense of absolute—Τὸ ἀνυπόθετον, *Rep.* vi.—that which does not depend on anything else for its essence, or outcome, or priority—λόγῳ—in order of thought. Of course, *quâ* γνωστὸν to us, it depends on us; but the Absolute may be and is γνωστὸν to itself. With regard to us, it is ultimum relatum; with regard to itself, it is not referred to anything else.

135 a. *Objection to the Absolute from the objective side.*

This objection is urged by both Hamilton and Mill, ὄντες ἔχθιστοι τὸ πρίν; but it assumes that because partial knowledge is not plenary knowledge, they therefore contra-

dict each other. How is the geography of Ireland contradictory to the geography of Europe? Plenary knowledge, of course, will correct partial knowledge, and may put it in quite a new light, but the facts on which the partial knowledge is grounded cannot be shaken by the fullest knowledge. Aristotle objects ἀδύνατον χωρὶς εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ οὐ ἡ οὐσία. If χωρὶς means that there is a bridgeless chasm between the two, the objection holds—not otherwise. Sense and Intellect are essentially χωρὶς, yet every act of Perception is a blending of both. That the objective sphere, or Things-in-themselves, is unknown and unknowable to us, is held by Kant, Herbert Spencer, and Comte. This doctrine is favoured by the antithesis between phenomenon and reality. As a matter of fact, the Greek word is in the present participle, *i. e.* φαινόμενον, and meant *that which is in the course of appearing*, and not φανέν, that which did appear. In a word, the modern means by φαινόμενον what the Greeks call φάντασμα, a kind of delusive appearance. Carneades distinguishes the act of perception into three parts—τὸ φανταστόν, the object; τὸ φαντασιούμενον, the subject; and φαντασία, the act. Now Plato's meaning is, that τὰ φαινόμενα, or τὰ γιγνόμενα, are possible, because they are produced by permanent reality which is discernible through them. For his conception of genesis of phenomena, see note 154 c.

137 c-143 a.

Τὸ ἔν.

Τὸ ἔν, all through the first proposition, means pure unity prior to all evolution. Like Hegel's *Seyn*, it has not been stripped of attributes, but is prior to all attributes. It is, like the *Seyn*, a postulate of completed thought.

137 d.

πέρας.

Πέρας is the limit *ab intra*: cf. τελευτή γε καὶ ἀρχὴ πέρας ἐκάστου: hence, as τὸ ἔν has neither *ab intra*, it is ἄπειρον.

This is taken from Melissus *Τὸ δὲ μήτε ἀρχὴν ἔχον μήτε τελευτήν, ἄπειρον τυγχάνει ἔον*. Fr. 2. Plato does not discuss the other possibility, argued by Melissus, that ἄπειρον could have limits *ab extra*: for there cannot be more than one *τὸ ἓν*.

137 e.

Plato's right line.

This definition is exact: it is obvious there can only be one such line; and, if it is unique, it follows it is the shortest in *rerum natura*. If Helmholtz's reasoning-beings of two dimensions living on the surface of a sphere understood the definition given by Plato, they would see it to be the shortest possible, and that their own geodetic line was not. If they liked to call the latter straight, of course they might; which is as irrelevant as the entire of Helmholtz's argument.

138 c.

αὗται γὰρ μόναι κινήσεις.

In the *Laws*—893 b–895—ten modes of motion are specified. Eight of these belong to body: (1), without change of place, *i.e.* on an axis; (2), with change of place—(a), either without change of base, *e.g.* a stone sliding on ice; (β), or with change of base, *e.g.* a ball rolling. The next two are where motion gives rise to—(3), concretion, or (4), decrection. The next two are where concretion is prolonged into (5) growth, or discrection turns into (6) waste. The next is where growth in bulk is prolonged into (7) production of state, and waste into (8) decay. The two movements of mind are (9) to move things other than itself, itself being moved; and (10) to move itself of itself out of a previous state of rest.

The power of transmitting motion as a link in the Chain of Sequence is the only power allowed man by Hume and his followers. The 10th motion includes free-will.

139 b-e.

The One has not Identity with itself or anything else that has distinctness : nor is it distinct from itself or anything else that has distinctness.

That is, the One, being one and nothing else, admits of no relation whatsoever ; if it did, there would be unity and relation, something more than unity, and therefore not unity, *q. a. e.*

It cannot even possess Distinctness, for Distinctness means that A is distinct from B, and so B is in turn distinct from A. If, then, Unity possessed Distinctness, it could only be distinct by means of Unity and not by means of Distinctness ; but Unity, *ex vi termini*, is not Distinctness. Therefore *Τὸ Ἐν* cannot be distinct in itself. A similar argument was urged against St. Anselm, that Unity was not Perfection. The mode of argument is due to the Megarics. The *Aufhebung* is the answer.

139 d.

Source of *τὸ ἕτερον*.

I.e. supplying the ellipses *εἰ μὴ τούτῳ—τῷ ἔν εἶναι—ἔσται ἕτερον, οὐχ ἑαυτῷ ἔσται ἕτερον· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἑαυτῷ ἔσται ἕτερον, οὐδὲ αὐτὸ ἔσται ἕτερον.* (See note 127 e.)

141 c.

διαφορότης.

διαφορότης was read by Proclus, T. vi. 237, and is supported by *ποιότης*, *Theaetet.* 182 a.

141 e.

γεγόνει.

For *γέγονεν*, Hermann reads *γεγόνει*, as *γέγονεν* has to be taken in two senses, perfect and past.

141 e. *γεννηθήσεται.*

οὐτ' ἔπειτα γενήσεται οὔτε γεννηθήσεται, *will neither come into being, nor be brought into being; will neither come of itself, nor be brought by anything else.*

141 e. *Ambiguity of ἔν.*

Τὸ ἐν οὔτε ἔν ἐστιν οὔτε ἔστιν, *i. e.*, Τὸ ἐν is neither the relation Unity, nor the quality Existence.

142 a. *ἡ αὐτῷ ἡ αὐτοῦ.*

εἴη ἂν τι ἡ αὐτῷ ἡ αὐτοῦ, *would it have any affection resulting to it, or proceeding from it: any income or outcome; i. e. either accident or property.*

142 a. *ὄνομα, λόγος, ἐπιστήμη, κ. τ. λ.*

Plato gives the following explanation of these terms:—

ὄνομα = the term.

λόγος = definition.

ἐπιστήμη = ἐν ψυχᾷ ἐνόν, ᾧ δῆλον ἕτερόν τε ὄν αὐτοῦ τοῦ κύκλου τῆς φύσεως τῶν τε λεχθέντων τριῶν, *i. e.* ὄνομα, λόγος, εἶδωλον.—*Epist.* VII. 342–3.

ἐπιστήμη is the psychical aspect of αὐτό, and is a process of intense activity. Plato objects to the sensible figure of the Circle, that it partakes of the Straight, *i. e.* is really a zigzag line. *The Circle* then would be the process of describing it without a sensible line (*Epist.* VII.), and in this way ἐπιστήμη resembles the Kantian schema. The *Epistles* are considered genuine by Cobet and Grote, and are very characteristic. At all events, the passage in the 7th could only have been written by a great metaphysician.

δόξα, ἐκ μνήμης καὶ αἰσθήσεως.—*Phil.* 38 b.

αἰσθησις = τὸ ἐν ἐνὶ πάθει, τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ σῶμα, κοινῇ γιγνόμενον, κοινῇ καὶ κινεῖσθαι.—*Phil.*, 34 a. This is scientifically true: the sensation lasts only as long as the impressed condition of the nerve is kept up.

142 b–155 e.

Τὸ ἔν.

In the second proposition, Τὸ ἔν is in combination with ἔστι. Each element is distinct before combination and in combination; though the combination may and does give rise to new relations.

142 d—e.

Relation of Τὸ ἔν and ὄν.

I. e. τῶν μορίων ἑκάτερον τούτων Τοῦ Ἐνὸς ὄντος (Τό τε Ἐν καὶ Τὸ ὄν), ἄρα ἀπολειπέσθον, ἢ Τὸ Ἐν Τοῦ ὄντος εἶναι μορίου, ἢ Τὸ ὄν Τοῦ Ἐνὸς εἶναι μορίου; *i. e.* where there is Τὸ ὄν, Τὸ Ἐν is in combination with Τὸ ὄν, and Τὸ ὄν is in combination with Τὸ Ἐν.

εἶναι, c. gen. = *to be a property of*: cf. Ὁ δὲ μὴ ἔστι, τούτῳ τῷ μή-ὄντι εἴη ἄν τι, ἢ αὐτῷ ἢ αὐτοῦ; 141 a. *Can a nonentity have either accident or property?*

142 e.

μόριον.

Each one μόριον—either τὸ Ἐν, or τὸ ὄν—of the two μόρια τὸ Ἐν and τὸ ὄν, holds in combination Ἐν and ὄν, and so on, *ad infin.*

This is strictly true: the universe has unity, and the universe exists; and each of the motes that people the sun's beam has equally existence and unity. One is Form: Existence is Matter, and to show that the One formulates existence into plurality is the aim of the second part of the *Parmenides*.

143 c.-144 a. *Genesis of Number, i. e. a system of Monads.*

There are three *συζυγίαι* or pairs, viz. :

οὐσία and *ἕτερον* ;
οὐσία and *ἓν* ;
ἓν and *ἕτερον*.

Now every pair is *ἄμφω*, and therefore *δύο* ; therefore each member of the pair is *ἐκάτερον*, and therefore one : so that in each pair we have two members,

$$2.1 = 2,$$

and each member being unified by the index 1, we have three symbols,

$$3.1 = 3.$$

Now where there is Two, we have *δὺς ἓν*, and where there is Three, we have *τρεῖς ἓν* ; where, therefore, there are three symbols, we have two members

$$(2 \text{ m . } 1 = \text{δὺς ἓν ὄντων}),$$

and where there are two members we have three symbols

$$(3 \text{ symbols . } 1 = 1 \text{ τρεῖς ἓν ὄντων}).$$

Three (symbols) therefore must be two (members), and two (members) must be three (symbols). Therefore *ἄρτια* (= *δύο* = *δὺς ἓν*) = *ἀρτιάκις* (= *δὺς ἓν*) : and *περιττά* (= *τρία* = *τρεῖς ἓν*) = *περιττάκις* (= *τρεῖς ἓν*) : and *ἄρτια* (= *δύο*, i. e. members) = *περιττάκις* (= *τρεῖς ἓν*, i. e. symbols ; and *περιττά* (= *τρία*, i. e. symbols) = *ἀρτιάκις* = (*δὺς ἓν*) members. From this we have the genesis of every number : for 2 = *δὺς ἓν* is *ἄρτια ἀρτιάκις*, that is even numbers even times ; and 3 = *τρεῖς ἓν* is *περιττὰ περιττάκις*, that is, odd numbers odd times ; and 2 (members) = 3 (symbols) is *ἄρτια*, even numbers odd times, *περιττάκις* ; and 3 (symbols) = 2 (members) is *περιττά*, odd numbers even times, *ἀρτιάκις*.

143 d.

οὐδὲ μία.

An instance of Plato's habit of using in the ordinary sense the philosophic word which is under argument: other examples are noticed in note on 157 d.

143 d.

οὐ τρία γίνονται τὰ πάντα ; i. e. are there not three distinct symbols ? lit., are not the distinct things three ?

143 d.

Interdependence of 2 and 3.

Let there be two roots, x and y ; let them have a common index, say *e. gr.* 1; and let $x = 1$: then we have x^1, y^1 .

We have thus three distinct symbols, x, y , and 1; x and y denoting the two roots, and 1 the index common to both. Now, as there are three symbols, the three symbols involve the index twice; that is, x^1 and y^1 ; but x as a root = 1, and y is made one by its index;

$$\therefore x \text{ and } y^1 = 1 + 1 = 2 \cdot 1 = 2.$$

Likewise the two roots x and y , and the identical index 1, require three symbols for their notation;

$$\therefore x \text{ and } y \text{ and } 1 = 1 + 1^1 + 1 = 3 \cdot 1 = 3.$$

To apply this:—Whatever admits of the predicate *both*, admits of the predicate *two*, and the predicate *two* indicates that each of the binaries is one. Now *one* as index being incorporated with each number of each syzygy, each syzygy involves the index twice;

$$\therefore 2 \cdot 1 = 2,$$

and as each syzygy requires, as we have seen, three symbols for its notation, each syzygy involves one thrice,

$$\therefore 3 \cdot 1 = 3.$$

Thus, in Aristotelian language, Three is the Form of Two, and Two is the Matter of Three. Hence, we may see why the Pythagoreans made Two the symbol of indefinite existence, for Matter without Form is indefinite; likewise why they made Three the symbol of definite existence. In the order of existence—*φύσει*—Three is prior to Two, for we require as prerequisites of Three

- (1). The radical 1 ; = 1 *ἐν* ;
- (2). The other thing ; which = *Θάτερον*, being unquantified, to be construed to thought requires quantification, and thereto requires
- (3). The index 1.

Without these we cannot have Two, for $2 = 1$ and $1 = 2 \cdot 1$.

143 d-e. *Genesis of all the Numbers from Τὸ ἐν and Τὸ ὄν.*

Supplying ellipses—*δυοῖν ὄντοι, οὐκ ἀνάγκη εἶναι καὶ δις ἐν ; καὶ τριῶν ὄντων εἶναι τρις ἐν, εἴπερ ὑπάρχει Τῷ τε Δύο τὸ δις-ἐν, καὶ Τῷ Τρία τὸ τρις-ἐν ; i. e. :*

$$\text{II.} = 2 \cdot 1, \text{ and III.} = 3 \cdot 1.$$

Then, *Δυοῖν δὲ ὄντοι καὶ δις-ἐν, οὐκ ἀνάγκη δύο δις εἶναι ; i. e.*

$$x^1 + y^1 = 1^1 + 1^1 = 1(1^1 + 1^1),$$

but

$$x \text{ and } y = 2, \text{ and the indices } 1 \text{ and } 1 = 2 ;$$

∴ we have *δύο δις* in the notion II.

$$\text{So mut. mut. of } 3 = 1(1^1 + 1^1 + 1^1) =$$

$$1x^1 + 1y^1 + 1 \cdot 1^1 = 1 + 1 + 1 = 3,$$

but

$$1 + 1 + 1 = 3 ;$$

and

$$x + y + 1' = 3 ;$$

and indices

$$^1 + ^1 + ^1 = 3 ;$$

∴ we have *τρία τρις* in the notion III. That is, each couple is two things; it is also two single things; and the unity of each single thing is a third thing, i. e. *x* and *y* and 1.

In Aristotelian language:—Formed Matter contains (1) Form, and (2) Formless Matter = 1 + 1 = II.; but Formless Matter is incogitable; therefore we have Matter unified by Form. But Form = 1; Matter = 1; and Unification = 1; ∴ 1 + 1 + 1 = 3. The mote in the sunbeam contains three metaphysical elements—(1) that which unifies; (2) that which is unified; and (3) the unification of 1 and 2, i. e. III. It is a pity the scholastic distinction between *metaphysical* and *physical* is not kept up. Metaphysical entities were those that could not exist separately, e. g. concave and convex: physical, those that could, i. e. *λόγῳ* and *φύσει*.

143 e.

δις ὄντων.

Τριῶν ὄντων καὶ δις ὄντων, καὶ δυοῖν ὄντων καὶ τρις ὄντων. Hermann brackets the second ὄντων and ὄντων, but they are right, i. e. *τριῶν ὄντων καὶ δις ἐν ὄντων* = the symbols are three, and the pairs are two; and *δυοῖν ὄντων, καὶ τρις ὄντων* = *δυοῖν ὄντων καὶ τρις ἐν ὄντων*, the pairs are two and the symbols are three. It must be recollected that the Greek arithmetic was originally the geometry of rectangles. In the present case, as usual, in place of our abstract multiplication 3×2 and 2×3 , two rectangles are generated. The first has 3 as its base and 2 as its side, and as the base is the more important factor, the plural is used, ὄντων. In the second, 2 is the base and 3 the side; here the base is 2, and is the more important, hence the dual ὄντων. The conception is that a rectangle is described on a base, and not on a side. The rectangle 3×2 is quite distinct from the rectangle 2×3 .

144 a.

ἀριθμός does not mean a single unit, but a collection of units. Thus one is not ἀριθμός, but two is: ἀριθμός ἐστι πλῆθος ὠρισμένον ἢ μονάδων σύστημα ἢ ποσότητος χύμα ἐκ μονάδων συνκείμενον.—*Nic. Ger.* i. vii. 1.

In speaking of Numbers, both the Platonists and the Pythagoreans meant always whole numbers, and not fractions, the unit being the foot, lineal, square, and cubic. The numbers, or rather rectangles, were ἄρτιοι, an even base by an even side; περιττοί, an odd base by an odd side; ἄρτιοι περιττάκις, an even base by an odd side; and περιττοὶ ἀρτιάκις, an odd base by an even side.

144 e. Τὸ ἐν ὑπὸ τοῦ ὄντος διανενημεμένον.

Justifies ὑπὸ in 166 a.

145 c, d.

A part contains the following notions:—

1. Its separate existence;
2. Its own relation to its fellow parts;
3. Its common relation to the whole.

This may be illustrated by a piece of a dissected map. The map is not all the separate pieces one by one—τὰ πάντα—nor any one: yet if any piece did not fit, it would not be in the map when it was put together, τὰ ἅπαντα; but if the piece belong to the map, it must be one of the separate pieces.

Metaphysically, all distinct ideas are equally distinct.

145 c, d.

ἀλλὰ μέντοι τό γε ὅλον αὖ οὐκ ἐν τοῖς μέρεσιν ἐστίν, οὔτε ἐν πᾶσιν οὔτε ἐν τινί. (εἰ γὰρ ἐν πᾶσιν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν ἐνί. ἔν τινι γὰρ ἐνὶ μὴ ὄν οὐκ ἂν ἔτι που δύναίτο ἐν γε ἅπασιν εἶναι.)

εἰ δὲ τοῦτο μὲν τὸ ἐν τῶν ἀπάντων ἐστί, τὸ δὲ ὅλον ἐν τούτῳ
 ἔνι, πῶς ἔτι ἔν γε τοῖς πᾶσιν ἐνέσται; οὐδαμῶς. οὐδὲ μὴν ἐν
 τισὶ τῶν μερῶν. εἰ γὰρ ἐν τισὶ τὸ ὅλον εἴη, τὸ πλεον ἂν ἐν τῷ
 ἐλάττονι εἴη, ὃ ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον.

The Whole is distinct from the parts; for if the Whole is in each quaque of the parts, it must be in some one quavis; and if that particular part contains the Whole, that one part cannot be one of the parts.

The argument is: if the Whole is in the parts, it is in all, some, or one; the clause from ἐν τινι to εἶναι is the converse opposite of the clause εἰ γὰρ ἐν πᾶσιν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν ἐνί. In the clause τὸ δὲ ὅλον ἐν τούτῳ [μὴ] ἔνι, Hermann brackets [μὴ]. I have struck it out, as it spoils the argument, which is: *if the Whole is in each part, it is in some one part. If so, the part thus specialised is differentiated from its former peers, but it is so differentiated by containing the Whole, not by not containing it.*

Hegel says: The relation of the Whole and the parts is untrue to this extent—that the notion and the reality of the relation are not in harmony. The notion of the Whole is to contain parts; but if the Whole is taken, and made what its notion implies, *i.e.*, if it is divided, it at once ceases to be a Whole.—*Logic*, p. 211. All through the *Parmenides* it must be kept in view, that any two notions in any degree distinct are totally distinct. “Each thing,” says Butler, “is what it is, and not another thing.”

Τὰ πάντα is the roll or litany of items; ἅπαντα is the sum total of the same items summed: Τὰ πάντα are the parts of the sum; ἅπαντα is the sum of the parts. It is a pity that modern English has lost its neuter plural and verb singular: “hot blood begets hot thoughts, and hot thoughts beget hot deeds, and hot deeds is love.”

145 e. ἧ μὲν ἄρα τὸ ἐν ὅλον, ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐστίν.

The notion Whole is not the notion Aggregate of items: cf. ἧ καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἐκ τῶν μερῶν λέγεις γεγονὸς ἐν τι εἶδος ἕτερον

τῶν πάντων μερῶν; ἔγωγε.—*Theaet.* 204 a, b. The order of notions is—(1) τὰ μέρη; (2) τὰ πάντα; (3) τὰ ἅπαντα; (4) τὸ ὅλον; (5) τὸ πᾶν.

145 e.

κινεῖσθαι.

Zeno's contribution to thinking is, the showing that motion is relative to a something which is not moved. This is well brought out in the Flying Arrow, which at any given moment coincides with its equivalent in the space through which it is passing.

146 a.

μηδὲ ἐστάναι, μὴ ἐστὸς δὲ κινεῖσθαι.

By Excluded Middle; if not the one, it must be the other.

146 a, b.

ἕτερον.

Hegel's view, that Otherness is negation, is supported by the history of the particle μή. If μὴ is etymologically *ne*, as Curtius mentions, comparing the Lithuanian *nei* (i. 317), *na* in the Vedas very often means *as*, and the order then would be—assertion, comparison, negation: cf. ἀνὰ and ἄλλος, *ib.* 307.

146 a–148 e.

1. Everything possesses Identity, and, in that respect, it resembles primarily everything else.

2. Everything is distinct from everything else, and, in that respect, it differs primarily from everything else.

3. In being distinct, it, *eo ipso*, resembles secondarily everything else; and, therefore,

4. Differs secondarily from everything else by the contrary of diversity—identity.

Hence τὸ ἓν, in possessing either quality, has resemblances, primarily and secondarily, to

(a) itself, and to

(b) τᾶλλα; and,

in possessing either quality, has diversities primary and secondary to

(a) itself, and to

(b) $\tau\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\alpha$.

In possessing both, $\tau\acute{o}\ \epsilon\nu$

is primarily like itself and $\tau\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\alpha$, and

is primarily unlike itself and $\tau\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\alpha$.

Nothing can be clearer than that Plato held that there were $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\delta\eta\ \tau\acute{\omega}\nu\ \pi\rho\acute{o}\varsigma\ \tau\iota$. Idealism is only the development of relations.

The One is identical and diverse to itself, and is identical and diverse to $\tau\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\alpha$, *i. e.* all ideas or objects of Reason are equally ideas, and therefore distinct: they all agree in distinctness; but, being distinct, they differ; therefore they agree through Difference, they differ through Identity; and as each has both Identity and Diversity together, each agrees with and differs from itself, and each agrees with and differs from $\tau\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\alpha$. The One agrees with $\tau\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\alpha$ in having both qualities; and the very having both qualities is the essence of its individuality.

148 c.

The order of notions is—

(1) $\tau\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}\nu$;

(2) $\mu\grave{\eta}\ \acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omicron\iota\omicron\nu$;

(3) $\mu\grave{\eta}\ \acute{\alpha}\nu\omicron\mu\omicron\iota\omicron\nu$;

(4) $\acute{\omicron}\mu\omicron\iota\omicron\nu$.

$\tau\acute{o}\ \epsilon\nu$ is $\tau\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}\nu\ \tau\omicron\iota\varsigma\ \acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omicron\iota\varsigma$;

$\tau\acute{o}\ \epsilon\nu$ is $\epsilon\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\nu\ \tau\acute{\omega}\nu\ \acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omega\nu$.

Taking each case separately:—

(1). $\tau\acute{o}\ \epsilon\nu$ is like $\tau\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\alpha$;

(2). $\tau\acute{o}\ \epsilon\nu$ is unlike $\tau\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\alpha$.

Taking both together—

Tò 'Εν is both like and unlike τᾶλλα;

and so, by parity of reasoning,

Tò 'Εν is like and unlike itself.

148 d–149 e.

Ancient arithmetic was originally geometrical: hence the notions,

Whole and Parts :

Contact.

149 a.

Contact—ᾗψεις—presupposes—

1. Something distinct, *e. g.*

a ——— b ; and

2. Something else in immediate contiguity to it; *e. g.*

$\overline{a \quad b \quad c.}$

Here $a b$ is distinct from $b c$, and $b c$ is in immediate contiguity. If to $b c$ we add $c d$,

$\overline{a \quad b \quad c \quad d,}$

αὐτὰ μὲν τρία, ἔσται αἱ δὲ ᾗψεις δύο. Hence, *ad fin.*, the things, τὰ ἀπτόμενα, are always one in advance of αἱ ᾗψεις. Hence, if τᾶλλα be totally devoid of unity, junction between τὸ ἐν and τᾶλλα is impossible, for τᾶλλα must be one, before it can combine with τὸ ἐν to form two.

149 e.

αὐταῖς γε ταύταις ταῖς οὐσίαις, *i. e.* essences, notions, ἰδέαι: cf. *Phaed.* 78 c–d.

εἶδη, Stall.

150 a. τὰ μεγέθους τε καὶ ἰσότητος, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰ ἐαυτῆς.

τί τινος = attribute.

150 c-d.

Tò "Εν, *quā* "Εν, is ἐν, and nothing else: τᾶλλα *quā* ἄλλα, is ἄλλα, and nothing else: τὸ μέγεθος, *quā* μέγεθος, is μέγεθος, and nothing else: and ἡ σμικρότης, *quā* σμικρότης, is σμικρότης, and nothing else. Tò "Εν therefore cannot be greater than τᾶλλα, nor τᾶλλα greater than Tò "Εν: in the same way, neither is less than the other: but if neither greater nor less, they are not unequal, and therefore equal.

So it is commonly said, all infinities are equal. Metaphysically, there is only one infinite, that whose essence it is to have no bounds or limit. It is evident there cannot be two of this nature, for each would overlap, and so bound the other. But in mathematical infinities, infinity merely means infinitely divisible or infinitely addible; *i. e.* a process which may be worked as long as there is anything to work on. The process is always one and the same, and so infinite: the material is always finite, and may be as different as one pleases.

150 d.

ὑπερέχω takes the genitive; therefore the vexed passage in the *Phaedo* runs thus, if the ellipses are supplied—one of the surest ways of construing Plato:—Τοῦ μὲν Σωκράτους (τῷ μεγέθει τῷ αὐτοῦ τοῦ Σωκράτους τὴν σμικρότητα ὑπερέχειν) ὑπερέχων, *i. e.*, τῷ ὑπερέχειν = cause; μεγέθει = instrument; Σωκράτους *sub.* = gen. on ὑπερέχειν; and τὴν σμικρότητα = acc. *de quo*.

151 a. μηδὲν εἶναι ἐκτὸς τοῦ ἐνός τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

Grote says: "Both these predicates (One—Many) are relative and phenomenal, grounded on the facts and com-

parisons of our own senses and consciousness. We know nothing of an absolute, continuous, self-existent One.”—*Plato*, i. 105–6. Here “absolute” is used in the sense of out of all possible range, a sense popularised by the frivolous discussions of Hamilton, Mansel, and Mill.

151 d.

The order of notions is—

1. Magnitude;
2. Measure;
3. Parts.

151 d.

“*But that a thing, which bears no relation to any one (cuivis) given item, should bear any relation to each (cuique) of the sum total of items, to no one of which (cuiquam) does it bear any actual relation either as part or otherwise, is impossible.*”

151 d–e.

Shadworth Hodgson makes similar remarks on the subjective embracing the objective, and *vice versâ*, *Space and Time*, pp. 45, *sqq.*

154 c–d.

$\tau\acute{o}\ \epsilon\nu$ does not *grow* younger or older than $\tau\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\alpha$, because it is so already : it has had so much start, and equals added to unequals leave the difference absolutely as before ; but, if we subtract the difference, the residue is always growing larger, and therefore the difference is growing less relatively to the residue : *e.g.* A is born a year before B ; thus A is always a year older than B ; but when A is two years old the relative difference is greater than when A is ninety.

154 c.

γίνεται, the emphatic word, is not *growing* or *becoming*, because it *is*.

154 c.

γένεσις is explained in the *Laws* thus: γίνεται δὴ πάντων γένεσις ἡνίκ' ἂν τι πάθος ᾗ; δῆλον, ὡς ὁπότεν ἀρχὴ λαβοῦσα αὖξην εἰς τὴν δευτέραν ἔλθῃ μετάβασιν, καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης εἰς τὴν πλησίον, καὶ μέχρι τριῶν ἐλθοῦσα αἰσθησιν σχῆ τοῖς αἰσθανομένοις, 894 a. The steps are—

1. αὖξῃ;
2. ἕξις καθεστηκυῖα;
3. ἕξις μένουσα.

155 c.

μεταλαμβάνειν differs from μετέχειν: μεταλαμβάνω is to coincide in part with, to have share in; μετέχειν is to form one with, to unite with; cf. 158 b.

155 e–157 a.

The One in this hypothesis passes from one state into another, and so do its attributes. The transition takes place through an unextended point: that is, time is cut in two by a timeless point, just as Space is cut in two by a breadthless line. Shadworth Hodgson seems to suppose that Plato held that the point possessed duration. It is well explained by Damascius—ἀμερές ἐστι τῇ ιδιότητι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἄχρονον.

156 a–157.

The notion is, any one state or condition which passes into a different condition has to pass through an intermediate

state, in which it is neither what it was nor what it is in course of becoming. Anaxagoras, from whom Plato took much of his Physics, says: οὐ κεχώρισται τὰ ἐν τῷ ἐνὶ κόσμῳ οὐδὲ ἀποκέκοπται πελέκει οὔτε τὸ θερμὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ ψυχροῦ οὔτε τὸ ψυχρὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ θερμοῦ, Fr. 13 *Mullach*. This joined with his doctrine, adopted by Plato, that there is no minimum, οὔτε τοῦ σμικροῦ γέ ἐστι τό γε ἐλάχιστον, ἀλλ' ἔλασσον αἰεί, necessitates the presence of τὸ ἐν in and out of Space and Time.

156 d-e.

ἄρ' οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ ἄτοπον τοῦτο, ἐν ᾧ τότε ἂν εἴη ὅτε μεταβάλλει; τὸ ποῖον δὴ; τὸ ἐξαίφνης . . . (see 155 e).

157 b-159 b.

Here Τάλλα owe their predicates to their participation of τὸ ἐν. *Cetera* and *ceterum* are very inadequate renderings of the Greek neuter plural, Τάλλα expressing neither unity nor plurality, but food for both.

157 b.

Here we have the full phrase τάλλα τοῦ ἐνός.

157 c.

The correlatives are ὅλον and μόρια: now τὸ ὅλον = πολλὰ μόρια, therefore any one μόριον is not μόριον of τὰ πολλὰ μόρια, but of τὸ ὅλον. For unless τὸ μόριον—any given part—be part of itself, there must be one part of the lot of which the given Part is not part. Consequently if the given Part be a part of many parts, it must be a part of the parts minus the given Part. But if it be a part of the other parts, it must be a part of every one of the several parts taken by them-

selves, since *quâ* parts the parts are similar, and therefore must be a part of itself: *q. a. e.* *E. g.* a shilling is part of a pound, but a shilling is not a part of the several shillings which make up the pound. For, if it be a part τῶν πολλῶν shillings, it must be either a part of itself, *q. a. e.*, or of the remaining nineteen shillings. But as the other nineteen shillings, when out of relation to the pound, are nineteen totally independent units, the Part must be a part of them *quâ* units, and therefore of every one of them (since there is no difference between them *quâ* units), and therefore of itself, which is exactly similar to the rest. A Part is correlative to a Whole, but it has no relation whatsoever to any one or all of the other parts, save that of being a fellow-part of the same integer.

In Plato's day, abstract language was taken from Geometry; perhaps *fraction* and *integer* would be better renderings of μόριον and ὅλον. *Mutatis mutandis*, the same reasoning is triumphant against Natural Realism, substituting Quality for Part, and Body for Whole. The Natural Realist makes all qualities, minus one, depend on the residual quality; so that we have either a quality which is more than a quality, or which is not a quality. The same reasoning applies to the Antithesis of Kant's Fourth Antinomy.

157 a.

ἰόν.

Justifies the vulgate in *Phaedr.*, 249 b.

157 b.

The order of notions in the order of analysis is—

1. εἶναι;
2. γίγνεσθαι;
3. συγκρίνεσθαι;
4. ὁμοιοῦσθαι.

Order of genesis *e contra*.

157 c.

μετέχε πη.

The Platonic μέθεξις is best illustrated by the *Concret* of Hegel, *i.e.* where an object or thought is seen and known to be the confluence of several elements—to be a process in its own nature, and not a mere stationary point of view; each object to be equal to itself, multiplied into all other things.—Wallace's *Hegel*, clxxvi. Cicero makes use of the same principle: semper enim ita assumit aliquid (sc. natura) ut ea quae prima dederit, ne deserat.—*De Fin.* iv. 14. It is the ideal side of the doctrine of Development.

157 c.

Here, c—τό γε ὅλον = ἐν ἐκ πολλῶν in d, = ἐξ πάντων ἐν τέλειον γεγονός.

157 d.

ἀδύνατον εἶναι : Sc. ἐστι.

Plato often uses words both in the ordinary and philosophic sense in the same passage: cf. οὐδὲ μία, 143 d: αὐτοῦ Παρμενίδου, 136 d: ἄπειρον, *Phil.* 17 e: συμφέρεσθαι, *Theaet.* 152 e.

157 e.

Τάλλα participates in Τὸ Ἐν through τὸ ὅλον; in modern language, through the notion Law, *i.e.* in the scientific meaning of the term, when “we think of the parts as held together by a certain force.” This is Hamilton's description of physical unity.—REID, 852.

158 a.

ὁ ἂν ᾗ μόριον ὅλου.

So the MSS., and they are right. The conjecture μορίου ὅλου is a mere truism, for the notion Whole is the correlation

of the notion Part. But *μόριον ὅλου* is emphatic, that which is a genuine part, and not a part *per accidens*. A shilling is $\frac{1}{20}$ of the amount of silver defined to be a legal pound : it is therefore, *quâ* $\frac{1}{20}$, *μόριον ὅλου*, because $\frac{1}{20} \times 20 = 1$: whereas a shilling *quâ* shilling is only one amongst any number of shillings, and is only $\frac{1}{20}$ of £1, *per accidens*, just as it is $\frac{1}{100}$ of £5. Each part must be one, because the parts are *πολλά*. Cf. οὐδ' ἄρα πολλά ἐστι Τᾶλλα. ἐν γὰρ ᾗ ἦν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν *μόριον τοῦ ὅλου*, εἰ πολλὰ ἦν. 159. Besides, the proposed change would require *τοῦ μορίου τὸ ὅλον*.

158 e.

The order of notions is—

1. ἄπειρα καὶ πεπερασμένα ;
2. ἐναντία ;
3. ἀνόμοια.

159 a.

Κατὰ μὲν ἄρα ἐκάτερον.

- (1). Τᾶλλα *quâ* πεπερασμένα are similar ;
- (2). Τᾶλλα *quâ* ἄπειρα are similar ;
- (3). Τᾶλλα *quâ* πεπερασμένα καὶ ἄπειρα are dissimilar, both *per se* and *inter se*.

ἀμφοτέρως, *i. e.* as uniting two opposite predicates, a double contrariety, ἐναλλάξ,

- (1). πεπερασμένα καὶ ἄπειρα.

- (2). πεπερασμένα καὶ ἄπειρα.

159 b–160 b.

Τᾶλλα are capable of no predicates whatsoever, if the One be one in aloofness. The key to this section is the notion

χωρίς—aloofness—the negation of actual relation. The One is allowed to be, but is relegated to isolation.

160 a.

Illustrates Hypothesis ii., as the order of Number is

ένός, δυοῖν, τριῶν, περιττοῦ, ἀρτίου.

The order is objective, φύσει.

160 b-d.

τὸ μὴ ὄν.

Negation is considered as relative to knowledge, and thus giving rise to the notion ἕτερον—otherness—distinctness.

160 b.

The order of notions is—

1. γνωστόν;
2. ἕτερον.

The order is subjective.

160 d-163 b.

The One in this section, though non-existent, admits of positive predicates, which are contrary opposites. Here the One is granted what we would call a subjective existence.

160 e.

In scholastic language τὸ μὴ-ὄν has—

1. Illudalitas;
2. Quidditas;
3. Hocceitas.

161 b.

εἰ ἐνός.

If Tò 'Εν have unlikeness to one, then the argument will not turn on anything like Tò "Εν, nor will the hypothesis relate to one, but to something different. That is, Tò "Εν, the subject of discussion, must have unity for its essence; if not, the hypothesis deals with something else. Mr. Jowett ignores the difference between Tò 'Εν and εἰν.

162 b.

Tò μὴ ὄν has οὐσία + μὴ-οὐσία; it therefore involves μεταβολή; and therefore all incompatible predicates. Here we have Hegelianism *in concreto*, as applied to Tò ὄν. Mr. Shadworth Hodgson, in his *Philosophy of Reflection*, attacks Hegelianism on the following grounds, which apply equally to Plato's proposition. It must be premised that Mr. Hodgson uses the term *contradictory* to signify, not the opposition of general and particular, but that between a proposition and its negative, *i.e.* difference of quality only: *e.g.* A is A, A is not A; while by a *contrary* he means that the negative particle joins on to the predicate: *e.g.* A is A, A is not-A. To resume, the objection is as follows: "The evolution of the concrete concept is his (Hegel's) fundamental idea; it evolves itself by *Entgegensetzung*, a concrete opposition containing undistinguished the purely logical opposition of contradistinction, and the opposition of content, which is contrariety. The former gives the motive power, the latter the order and arrangement, of the evolution. Thus the pure Nothing, *Nichts*, at the beginning is logically opposed to the pure Being, *Sein*; hence the *movement* between them. There is no opposition of content, no difference of content at all, between them, until they are conceived *together*; then they are perceived to be different in *content*, but at the same time to be a process, a *Werden*, not (either of them) a state or thing. The Whole makes one undistinguishable process of opposition, a becoming, *Entgegensetzung*, a *Werden*. To analyse

this process, to show what is due to perception, what to conception, what part of the opposition is due to content, and what to logical contradiction, would be to destroy it as a theory of the universe."—Vol. I. pp. 384, 5. Again : "Of two wholly contradictory terms, the one is thought as existent, the other as non-existent." "The negative member of a pair of contradictory terms, which is a pure creature of logical method, analogous to imaginary quantities in mathematics, is treated by Hegel as if it were a concept with a perceptual content. The "*Nichts*" at the beginning of the *Logik* is the first instance of it."—p. 382.

The question is, What is the value of a creature of logic? And here comes in the work of Kant. Kant showed that the intelligible element was indispensable. The universe was not a lot of separate things, set in an intellectual substratum, like stars in the heavens. No; the intelligible was required both for the stars and for the space in which they float. Be this theory as it may, it was extended by Hegel to the object; hence, in *rerum natura*, the intelligible element has more reality than its content, so far as that content is sensible. But as logic is the explicit statement of the intelligible, it follows that the logical form has more *Wahrheit* than its sensible padding. As to negation, which is the point of the process, Mr. Hodgson makes it arise from our fixing our attention on some one in a train of differentials (p. 376). But surely things are different because they are already differenced, and the logical description of differentiation is Otherness, or Negation. And as before, the Negation of Logic is more real than the same material of sensation.

162 a.

I. e. δεῖ αὐτὸ τὸ μὴ-᾽Ον ἔχειν τὸ εἶναι-μὴ-ὄν δεσμὸν τοῦ μὴ-εἶναι (εἰ μέλλει μὴ-εἶναι), ὁμοίως ὥσπερ δεῖ τὸ ᾽Ον ἔχειν τὸ μὴ εἶναι τὸ-μὴ-᾽Ον δεσμὸν τοῦ εἶναι, ἵνα τελέως αὖ εἶναι ᾗ.

I. e. Τὸ μὴ-᾽Ον requires as a security for its existence as μὴ-ὄν, that the proposition should be affirmative; *i. e.*

Τὸ μὴ-᾽Ον is μὴ-ὄν ;

and Τὸ ᾽Ον requires in the same way that the proposition should be negative; *i. e.*

Τὸ ᾽Ον is not μὴ-ὄν.

Here Plato apparently regards affirmation and negation as an affection of the copula. The reasoning assumes that *contrariorum eadem scientia*. This is true of reflex, but not of direct consciousness. Of course all Philosophy is reflex.

162 a.

μετέχοντα τὸ μὲν ὄν οὐσίας (μὲν) τοῦ εἶναι-ὄν, μὴ οὐσίας δὲ τοῦ εἶναι-μὴ-ὄν. μὲν is understood after the first οὐσίας by a common ellipse: cf. τὸ δὲ μὴ-ὄν, μὴ οὐσίας μὲν τοῦ εἶναι μὴ-ὄν, οὐσίας δὲ τοῦ εἶναι μὴ-ὄν. For sense see preceding note, *ib. b.*

162 a.

I. e. εἰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ-ὄν μὴ ἔσται μὴ-ὄν (ἀλλὰ ἀνήσει τι τοῦ εἶναι τὸ μὴ-ὄν πρὸς τὸ μὴ εἶναι τὸ-μὴ-ὄν), εὐθὺς τὸ μὴ ὄν ἔσται ὄν.

ἀλλὰ introduces the same proposition in another form, thus:—

εἰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ-ὄν μὴ ἔσται μὴ-ὄν = the non-existent is non-existent: an affirmative proposition: ἀλλὰ introduces it in another form: if the non-existent gives up its being non-existent, and becomes not being the non-existent, the negatives are cancelled, and the non-existent exists.

It may be rendered, “if it does allow the affirmative essence of the Copula—the *is*—to merge in the negative essence of the

Predicate—the *is not*—the Copula becomes *is not*, and thereby cancels the *is-not* of the Predicate.”

ἀνήσει is metaphorically the correlative of *δεσμός*, *infra*, *unless it hold fast by and not let its is slip into is-not*.

163 b–164 b.

In this proposition, *τὸ ἐν* is totally deprived of *ἔστι*, and the emphasis is on *οὐσίας ἀπουσία*.

164 a–b.

This conclusion is apparently the same as that of the First Hypothesis. In reality nothing can be more diverse. In the former case, The One possesses actually no predicate in particular, although, as the second proposition shows, it is capable of combining with all predicates whatsoever. In the latter case, The One has actually no predicate at all, because it is incapable of having any.

. 164 b–165 e.

In this proposition *οὐσία* is taken away from the *τὸ ἐν*, and the effect on *τᾶλλα* is considered. The result is *φαίνεσθαι*, *i.e.* a presented unity in things, somewhat like the Cause and Substance of Hume, mere fictions. This is the view set forth by Brown, Lect. V. The emphasis is on *φαίνεται*.

164 b.

This proposition represents the views held by the majority of British philosophers and scientific men of the present day. Unity exists only in the mind; the object, according to circumstances, is only a *major* or a *minus* in Quantity, Quality, or Degree.

165 e, to end.

δόξα.

In this proposition, οὐσία is totally denied of τὸ εἶναι : what amount of οὐσία, then, can τᾶλλα retain? None whatever; not even the impression—δόξα—can be produced by Τᾶλλα. That is to say, in The non-existence of The One, Τᾶλλα cannot produce in us the idea of quasi-unity allowed in the last hypothesis. Real unity being no more, artificial unity is gone too. Hume's quasi-idea is impossible.

166 a.

MSS. ὑπό, rightly. The meaning is, the δόξα τὸ μὴ εἶναι is never produced by τᾶλλα. ὑπό is applied to the action of a notion, διὰ τὸ πεπονθέναι τὸ ὑπ' ἐκείνου, sc., ἐνὸς—πάθος. *Soph.* 245 d, e. δοξάζω is used passively in this dialogue.

166 c.

ἀληθέστατα.

This is the solemn conclusion, the amen of the exposition. Nothing can be in worse taste than to censure the dialogue as ἄπρους. An ethical discourse, which deals with our emotions, may conclude with an allegory; but a discussion like the *Parmenides*, conducted with mathematical formality and colourlessness, would show against the gorgeousness of a Platonic myth, somewhat like the Parthenon in a transformation scene.

APPENDICES.



APPENDIX A.

THE fragments of Zeno, which illustrate the notion *Tà πολλά* and its results, are as follows:—

1. εἰ πολλά ἔστιν, ἀνάγκη τοσαῦτα εἶναι ὅσα ἔστι, καὶ οὔτε πλείονα αὐτῶν οὔτε ἐλάττονα. Εἰ δὲ τοσαῦτα ἔστιν ὅσα ἔστι, πεπερασμένα ἂν εἴη. Which conclusion conflicts with *Tò ἓν*.

2. εἰ πολλά ἔστιν, ἄπειρα τὰ ὄντα ἐστίν· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἕτερα μεταξὺ τῶν ὄντων ἐστί, καὶ πάλιν ἐκείνων ἕτερα μεταξύ. Καὶ οὕτως ἄπειρα τὰ ὄντα ἐστί. Which conclusion conflicts with the former, and both with *Tò ἓν*.

3. εἰ πολλά ἔστιν, ἀνάγκη αὐτὰ μικρά τε εἶναι καὶ μεγάλα· μικρὰ μὲν, ὥστε μὴ ἔχειν μέγεθος, μεγάλα δὲ ὥστε ἄπειρα εἶναι. Zeno here points out the true objection to the atom and space as metaphysical ultima: the atom is all quality, and space is all quantity.

Zeno's arguments against motion bring the fact, when analysed, into collision with *Tò ἓν*. Thus motion takes place from point to point, therefore within determinate limits: therefore, to make motion rational, intelligible things must be πεπερασμένα: *q.a.e.* Again, the space between the points is ἄπειρον: *q.a.e.*

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The Flying Arrow is made comprehensible by Mr. Proctor's *Photographs of a Galloping Horse*.* At a given moment, the horse is point-blank to the plate. Professor Monck's objection, that the body might move during the breaks,† would have served Zeno, for it would bring out his point that rest is motion and motion rest.

Plato makes much use of Zeno; for Τὸ ὅλον, being ἐν ἑτέρῳ, is on the way to motion.

* *Gentleman's Magazine*, December, 1881.

† Monck's *Hamilton*, p. 98.

APPENDIX B.

ὁ τρίτος ἄνθρωπος.

PLATO'S method of specification is given most fully in the *Philebus*, 14 c-18 d. It has nothing to do with referring, say, an individual man to the class Man, a process which is justly caricatured in ὁ τρίτος ἄνθρωπος. If the man is in the class, why do you take him out of it? If he is not in it, how do you get him into it? By a medium, which must be related, and both; therefore ὁ τρίτος ἄνθρωπος is irrepressible.

The Platonic process states that there is a unity which can be discerned; that such unity is one pole, while the other is lost in indefiniteness, τὸ ἄπειρον; that the investigator must discover and count the varieties which lie between the two limits, and in that way approach real unity; and when such unity is discovered, we may then disregard the endless variety of intermediate details. It is, therefore, a process of positive research, and not a barren negative. The thing is to be found, if we search, εὐρήσειν γὰρ ἐνοῦσαν. The basis of the process is Τὸ ἔν, just as the basis of Aristotle's view is the existence of γένη in nature. Mill, similarly, has to build his logic on causation, as he understands it; but, to the consistent empirical, there can be no basis of logic except τὸ

συμβεβηκός. "All things," says Hegel, "are a judgment: that is to say, they are individuals, which are a universality or inner nature in themselves. They are a universal, which is individuality. Their universality and individuality are distinguished, but the one is at the same time identical with the other."* Plato's process, as well as Hegel's, is safe against ὁ τρίτος ἄνθρωπος, which no empirical logic is.

* Wallace's *Hegel*, p. 258.

FINIS.